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A bstract
This thesis is comprised of three empirical studies on CEO pay and CEO turnover in the USA. It 
specifically examines the effects of the market for corporate control and governance on CEO turnover 
and CEO pay, and the effect of risk of dismissal on CEO pay.
Using data on CEO pay, CEO turnover and acquisitions in the US, we analyze the risk of CEO 
turnover in the period 1992-2010 and the effect of market for corporate control on turnover probability. 
31% of the CEOs in the sample are replaced in this period, either for performance related reasons or 
following takeovers. Post Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002, the performance sensitivity of turnover is stronger 
and CEOs face a higher dismissal risk, which indicates partial success of governance regulations in 
mitigating agency problems. Small and more independent boards are associated with higher likelihood 
of CEO exit. Takeovers act as external force of discipline and increase the probability of turnover for poor 
performing CEOs by 129%. These results contribute to the debate on the role of governance regulations 
in enforcing optimal contracting.
Next, we examine the impact of acquisitions on the pay of acquiring CEOs to explore whether 
acquisitions exacerbate the divergence of interest between shareholders and CEOs. To examine system­
atic agency problems, we further examine if CEOs are rewarded differentially for shareholder wealth- 
generating (good) and shareholder wealth-destroying (bad) acquisitions. Controlling for firm size, our 
estimates suggest that CEOs are paid a 3.5-4% premium in post-acquisition pay, which increases the 
pay of the median CEO of an acquiring firm in the sample by US$ 173,000. Consistent with the earlier 
studies by Bliss and Rosen (2001), we find no evidence that post-acquisition premium in CEO pay is 
conditional upon the ex-post wealth-effect of the acquisition, thereby suggesting possible decoupling of 
pay and performance following acquisition. Further, our results that acquisition premium in CEO pay 
can be partially attributed to weak corporate governance is in agreement with managerial power and 
rent-seeking hypotheses.
Controlling for post-acquisition survivor bias, we observe a smaller acquisition premium in CEO pay 
which may suggest that stronger governance exposes CEOs undertaking bad acquisitions to higher risk 
of turnover.
Average CEO Pay has grown significantly in the last two decades but so has the risk of forced 
turnover. Most explanations for increased CEO compensation focus on market power - the increased 
competition in the external CEO market, or entrenchment -  rent extraction by CEOs from captured 
boards. We attempt to provide an alternate explanation for the recent growth in CEO pay.
We estimate the compensating differentials in CEO pay for increasing risk of dismissal. Our estimates 
suggest that CEOs are paid 2-4% premium in pay for a percentage point increase in the risk of dismissal, 
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the post- Sarbanes Oxley sub-period (2003-2010). The increasing use of risk-free cash payments to 
compensate for higher turnover risk may lower the performance sensitivity in CEO pay. We highlight 
this as a possible inadvertent effect of governance regulations.
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Chief Executive Officers arguably have the greatest impact on a firm’s fortunes. How 
the labour market for Chief Executive Officers (henceforth CEOs) operates is central 
to the understanding of separation of ownership and control of firms. The level and 
structure of CEO pay has an impact on CEO behaviour and risk taking, and long term  
profitability of the firm. Therefore, studies on CEO labour market have gained increased 
prominence in personnel economics and corporate finance. The literature on the CEO 
labour market has traditionally focused on the determinants and structure of CEO pay 
(Murphy, 1999; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In these models CEO 
pay is determined by firm level factors viz. firm profits, firm size or CEO level factors 
viz. managerial power and entrenchment. Only recently a growing body of literature 
focuses on the effect of the external environment on CEO pay (Mikkelson and Partch, 
1997; Guest, 2009). The empirical evidence on the determinants of CEO pay and their 
relative importance is inconclusive across da ta  periods and countries.
Another body of literature analyzes CEO dismissal and replacement decisions of firms. 
The central hypothesis in a vast m ajority of these studies is tha t in an efficient market
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paradigm, non-performing CEOs are replaced by the shareholders or by the market for 
corporate control (Zajac, 1990; Gregory-Smith, Thompson and Wright, 2009). There are 
reasons to believe th a t the dynamics of CEO turnover changes with the macroeconomic 
environment and changes in governance regulations significantly impact upon CEO re­
placement decisions (Kaplan and Minton, 2012). At the same time, the dynamics of 
CEO replacement may impact on the structure and level of CEO pay (Peters and Wag­
ner, 2012).
This thesis contributes to the literature on CEO pay and CEO replacement decisions 
in the following ways: We use a wide range of governance controls to analyze the effect of 
corporate governance on the dynamics of CEO labour market. Results of the m ajority of 
previous research are based on data  prior to 2002. Our results partially reflect the effects 
of governance regulations and stock market reforms in the US post-2001 and contributes 
to the debate on the effectiveness of the regulations. Controlling for the probability 
of post-acquisition CEO turnover, we find a smaller acquisition premium in CEO pay. 
This adds to the debate on the misaligned incentives of CEOs to undertake acquisitions. 
Finally, our results suggest tha t the growth in CEO pay in the last two decades may be 
partially attributed to the compensating differential paid to CEO for the growing risk of 
dismissal from the job.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theories 
of CEO pay and CEO replacement. Chapter 3 discusses the main data  sources used in 
our analyses. Chapter 4, the first empirical chapter, examines the effect of governance 
and the market for corporate control on CEO replacement. Chapter 5 investigates the 
impact of acquisitions on the pay of the acquiring CEO and examines whether the CEOs 
have an misaligned incentive in undertaking acquisitions. Chapter 6 analyzes the effect of 
the risk of dismissal from job on CEO pay and estimates the compensating differential in 
CEO pay. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the empirical results and concludes.
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Chapter 2
Theory and Literature R eview
Chief Executive Officers inspire extreme sentiments. They change the future of individ­
uals, organizations and, sometimes, the course of business history (Lorange, 1980). It is 
interesting to know how a business professional is chosen for the top job, how she is com­
pensated for the great risks and responsibilities th a t she assumes and other aspects of the 
CEO labour market, which is different from the labour market for other classes of labour 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1987). From Figure.2.1 we observe th a t in the fifteen year period be­
tween 1990 and 2005 corporate profit and average worker’s pay in the USA has increased 
by 106.7% and 4%, respectively, but the growth in CEO pay (cash compensations plus 
stock options) has been 298.2%.
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Figure 2-1: The Growth in CEO Pay: 1990-2005
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Note: Data adapted from The Consumerist, April 9, 2007 for S&P 500
Thus we see from Figure 2.1 tha t there has been a disproportionate increase in CEO 
pay in the last four decades.
Economists have been interested in understanding the governing principles of CEO 
pay and the dynamics of executive labour market for over five decades now (Roberts, 
1956). Consequently, a rich body of literature has been generated with varying focus on 
CEO pay, CEO turnover, agency problems and executive labour market mobility. Over 
this period, the nature and complexity of executive labour markets has changed sub­
stantially and so have research interests. However, there has always been a division of 
opinion regarding the determinants of CEO pay and their relative importance. The de­
cisive explanation still remains elusive. In the early decades of research on the executive
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labour market, the division was based on the usage of firm size or profitability measures 
as determinants of CEO pay. In reality, the nature of CEO pay is more complex and 
cannot be explained by any one variable. Contemporary approaches therefore aim at un­
derstanding the series of intercorrelated variables th a t would help explain the underlying 
forces driving level and growth of CEO pay.
In this chapter we review the existing literature on CEO pay and CEO labour market. 
We review the theoretical frameworks of executive labour market and CEO pay and 
review the literature on determinants of executive compensation, in particular the effect 
of firm performance on CEO pay. Further, we review existing literature on CEO turnover 
and replacement. Finally, we discuss the effects of change in corporate control (Takeovers 
and Acquisitions) on executive labour market.
2.1 T h eoretica l Fram eworks o f  th e  E xecu tive  Labour M arket 
and CEO pay
The dynamics of the executive labour market and the setting of executive pay have 
attracted  the interests of managers, compensation executives, organization theorists, ac­
countants and economists (Cisel and Carroll, 1980, Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz, 1983). One of the key motivators of academic interest in this is th a t while in 
the 1980s public company CEOs in the US earned 42 times the wage of factory workers 
on average, by 2010 the median CEO was earning 343 times the wage of an average fac­
tory worker (Businessweek, 2010). Various theories are expounded to explain why CEOs 
receive so much in compensation and how the compensation contracts are formulated. 
Chief among these are the Tournament Model, Principal-Agent theory, and the Manager­
ial Power theory. These theories are interdependent and the testable hypotheses are often
5
inseparable. The level and growth of CEO pay is co-determined by the variables th a t are 
central to these three theories and are econometrically estim ated within a general wage 
equation.
2.1.1 Tournament Theory
Tournament theory, formalised by Lazear and Rosen (1981), offers a model for promotions 
in an organization. In this model, a group of contestants compete for a set ‘prize’ (in 
an organization context promotion to the next higher level) and the winner is decided 
based on the relative performance of the players (Green and Stockey, 1983; Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Bloom, 1999). The promotion is associated with higher salary and in turn  
higher lifetime earnings. The prize comes not only in the form of promotion to the next 
higher level, but also as the option of participating in further tournam ents and to move 
to higher levels. This option-value of larger prizes provides incentives for participants to 
exert effort. There is no option value of promotion for a CEO. The lack of option value of 
further promotion is therefore compensated by a higher wage-premium for promotions to 
CEO level (Rosen, 1986). In essence, the tournam ent model predicts th a t compensation 
is a convex function of organizational levels (Lambert et al, 1993; Main et al, 1993). Thus 
to induce greater investment from individual players (C(//)) and and higher productivity, 
a firm will increase the spread of the prize between levels (W2- W 1).
If the behaviour of all the contestants are identical, a contestants expected utility is: 
(PHRd-Chx)] + (1 -  P)[W2-C{fi)] =  P W  1-h(l -  P ) W 2-C{/X) (2.1)
where P  is the probability of winning the tournam ent. In essence, tournam ent theory 
implies th a t CEO pay is a function of firm size because a larger firm will need a bigger
6
spread of prizes. Therefore,
W =  /(A) (2.2)
where A is the size of the firm.
This predictions of the tournam ent model was tested on a sample of 1115 executive 
and non-executive managers at 100 UK companies by Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2001). 
Using multivariate regression analysis, they observed th a t a promotion from a divisional 
CEO to a group CEO entails a 62% increase in median to tal compensation (i.e. from 
£448, 601 to £724,496) while a promotion from an Executive Director to a Divisional 
CEO brings about an increase of 27% in median to tal compensation (from £352,882 
to £448,601). This study is one of the first to use the Black-Scholes valuation formula 
to arrive at a more comprehensive measure of compensation by taking into account the 
present values of stock option grants. However, the results are based on longitudinal da ta  
for the short period of 1997-98 and therefore do not capture the time-varying nature of 
such tournaments.
The tournam ent model of promotion also predicts th a t with an increasing number of 
contestants, the prize (i.e. the spread of income between the two levels for which the 
tournam ent is being contested) increases (Lambert, 1993; O ’Reilly et al, 1988). Empirical 
evidence on this proposition has been varied. Main et al. (1993) and O ’Reilly et al. (1988) 
used US data  and Danish data, respectively, and find similar results. Conyon, Peck 
and Sadler (2001) found partial consistency of their results with the proposition. They 
observed an approximate increase of 3.5 percent in the difference of average (median) pay 
between the CEO and the rest of the management team, for each additional executive in 
the number of contestants.
W hether the observed wage dispersion between the CEO pay and the next organization
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level has any effect on firm performance has been debated in academic research for many 
years. Main et al. (1993) reported a positive association between the coefficient of 
variation of wages with firm performance in USA whereas Eriksson (1999) observed the 
same relationship using a sample of Danish firms. Testing this hypothesis on a sample 
of UK firms, Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2001) observed no significant positive effect of 
wage dispersion on firm performance. However, the study by Conyon et al. (2001) did 
not include measures of executive interdependence like the earlier studies.
Thus, the tournam ent model provides a framework to explain why CEO salaries are 
higher and the dynamics of promotion to the CEO level. However, the empirical evidence 
for the theory remains mixed. Effects of different governance structures on the outcome 
of tournam ent remains empirically untested to a great extent.
2.1.2 The Principal-Agent Theory
In traditional market-based economic models the owner of the business bears the risk 
and reaps the rewards of success (Marris, 1964). In large publicly owned firms, the 
shareholders are the owners of a firm and they bear the ultim ate risk. However, the dis­
persed nature of shareholding calls for management to make decisions and run the firm 
on behalf of the owners. This is the Principal-Agent approach to understanding CEO 
compensation and employment whereby the M anager/CEO (the agent) has the fiduciary 
responsibility to act on behalf of the shareholders (the principal). This framework ex­
plains how a risk-averse agent (i.e. a CEO) chooses to maximize his utility, U(w,9),  where 
‘tT is the wage he receives and ‘0’ is any unobserved action th a t leads to x(8) stochastic 
output (Mirrless, 1976).
In a principal-agent framework, the shareholders’ expected payoff can be expressed
as:
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^Shareholders_  ^  _  w (n(e, 0))] =  J  [n(e, 9) -  w(U(e, 9))}f(U; e)dU (2.3)
and risk averse managers expected payoff can be expressed as:
^ M a n a g e r  =  0)), e)] =  J  u(w(U(e, 9 ) ) f (U ; e)<ffl -  $(e) (2.4)
where e is the effort exerted by the agent, 6 is uncertainty affecting firm’s profits and 
is independent of managerial effort, n(e, 9) is random  firm profit and in an agency theory 
framework n '>  0. Further, to(II) is the agent’s wage function, $(e) is the agent’s disutility 
of effort and /(II; e) is the density function of the stochastic firm profit II. given the effort 
level, e.
The utility function of the agent can be expressed as:
U(w.e) =  u[w(U(e,9))\ — $(e)  (2-5)
We assume u ’> 0 and U" < 0. This implies th a t the agent is risk averse and the utility 
function is separable in income and effort.
The shareholders, therefore need to design a wage contract w*(.) and pick a effort level 
e* th a t maximizes their expected payoff:
{«;*(.), e*} =  argmax7TS/iare/loiders=  argmax J  [n(e, 9) -  w(U(e, 9))]f[U] e)dR (2.6)
subject to the following constraints:
argmaxnMana9ev — arg max J  u(w(II(e, 0)))/(II; e)dH -  $(e) >  U0 (2.7)
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and
J u (w (U ( e \ d ) ) ) f {U ;e * )d U - ^ (e * )  >  J  u(w(U(e, 6)))f(U]  e)dll -  $ (e), Vee[emin, emax] (2.8)
The first constraint is the Individual Participation constraint. Given the wage contract 
w*(.) a rational agent will require th a t the utility maximizing effort level is at least equal 
to the reservation utility, U0. The second constraint is th a t of Incentive Compatibility 
whereby given the wage contract, the unobservable effort level chosen by the shareholders 
(e*) must lie within the band of utility maximizing efforts of the agent (Vee[emin. emax]). This 
is necessary to induce appropriate level of effort from the agent, thereby minimizing risk 
of moral hazard.
In large publicly held organizations, there may not be a single equity holder with a 
substantial stock holding. Under such situations, where external constraints are not rigid, 
the CEO may have discretion to pursue their own interest, even if it is at the cost of the 
shareholders (Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964). These actions can range from resorting 
to empire building in an effort to increase his/her own salary (Jensen, 1974, Williamson, 
1964), failure to distribute wealth when the firm does not have suitable investment op­
portunities (Jensen, 1986) to the manipulation of power to entrench themselves in the 
organization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). This problem of the agents not acting in the in­
terests of the principal but in their own interests is called the “Agency Problem” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The cost to the shareholders of the agency problem is the sum 
of the loss in wealth when the CEO acts in her own interest and the costs of moni­
toring CEO actions and performance. These costs are called agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The implicit agency cost can be greater than  observed agency costs if 
we account for the distortion of managerial incentives which may affect long term  firm
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performance. Thus, it becomes imperative to align the shareholders’ interest and the 
CEOs interests so as to minimize the agency costs. Financial economists prescribe the 
“Optimal Contracting Approach” as a partial remedy to the agency problem.
A contract, in this context, is a legal document enumerating the clauses of the agree­
ment between the principal and the agent on the issue of the rights of each party, the 
performance monitoring process and the rewards for performance (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Thus, the optimal contracting approach refers to designing an efficient compen­
sation contract th a t would provide strong incentives for the CEOs to  act in the interests 
of the shareholders and at the same time minimize compensation costs for the share­
holders (Murphy, 1999; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2001). The optimal contract would 
maximize risk neutral shareholders’ utility, lx - w ( x Y  by paying the manager a wage of 
iw * x \  According to this approach, CEOs are highly paid for their unique skills and 
experience and not because of managerial rent capture (Grossman and Hart, 1982). The 
optimal contracting model attributes the divergence from optimal contracting to polit­
ical limitations (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, empirical evidence of divergence 
from optimal contracting is too frequent to be accounted for by political lim itations only 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
Divergence from optimal contracting can also be partially explained by understanding 
the role of the Board of Directors, who act as custodians of the shareholders’ interests. A 
key assumption of optimal contracting is th a t the process is carried out through an arm ’s- 
length bargaining relationship between the boards and the executives, or the interplay 
market forces induce on such optimal contracting (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). 
This assumption of arm ’s-length bargaining is violated when the Directors themselves 
suffer from the agency problem. This argument of how Directors directly, or implicitly, 
collude with the CEO and cause divergence from optimal contracting has led to the 
development of the ’Managerial Power’ theory. Further, if the market for corporate
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control is weak, the external force on optimal contracting is inefficient (Bebchuk, Fried 
and Walker, 2002).
2.1.3 The M anagerial Power Theory
Managerial power theory stems from the deviation of executive compensation from opti­
mal contracting predictions. This is often used to explain the influence of CEOs on the 
optimal contracting process and how managerial rent capture may be possible (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2002). Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) highlight how an inefficient 
m arket for corporate control may lead to a CEO resisting hostile takeover bids th a t would 
be beneficial to shareholders’ wealth. The provision of golden parachutes further weakens 
the effect of market forces for corporate control by making CEO replacements costly and 
driving up the acquisition costs. It has been observed tha t the existence of CEO golden 
parachute lowers the likelihood of a target firm’s participation in non-auction inducing 
resistance to takeover attem pts (Buccholtz and Ribbens, 1994).
The managerial power approach argues tha t in organizations with an absence of a 
large number of outside directors, a few instititutional shareholders or the existence of 
anti-takeover protection, the CEOs can wield power in developing an inefficient contract 
and extract rent. The theory builds on the premise th a t the Directors may have strong 
incentives to act against the interests of the shareholders. It may be of greater benefit to 
the Board of Directors to favour the CEO. A study by Pearl, Meyer and Partners (2005) 
noted th a t the median annual compensation of Directors of top 200 US companies was 
$182,000, with the highest paid Director at United Health receiving about $900,000. The 
same study notes th a t the average time spent by Directors on company affairs is 275
°A golden parachute is a term used to describe the clause in a CEO’s employment contract that 
specifies the compensation he would receive in the event of a change in control and the termination of 
employment. This form of compensation is generally large and is in the form of severance pay, vesting 
of stock options, cash bonuses or any combination of these.
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hours a year. Thus the financial benefits of Directorship are obvious. This provides an 
incentive for the Directors to favour the CEO as she can implicitly or explicitly influences 
nominations of new Directors on the Board. Except for the case of hostile takeovers, 
Board elections are rarely contested (Bebchuk and Kahan, 1990). Hence, getting the 
nomination almost ensures a substantial financial gain and social prestige. In their self- 
interest, Directors may have an incentive to fail to develop an optimal contract. Cyert, 
Kang and Kumar (2002) provide further empirical support by noting th a t when a CEO 
is the Chairman of the Board, her compensation is higher by 20-40 percent. They also 
observed a negative association of CEO ownership with the equity holdings of the largest 
shareholders. Bertrand and M ullainathan (2001) finds weak pay-performance sensitivity 
but one th a t does not filter out common shocks. In other words, CEOs may be paid 
for “luck” . Further, they find th a t in firms lacking larger shareholders or blockholders, 
the pay-performance sensitivity in CEO pay is even weaker. A higher concentration in 
shareholding pattern  is also associated with lesser number of option grants.
W hat then prevents the CEOs from capturing all of the economic rents? Managerial 
power theory argues th a t it is the outrage cost tha t prevents the CEO from capturing all 
the rent. If the Director’s bias becomes too obvious, the financial press and institutional 
share holders would take notice and may initiate a change. This fear of outrage acts as 
a buffer against blatant managerial rent capture but leads to camouflage of CEO pay in 
various other forms. Empirical evidence confirms tha t CEO pay levels and pay increases 
are tempered by public views (Johnson, Porter and Shackell, 1997). Hence managers 
may resort to obscuring their rent-extraction.
In summary, these theories suggest th a t a CEOs wage function is co-determined by 
the size of the firm (A), stochastic firm performance (IL{9)) and managerial entrenchment. 
We discuss the theoretical frameworks th a t underpins our empirical analysis and the 
econometric methods to test the hypotheses in the individual empirical chapters (Sections
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4.2, 5.2 and 6.2)
2.2 E xecu tive  C om p en sation  and F irm  P erform ance
In the agency-theoretic framework th a t forms the basis of executive compensation re­
search, academics have been interested to analyze the performance param eters th a t can 
be used to align the interests of the principal and the agent efficiently. Further research 
has focused on estimating the strength of the pay-performance sensitivity in executive 
compensation design.
At one end of the spectrum  are the managerialists, who support the corporate growth 
hypothesis and provide evidence th a t the size of the firm (measured by sales or assets) is 
the major determinant of CEO pay. The rationale for this argument is th a t as the size of 
the firm increases, a higher level of CEO pay is required to m aintain the pay differential 
between hierarchical levels. This high pay differential would act as an incentive for a 
large number of people to  select into the tournam ent for the CEO position and hence 
drive up productivity (Simon, 1957). It has also been argued, th a t with the increase in 
firm size, the CEOs face higher job complexity and higher risk, and hence must be paid 
to compensate for this increased risk (Ungson and Steers, 1984).
Taking a different approach are those who link corporate profitability (measured by 
net profit or the return on assets) with CEO pay (Ciscel and Carroll, 1979). The ar­
gument in favour of this is th a t if optimal contracting holds, then the performance of 
the agent will be reflected in the firm performance which is aligned to  the interest of 
the shareholders. This school of thought calls for a strong pay-performance relationship 
in CEO compensation. However, there has been a debate about the measure of firm 
performance th a t best reflects the performance of the agent (Garen, 1994; Agarwal and 
Samwick, 1999; Core et al, 2002).
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No conclusive evidence has been established about the applicability of these two 
schools of thoughts in determining managerial contracts. The first generation of stud­
ies on this debate seems to validate the argument th a t firm size has a greater impact 
on CEO pay than firm performance (Roberts, 1956). Later work has reported mixed 
results. Whereas some studies have noted a strong effect of firm performance in terms 
of accounting measures (Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; Kokkelenberg, 1988), another 
group of researchers have found evidence of both firm performance and firm size in hav­
ing an impact on CEO pay (Meeks and W hittington, 1975; Leonard, 1990). These studies 
included the top five executives in a firm, and used a range of measures for executive 
compensation. The early studies on firm size-executive pay relationship were criticized 
by Murphy (1985) and Hall and Liebmann (1998) for omitting stock options, deferred 
compensation and stock awards, which are deemed to be more performance-sensitive 
components of pay than  salary and bonuses. In his seminal work, M urphy (1985) used 
US panel da ta  to test the relationship between executive pay and returns to shareholders, 
measured by stock appreciation and dividends. Using fixed effects and first difference re­
gression models, he reported a significant positive association between executive pay and 
stock price performance. In further research to estimate the elasticity of this association 
in a sample of 2000 CEOs spanning five decades, he noted th a t the pay performance 
sensitivity is low as reflected by the semi-elasticity value of 0.12-0.16. Hence his work 
highlighted the limited effectiveness of optimal contracting.
Research from a managerial power theory standpoint argues th a t even though a range 
of papers estimate the semi-elasticity of the pay-performance relationship with varying 
degrees of consistency, they stop short of exploring the full spread of contingencies th a t 
are involved in pay-performance dynamics (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989). For example, it 
highlights the fact th a t the pay performance relationship is not a constant and varies with, 
among other parameters, CEO tenure. Murphy (1986), using a human capital model
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perspective, finds tha t the CEO pay-performance relationship has a decreasing sensitivity 
because with increases in tenure, the information asymmetry between the shareholders 
and the CEO decreases and the base pay starts to reflect managerial productivity with 
increased precision. Using CEO tenure as a proxy for CEO influence over the Board, Hill 
and Phan (1991) report that the CEO pay-performance relationship decreases over time. 
The reason for this decline is th a t with an increase in tenure the CEO may entrench 
himself more in the firm, making dismissal more challenging. Also, with an increase in 
tenure, the CEO begins to nominate new Board members and may choose not to re­
nominate difficult ones, thereby increasing her influence over the Board (Finklestein and 
Hambrick, 1989).
Studies on the effect of firm performance on CEO wealth produces ambiguous results. 
Kallen (1991), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) argue th a t CEO wealth is unaffected by 
firm performance even when the firm files for bankruptcy because of their ability to 
control corporate assets. In widely cited research, Smith and W atts (1992) build on their 
earlier work and notes th a t there is a substantial reduction in CEO salaries and bonuses 
in financially distressed1 firms. They attribute the difference in inference to the fact 
th a t during financial distress about 33% of the sample firms replace their CEOs which is 
consistent with evidence provided by Gilson (1989, 1990). The successors are nominated 
from inside the firm or hired externally. They note tha t the outgoing CEO is replaced 
from within in almost 40% of the cases and th a t is associated with a 35% drop in median 
CEO compensation whereas the external hire of CEOs is associated with a 36% increase 
in CEO compensation even in times of financial distress. This difference in CEO salary 
depending on the mode of CEO succession is explained by arguing th a t since insiders are 
held responsible for financial distress, an internal promotion is likely to be associated with
'A  firm is said to be in financial distress if it cannot m eet or lias difficulty paying off its financial obligations to its 
creditors. Financial distress is characterized by high fixed costs, illiquid assets, or exposure to industry risk.
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decreased CEO pay as a measure of risk-sharing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) whereas an 
external candidate would be hired for her specific skills of bailing a firm out of financial 
crisis (Dumaine, 1990).
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) establish th a t the pay performance sensitivity of CEOs 
will be decreasing in the riskiness of the firm’s performance i.e. they observed th a t CEOs 
in firms with high performance variances have a pay-performance sensitivity th a t is lower 
than  CEOs in firm’s with low variances. The pay-performance sensitivity mean of US$ 
14.52 and median US$ 69.41 per 1000 US$ is higher than the 1998 estimates of Hall 
and Liebman (mean=US$ 5.29, median=US$ 25.11). Om itting the variances of stock 
price performance from the model is shown to create a substantial downward bias in 
pay-performance sensitivity.
The study is based on compensation survey reports to which firms voluntarily partici­
pate generating selection-bias in sample and skewed industry and size distribution. Also, 
the data  is an unbalanced panel as some firms have not participated in the surveys on a 
year-on-year basis.
Most studies of the pay-performance relationship have tried to explore this correlation 
but only a few have tried to establish causation. Most of these causal studies have been 
inconclusive. Leonard (1990) could not establish a clear relationship between various 
components of CEO pay with return on equity. Using a sample of US CEOs, he reported 
a significant association of the accounting measures of firm performance and CEO pay 
but statistically insignificant relationship of stock performance and CEO pay. The causal 
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation has been inconclusive.
Numerous studies have been carried out to understand the benefits accrued to  the 
firm by stock options as a form of CEO payment. The efficiency of options as a tool of 
incentive alignment has found mixed empirical support. It has been argued th a t firms 
facing financial constraints would try  to conserve cash by resorting to option grants (Core
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et al, 2002). Empirical studies on new firms have noted th a t companies with greater cash 
flow use option grants more extensively (Ittner, Lam bert and Larcker, 2003).
Their effectiveness as a retention tool is also found to be limited, contingent upon 
the external environment. In a bullish market when stock prices are above exercise 
values, the retention tool is efficient but in a bear market, when the stock options are 
“underwater” , the incentives can become counter-productive as executives may seek to 
move to  organizations offering fresh contracts.
Research on the effectiveness of option grants report the calculated ‘certainty equiva­
lents’ and note th a t the perceived cost of option grants are lower than  the actual economic 
costs of such option-grants (Lambert, Larcker and Verecchia, 1991). They proposed a 
framework to evaluate the compensation contract from a CEOs perspective, which does 
not follow from the market based valuation formulae like the Black-Scholes model (1973). 
A greater benefit of option grants may be obtained when option exercise prices are in­
dexed to the market. Indexing creates less noisy performance measure which is protected 
from market shocks. In practice, indexing to the market is not widespread. This may 
be attribu ted  to accounting requirements to report indexed income which deflates cor­
porate earnings figures and even though it reduces company’s cost of granting options, 
it reduces the value of the compensation package to the CEO. Hall and Murphy (2003) 
conclude th a t the maximization of incentives (per $ of compensation) occur when options 
are granted below the market price of the grant date.
Even though there has been sustained interest in the pay-performance relationship 
in executive compensation contracts, there has been little research to understand if the 
pay-performance sensitivity actually yields the intended results of m itigating the agency 
problem by enhancing company performance.
In summary, a general model of CEO wage function can be expressed as:
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Payit=  a + P1Firm P erf ormance +  (32Firm  Size + p^CEOTenure + P^Xu (2-9)
where X it represents other CEO level and firm level observables.
2.3  CEO Turnover
To mitigate the agency problem, shareholders entrust the board of directors with the 
responsibility of designing optimal contracts for CEOs. In addition, it becomes imperative 
for shareholders to monitor the performance of the CEOs so th a t the actions taken 
by the CEOs are in their interest. Hence, the size and composition of the board of 
directors, compensation of directors and equity ownership structure become im portant 
determinants of CEO performance and firm profitability. These param eters have been 
dynamic and evolved with time and so have the monitoring mechanisms (Weisbach, 
1988; Karpoff, M alatesta and Walkling, 1996; Yermack, 1997; Mikkelson and Partch, 
1997). Understanding how corporate governance structure and changes in th a t affect 
CEO monitoring, leading to CEO dismissal, will be facilitated by analyzing the changes 
in corporate governance regimes.
Studies th a t seek to understand the effects of composition of the board argue th a t 
since directors from within the organization may be influenced by the CEO and have their 
stakes linked with the CEOs, outside Directors are more efficient in enforcing monitoring 
mechanisms as they are less susceptible to the influence of managerial power (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). Weisbach found evidence tha t outside directors are more 
likely to replace a poorly performing CEO than  inside directors. In keeping with this 
argument, there has been an increasing trend in the proportion of outsiders on the board 
of directors since the 1970s. In 1972, 71 percent of manufacturing firms in the USA had a 
m ajority of outside directors on the board, however, by 1986, 86 percent of manufacturing
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firms adopted this strategy (Bacon, 1990). This thrust for greater board independence 
was also enforced by institutional investors through shareholder proxy proposals (Gillan 
and Starks, 2000). However, it may be counterproductive to have a board composed 
entirely of outside directors even if it may seem a more unbiased way to monitor CEO 
performance. This is because many prospective CEOs are promoted from among the 
inside directors and having insiders on the Board exposes them  to the requirements 
of the job and also a chance for outside directors to evaluate the prospective CEOs 
(Weisbach, 1988). The effect of the change in composition of board of directors on firm 
performance is not conclusive. McAvoy et al (1983) observes tha t there is no difference 
in performance of firms which has m ajority of outside directors when compared to those 
who do not. This result may suffer from the simultaneity problem where many competing 
and inseparable factors lead to a result whose results may be confounding (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1987).
At the same time there has been an effort to optimize the size of the board of directors. 
Academic research suggests th a t a streamlined board would enhance efficiency of the 
board and ensure better monitoring. In the period between 1972 and 1989, the median 
size of the board of directors in large US firms reduced from 14 to 12 (Bacon, 1990; 
Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1997). The median board size further reduced to 9.31 in the 
period 2003-2010 (Execucomp).
The changes in corporate governance frameworks have been towards a more sophisti­
cated mechanism of monitoring CEO performance tha t would ensure th a t non-performing 
CEOs are replaced by potentially better candidates. Some economists, however, are of 
the opinion tha t the compensation contracts and product and capital market forces, pro­
vide enough incentives to minimize agency problems and the monitoring by directors 
cannot provide significant improvement over th a t (Hart, 1983). Thus CEO turnover is 
expected to be dependent on the corporate governance measures. The rationale is th a t
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the threat of dismissal acts as an incentive for the CEOs as they are generally paid a 
compensation which is greater than their opportunity cost in the external market. Hence, 
in alignment with the agency theory framework, the CEOs will be incentivized to act 
in the best interests of the owners. Empirical evidence shows a negative association 
between firm performance and probability of CEO turnover, supporting the predictions 
th a t CEOs are dismissed for poor firm performance (Couglan and Schmidt, 1985). This 
is in contrast to findings by Vancil (1987), who reports th a t CEOs are seldom fired and 
CEO turnover occurs generally as a natural succession process. An early study on the 
impact of corporate governance on CEO turnover reports th a t an outsider dominated 
board is more likely to replace a CEO on grounds of low performance than  an insider 
dominated board (Weisbach, 1988). However, simultaneous endogeneity of board forma­
tion and CEO removal remains, particularly in the light of evidence th a t in times of poor 
performance there is an increase in the number of outside directors on boards (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1987).
2.4  E ffects o f  M ergers and A cq u isition s on CEO P ay  and CEO  
Turnover
A growing body of research connects CEO turnover and the change of control of a firm, 
particularly acquisitions. The objective of such enquiries is to analyze the determinants 
of post-acquisition CEO departures. This research, carried out from a market discipline 
standpoint, argues tha t the dismissal function for under-performing CEOs are influenced 
by the strength of market for corporate control (M artin and McConnell, 1991), or from 
the view which focuses on decline of relative standing of CEO in the firm that may 
cause CEO departure (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). Buchholtz, Ribbens and Houle
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(2003) explained the patterns in post-acquisition CEO turnover using a hum an capital 
perspective. They used Cox proportional hazards model on a sample of 181 acquiring 
firms in the US for the period 1987-1990. Their results suggest th a t the probability 
of CEO departure follows a U-shaped profile with CEO age. Younger CEOs, with little 
investment in the firm are most mobile in the labour market whereas the older CEOs have 
relatively lower future returns on investments in the firm. Hence the probabilities of post­
acquisition turnover are higher for these two age groups. The findings are represented in 
Figure 2.2 by plotting CEO age with probability of CEO departure. This is consistent 
with earlier work of Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) and Sonnenfeld (1988: 14).
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Consistent with the findings of Hambrick and Cannella (1993), Buchholtz et al, noted a 
positive non-monotonic relationship of post-acquisition CEO turnover with the length of 
CEO tenure. This may be because with increasing tenure, the firm specific skills th a t the 
CEO acquired may become redundant for the acquiring firm. Also, with increase in the 
tenure, a CEO makes human capital investments (Williamson, 1985) and a psychological 
investment (Rubin and Brockner, 1975) in a firm making him more entrenched2. This 
may lead to filtering of information sources (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Thus, long 
tenured CEOs are more likely to be removed post-acquisition. The paper also notes tha t 
with the increase of ’relatedness’ between acquiring and acquired firm, the higher is the 
probability of post-acquisition CEO departure. The reason for such a relationship can 
be th a t the industry-specific human capital of the CEO is no longer scarce but is now, in
'■’Managerial entrenchm ent is the extent to which managers are able to use their discretion and capture econom ic rent 
and agency costs.
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fact, replicated. The study however does not differentiate between forced CEO turnover 
and voluntary CEO turnover post acquisition which could have given a clearer indication 
of the dynamics.
It has been observed th a t with increasing CEO tenure and higher relatedness of the 
target and acquiring firm, the likelihood of post acquisition CEO departure increases 
(Buccholtz et al, 2003). However, with increasing intensity in the takeover market, the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance has not changed substantially (Huson 
et al, 2001).
Research on CEO turnover is naturally extended to CEO replacement. The research in 
this domain focuses on the trade-off between internal promotion and external hiring and 
the choices of firms thereof. M urphy and Zabojnik (2004) uses a partial equilibrium model 
to  predict the optimal strategies of internal-external hiring of CEOs. They argue th a t 
over the years, with technological innovations, there is a growing need of general human 
capital over specific human capital. Thus, in their framework, CEO pay is determined by 
the competitive market for CEOs where firms compete for most productive CEOs and 
th a t the increasing general management skill explains the rapid growth of CEO pay in 
recent history.
The model presented in Figure 2.3, expresses firm profits as a function of firm size 
and managerial ability and compares the cases of internal promotion and external CEO 
hire. The model establishes cutoffs aL and aH  as a decision rule for internal promotion 
and external hire. W hen a is managerial ability, k is the firm size, r is the cost of capital, 
wM{a)  is the m arket wage for CEO with ability a and n is the profit, then a firm will find 
it profitable to internally promote a CEO candidate when ir(k. a. 1) > 0 th a t is to say
f {k)a  — rk >  wM(a)
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Figure 2.3 depicts the strictly convex wage function w(a)  and a linear f (k)a  -  rk  function 
which shows monotonic increase in a. If the managerial ability of an internal candidate 
is higher than aH  or lower than aL,  the firm will prefer to hire an external candidate. 
This is because of insufficient managerial ability of the internal candidate to  manage a 
firm of size k (lower than  .aL) or to compensate the high potential internal candidate for 
foregoing outside employment (higher than aH)
This model is consistent with the results of Huson, Parrino and Starks (1998) who 
document the growing trend of outside CEO hires. Other studies of CEO promotion 
explore the linkage of firm performance with means of CEO succession and bring to  the 
fore the view that higher performing firms will promote CEOs from within rather than  
hire from outside. The argument is th a t in case of an outside hire, the information 
asymmetry between the Board of Directors and the CEO is greater than  for an internal
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hire. The hypothesis is empirically tested for a sample of 92 CEOs in the US and it was 
found th a t the internal CEO hires are correlated with higher firm profitability (Zajac, 
1990). The results are consistent with the results of D atta  and Guthrie (1994) who find 
th a t firms with lower profitability are more likely to hire outside CEOs than  from inside. 
However, there has been no causal study to establish whether external CEO hire leads 
to higher firm performance.
There has been academic interest in analysing how the market for corporate control 
and product market conditions affect CEO pay. A number of papers examine the effect of 
mergers and acquisitions on CEO compensation and find th a t mergers and acquisitions 
do not add to shareholders wealth and in most cases actually destroy it (Jensen, 1986; 
Dodd, 1980; Langetieg, 1978). This makes it all the more interesting to understand 
why CEOs undertake these activities, how these activities impact upon firm performance 
and whether the CEOs are rewarded differentially for wealth-generating and wealth- 
destroying mergers and acquisitions. In one of the first generation studies in this domain, 
F irth  (1980) noted tha t CEOs benefitted from mergers and acquisitions and hence they 
undertake such activities, irrespective of its effect on firm performance and shareholders’ 
wealth. The results have been consistent in later studies th a t established a significantly 
positive relation between mergers and acquisitions and executive compensation (Kroll, 
Simmons and Wright, 1990; Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Girma, Thompson and Wright, 2006; 
Guest, 2008). Conyon and Gregg (1994) study a sample of 169 UK firms in the period 
1985 to 1990 and estimate a 6.5% pay increase for CEOs of firms th a t were involved 
in three or more acquisition activities in any three year period whereas the premium 
was 2.5% for CEOs of firm involved in at least two acquisitions. In a contrasting finding, 
Avery et al (1998) uses an executive career tracking methodology from 1986 through 1991 
and reports th a t CEOs have very little incentives to undertake acquisitions to increase 
her own pay.
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Using data  from a relatively small sample of 50 firms th a t have undergone mergers and 
acquisitions in the period 1979-1986, Kroll et al (1990) explore the relationship between 
acquisition and CEO pay, controlling for the ownership of the firm. They observed that 
there is a substantial increase of CEO pay in the year following acquisition and this 
increase is associated with industry-adjusted Return-on-Equity performance of the firm 
for owner controlled firm and unrelated to such industry standard performance measures 
for manager controlled firms. For hostile takeovers, the CEOs of the acquiring firm 
suffers a 5-6% pay decrease in the third year from the event, which can be attributed to 
divestments and spin-offs that generally follow hostile takeovers. In the year of merger, 
while CEOs completing a wealth generating merger deal enjoys a 1.9% increase in salary 
on average, ceteris paribus, a CEO completing a wealth reducing takeover is penalized 
by a 2.80% reduction in salary. The differential wealth effect of merger on CEO pay 
is insignificant in the second lag from the year of merger. However the study only uses 
cash components of CEO compensation and hence does not predict changes in to tal CEO 
compensation through impact on share prices.
In a further study of the differential impact of mergers and acquisitions on CEO pay 
with respect to ownership structure, Kroll, Wright, Toombs and Leavell (1997) noted 
th a t whereas acquisitions announced by the owner controlled firms are associated with 
positive excess returns accruing to the shareholder, acquisitions announced by a manager 
controlled firm bring about a negative return to shareholders’ wealth. Furthermore, 
post-acquisition increases in CEO pay in an owner controlled firm are associated with 
positive excess returns accrued to shareholders whereas for manager controlled firm, the 
association is with greater firm size.
Khoranna and Zenner (1998) use a pooled panel da ta  model on a sample of 46 exec­
utives of 27 acquiring firms in the US during 1982-1986 and find a positive association 
between CEO pay and the event of acquisition. They also report a large increase in
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stock and option grants in the year of acquisition. The increase in cash compensation 
and to tal compensation were estimated to be 10.5% and 4.9% respectively. Controlling 
for wealth-generating and wealth-reducing acquisitions, the study also noted th a t wealth 
generating acquisitions have a positive effect on CEO compensation whereas the effect 
of wealth reducing acquisitions is not significantly different from zero.
To understand what the determinants of the post-acquisition pay-premium are for 
CEOs, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) studied 327 large acquisitions by US firms in the 
period 1993-1999. They found th a t the CEO pay increase is positively associated with 
deal size and the time taken to complete the deal and th a t the pay increase is in the form 
of cash bonuses. Consistent with arguments of Bebchuk and Fried (2003), they observed 
th a t in firms where CEOs have more power and undertake large deals, the cash bonus 
is significantly larger. The wealth effect of the merger has an insignificant effect on the 
bonus payout.
In one of the most comprehensive studies on the impact of M&A on CEO compen­
sation, Guest (2008) uses a sample of 4528 acquisitions of 2469 publicly listed UK firms 
over the period 1984-2001 and reports th a t there is no significant difference in the impact 
on CEO pay following good and bad acquisitions. The absence of difference in payment 
post good and bad acquisitions is unrelated to the strength of corporate governance.
Controlling for domestic and cross border acquisitions, the study observed th a t there is 
no significant difference in CEO pay increases post cross border and domestic acquisition 
and th a t acquisitions of target firms in countries with higher pay levels has no significant 
effect on CEO pay. That solicits an inquiry to understand which CEOs will have a greater 
propensity to resort to mergers and acquisitions in an effort to increase their own salary? 
It appears th a t CEOs who have a lower proportion of equity based compensation are 
more likely to undertake acquisitions (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Looking from a different 
perspective to understand if CEOs have vested interests in M&A deals, it has been
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observed tha t in a target firm whose CEO has no golden parachute, CEO stock ownership 
will have a stronger effect on takeover resistance than in a firm who’s CEO has a golden 
parachute (Buccholtz and Ribbens, 1994). Moral hazard, hence, is considered by many 
economists as an im portant empirical phenomena in CEO compensation (M argiotta and 
Miller, 2000). Moral hazard in optimal contracting is often tested by investigating the 
risk-taking behaviours of CEOs (like undertaking acquisitions) and the impact of such 
actions on firm performance and CEO pay (Guest, 2008; Lehn and Zhao, 2006).
2.5 C onclusion
The theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence suggest th a t CEO pay is co-determined 
by interaction of several inter-correlated variable. The key variables identified are firm 
performance, firm size and managerial entrenchment. CEO tenure (Harford and Li, 2007) 
and governance param eters like board size and percentage of outside directors on board 
(Kaplan and Minton, 2012) are used as proxies for managerial entrenchment and strength 
of corporate governance. W hilst the Principal-Agent model suggests a strong associa­
tion of firm performance and CEO pay, it has been observed th a t CEO pay is more 
sensitive to firm size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) and tha t pay-performance sensitivity 
is only marginally significant (Murphy, 1985; Bebchuk and Pried, 2004). Thus, the rel­
ative importance of these variables in determining the level and growth in CEO pay is 
still debated in literature. There has been contrasting evidence on CEO’s incentives in 
undertaking risky projects (acquisitions) to increase firm size and consequently her pay 
and to what extent such risk-taking behaviours reflect agency problems. Further, in an 
agency framework, if a poor performing CEO is more likely to be removed from the job, 
the risk of CEO turnover may impact upon CEO pay. There is limited evidence on the 




3.1 In trod uction
The objective of this thesis is to study the dynamics of the labour market for Chief 
Executive Officers. In this chapter we discuss the datasets used to  collate information 
on pay, tenure, firm level and individual characteristics of the CEOs. Further, we collect 
information on the m ajor macroeconomic and regulatory changes th a t overlap with our 
study period. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the various data  sources employed 
for our empirical analysis and the coverage of the data. We also present the summary 
statistics of the key variables used in the empirical chapters. In each of the following 
empirical chapters, we discuss the sampling procedure and the final sample used for 
analysis.
3.2 D a ta  Source and C overage
The Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC) of the United States of America man­
dated full disclosure of CEO pay from 1992. Public listed firms are required to file a
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proxy-statements (DEF-14A) with the SEC within 120 days from the end of fiscal year, 
detailing the level and structure of all components of pay of the top executives. Eco­
nomic research on CEO compensation has relied on secondary sources of CEO pay data, 
compiled from the proxy filings of the firm. D ata sources includes Standard and Poor’s 
Execucomp, Forbes, The Wall Street Journal/M ercer CEO Compensation survey and 
annual surveys of major consulting firms and rating agencies viz. Hewitt Associates and 
M oody’s. The primary dataset used in this thesis is the Standard and Poor’s Execu­
comp.
Earlier studies of CEO pay rely almost exclusively on the Forbes database and proxy 
filings of firms. Proxy filings on CEO pay earlier than 1992 are hard to get, particularly 
in electronic format. This makes the Forbes da ta  from 1970 the most reliable source 
of historical data  on CEO pay. Seminal works of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall 
and Liebmann (1998) use the Forbes data  for their analysis. Since 1999, however, the 
Execucomp database has been the most used database, particularly because of its wide 
range of coverage on CEO pay components. In this research, we rely on the Execucomp 
database for data on CEO pay.
The Execucomp database compiles CEO pay data  from 1992 and updates the data­
base annually in the month of October. It covers Standard and Poors (henceforth S&P) 
500 firms in the year 1992 and 1993 and S&P 1500 firms thereafter, representing ap­
proximately 90% of US market capitalization. S&P 1500 contains S&P 500 firms (500 
firms), S&P Midcap (400 firms) and S&P Small Cap (600 firms). In the period 1992- 
1997, Execucomp provides data  on 1157 firms. From 1997 onwards Execucomp covers all 
firms in S&P 1500. In the period 1992-2010, Execucomp covers over 208,000 firm year 
observations for CEO and top executives of 3267 firms. For the purpose of this study, we 
include only the CEO in our sample. We follow CEO from the beginning of the sample 
period (or the time they first appear on the database, whichever is earlier) until the end
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of the sample period or until the time they drop out of the sample through takeovers, 
delisting or bankruptcy. Some firms drop out of the sample for a period of time before 
re-appearing which we discuss later in the chapter. This leads to an unbalanced panel.
Individual firms are identified by a range of identifiers consistent with the Com pustat 
databse. The most commonly used firm identifiers are ticker symbol (TIC), CUSIP 
and GVKEY. Ticker is an alpha-numeric abbreviation used to uniquely identify publicly 
traded stock of shares on a particular stock market. The ticker symbol of a firm’s stocks 
are often used as an identifier for the firm. CUSIP is also a commonly used alphanumeric 
firm level identifier assigned by an independent agency. CUSIP codes are generally nine 
characters long, of which the first six characters identifies a firm; the next two characters 
identify a particular asset (e.g., a class of stock or a bond issue) issued by the firm; whereas 
the last character is a "check digit" to improve the accuracy of electronic transmission 
of CUSIPs. Company name, CUSIP codes and ticker symbols are subject to  change 
over time. To circumvent this problem, Standard and Poor’s have defined a unique six­
digit identifier, Global Company Key or GVKEY, for each firm in their datasets. This 
allows for more accurate tracking of firms, particularly in situations of takeovers and 
reverse-mergers.
For each firm, annual compensation details of the top five executives are reported 
although some firms may disclose information on top ten executives’ pay. The CEO of a 
firm in a given year is identified from the CEOANN field in Execucomp. Each executive 
is identified by a unique identifier (EXECID) and each executive-firm combination has an 
unique identifier, which enables career tracking of individual CEOs and other executives.
Execucomp provides information on 145 variables, most of which are regarding com­
pensation. In addition, it provides limited information on CEO characteristics (age, date 
joined as CEO, gender, etc.) and board memberships (Chairman CEO, percentage equity 
holdings of the CEO etc.). Information on pay is disaggregated by components of pay.
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Salary and bonus and other cash-based components of pay are reported in thousands of 
US dollars. The value of stock option grants are estimated using the Black Scholes option 
pricing model. The grant date for options is assumed to  be July 1st of every year with 
the risk free rate being the yield-to-maturity of 7-year US treasury bills. Exercise prices 
are obtained from the annual proxy filings of the firms and the market price is assumed to 
be the strike price per share, unless otherwise mentioned in the proxy filings. Execucomp 
also reports information on Restricted Stock Units, Long Term Incentive Payments and 
measures of total compensation including (TDC1) or excluding (TDC2) option grants. 
We use TDC1 in all our estimations.
In our analysis we use Execucomp data  from 1992-2010 for information on CEO pay 
and CEO tenure. We augment the Execucomp data  with the following databases: Thom­
son Financial Securities D ata’s SDC Platinum ™  Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database, Thomson One Banker and Forbes company database is used to identify events 
of mergers and acquisitions. Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum  provides information on 
672,000 mergers and acquisitions from 1985 and is updated daily. The database provides 
information on mergers and acquisitions, proxy fights for corporate control, repurchases 
and spin-offs, covering a comprehensive range of corporate restructuring.
Finally, information on governance is obtained from the RiskMetrics database (for­
merly IRRC). Although the IRRC data  starts in 1990, it was inaccessible for our study 
due to licensing issues. Hence we rely on RiskMetrics data  from 1996. Corporate gov­
ernance data  is available for the period 1996-2007 and hence analysis with controls for 
governance is done with a smaller sample size. In the sample period, RiskMetrics covers 
over 12000 observations from 1526 firms. The potential bias due to the sample selection 
are discussed in the empirical chapters. The database provides information on structure 
and composition of the board and the nomination, compensation and audit commit­
tees. Further, it has information on shareholder rights, voting norms, takeover defenses
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(prevalence of poison pills) and directors’ compensation. The definition and regulatory 
requirement of independent directors on board were refined by NYSE and NASDAQ in 
2002. We have used information on directors from the Forbes database to check the 
robustness of the definition of independent directors throughout the sample period.
Thus, we test our hypotheses with an extensive dataset of CEO pay which is aug­
mented by information on firm performance, corporate governance, mergers and acqui­
sitions. Our database improves upon the information of the Execucomp database by 
incorporating information on CEO turnover from company press releases, media reports 
and tracking the career movement of individual CEOs.
Description of key variables and their sources are compiled in Table 3.1 below:
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Table 3.1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Descriptions Source
Turnover Indicator for event of CEO exit for a firm in a given year Execucomp, Forbes
Duration Length of CEO tenure in a firm Execucomp, Forbes
CEO Pay Salary +  Bonus +  Stock awards +  LTI +RSU  
+  Option_awards -I- nonequity incentives
Execucomp
RSU Restricted Stock Units Execucomp
LTI Long Term Incentives Execucomp
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes =
Revenue -  Operating expenses +  Non-operating income
CRSP
ROA Return on Assets =  Net Profit/Total Assets CRSP
Value Weighted Return Weighted average of all stock returns, weights given by 
the market value of the stock issue (price*shares outstanding) 
at the end of the previous trading period.
CRSP
Benchmarked Value Difference of firm’s annual value weighted return from CRSP
Weighted Return that of the median firm in the 2-digit SIC level
M&A Indicator for event of M&A in a given year Thomson One Banker, Forbes
Board Size Number of Directors on a board RiskMetric
Board Independence Percentage of outside Directors on the board RiskMetric
Board Busyness Average number of directorships held by the Directors RiskMetric
CEO Duality Indicator for Chairman-CEOs RiskMetric
3.3 D escrip tive  S ta tistics
In the following tables we present descriptive statistics for the augmented Execucomp 
data  for the full sample period (1992-2010) and the two sub-periods, before and after 
the promulgation of the corporate governance regulations in 2002. In 2002, following 
the corporate scandals surrounding Enron Corporation, a host of corporate governance 
regulations were enacted in 2002. Chief among them are the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the 
NYSE and NASDAQ reforms. These governance regulations, designed to make corporate 
governance more transparent and increase managerial accountability, may have an impact 
on CEO pay and CEO turnover decisions. The major implications of these regulations 
are discussed in details in the subsequent empirical chapters. From Table 3.4 and 3.5, a 
mean CEO in the dataset is paid US$ 4.3 millions, going up to US$ 6.6 million in the
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later sub-period of the data. In addition, Figure 3.1 shows th a t CEO pay has a general 
upward trend in the period 1992-2009. The rise in CEO pay is characterised by increasing 
use of stock option grants in the mid-1990s. The growth in equity based pay with respect 
to non-equity based payment is detailed in the figure and tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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From the mid-1990s, the explosive growth in equity-based CEO pay can be attributed 
to an increased concern to align CEO pay to performance, accounting and tax  norms 
th a t did not require options to be treated as expenses under FASB (123).1 In response 
to the stock market crash of 2001 surrounding the dot-com and Enron crises th a t pushed 
the stock options of the CEO underwater 2, and FAS(123r) tha t requires firms to treat 
option grants as accounting expenses, there has been increasing use of restricted stock 
units as a preferred equity payment vehicle. However, as evident from Figure 3.1 and 
detailed in Table 3.5, the 2003-2010 sub-period of the dataset is characterized by a
1 FASB (123) refers to  article no. 123 of Financial Accounting Standards Board of U nited States o f Am erica that laid 
down accounting norms for stock based com pensation. This was subsequently revised in Decem ber 2002 in article no. 
148 in response to the financial irregularities and accounting scandals surrounding Enron Corporation, W orldcom, T yco  
International, etc. A rticle 148 was superseded by FASB (123r) in 2004.
2 "Underwater" is a term used to refer to a situation  when the exercise price of a stock is higher than the market price 
for the underlying stock.
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decreasing proportion of non-equity compensation in average CEO pay with respect to 
cash-based compensation. The change in compensation structure could result from a 
number of factors, viz. increasing risk of CEO job, claw-back provisions for CEO pay 
laid down in the recent governance regulations, etc. We discuss this is greater details 
in the later chapters. For parts of our analysis, we use cash based compensation and 
non-cash compensation separately. Non-cash compensation is the change in value of 
the CEOs option grants in a given year, calculated using a 7-year vesting period and the 
annual average market price of the shares. Thus, in years of poor share price performance, 
the CEOs stock options may be "underwater", i.e. the non-cash compensation can be 
notionally negative.
In Table 3.2, the number of CEOs (2703) is smaller compared to number of firms 
(2755). This is because some CEOs move from one sample firm to another sample 
firm in the sample period. The changing risk of the CEO job is manifest in the higher 
proportion of CEOs leaving the post in the second half of the data. About 26% CEOs in 
the 2002-2010 period left their post compared to 22.6% of the CEOs in the earlier part 
of the sample period. For our empirical analysis we classify CEO turnovers by reasons 
of exit3 (Table 3.2). CEO turnovers arising out of retirements, resignations, and forced 
dismissals are classified as internal turnover, where internal refers to reasons arising from 
within the firm set up. CEO turnover following a tender offer is classified as takeover- 
related turnover. In the data  period there have been six events of an incumbent CEOs 
death. We do not treat these events as turnover.
Median CEO tenure in the data  period is about eight years although it is significantly 
shorter in the second sub-period at six and half years. This declining median CEO 
tenure may indicate an increasing likelihood of CEOs to be dismissed or forced to resign.
3 W e study tlic press reports around events of CEO turnover to identify the reasons o f exit and w hether the CEOs have 
been forced out. Some degree of discretion has been applied in the classification process.
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Alternatively, it may mean a large proportion of CEOs retiring towards the end of the 
first sub-period (1993-2001) so tha t the later sub-period is characterized by CEOs who 
are early in their tenure. However, the median CEO age in the first sub-period (60.28 
years) is marginally lower than th a t of the second sub-period (61.04 years) making such 
an argument untenable.
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Table 3.2: Classifications of Turnover
1993-2010
No. of firms 2755
No. of CEOs 2703
No. of CEO exits 855
% of CEO exits 31.63%
No. of Takeover related exits 381
% of Takeover related exits 14.10%
Number of Forced exits 360
% of Forced exits 13.42%
No. of Resignations 66
% of Resignations 2.44%
No. of Retirements 48
% of Retirements 1.78%
No. of Internal Turnovers 474
% of Internal Turnovers 17.5%
Total Observations 15121
We discuss the time series nature of CEO turnover and the possible modes of CEO 
exit in more detail in Chapter 4.
From Tables 3.4 and 3.5 the median firm in the dataset has annual sales of about US$ 
9,259,000, converted to 2000 US$. Thus, the median firm in the data  is a large firm. A 
median firm in the dataset has a positive return on assets (3.81) with some outliers at 
both ends of the distribution. A median (mean) board in sample firms is constituted of 
9 (9.5 directors). The board size does not change significantly over the time period. The 
2003-2010 sub-period which follows the corporate scandals and the subsequent regulations 
on corporate governance is characterized by a higher percentage of independent directors 
on board (76.21%) compared to the 1993-2001 sub-period (64.58%). This can partly be 
attributed to the m andatory requirement of independent directors4 on the board laid 
down in Section 303A of the NYSE corporate governance reforms (2002). In the same 
period, the number of directorships held by a median director increased from 2 to 3,
4V ide A rticle 303A of N YSE and Rule 4200 of NASDAQ , an "independent director" is one who is deem ed to have 
no m aterial interest in the firm and have no political, social and familial connection with any em ployee of the firm. The  
definition does not include people having connection to a firm in the capacity of auditors and tax consultants of their 
fam ily thereof as independent directors.
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indicating th a t an increasing number of directors are being involved in the governance of 
multiple firms. This may result from residual demand for skilled and competent directors 
or an increasingly refined definition of "independent" directors tha t publicly listed firms 
are required to m aintain on the board of governance committees.
The period 1992-2010 overlaps with two merger waves in recent economic history: the 
Fifth merger wave (1992-2000) which saw a significant increase in cross-border M&As and 
the Sixth merger wave (2003-2008) which was driven by shareholder activism in the USA 
and the Europe. We augment our dataset with information on takeovers and acquisitions 
to study the likely impact of corporate restructuring on CEO tenure and CEO pay. We 
use Acquisition Weekly, Thomson One Banker and Forbes company database to identify 
events of acquisitions and takeover. From Table 3.3, in the sample period we identify 1311 
takeovers of which 169 were undertaken acquiring firms not listed on a US stock exchange 
and hence classified as "international". Takeover is defined as an event whereby a firm 
owning less than  50% of a sample firm’s (target) voting shares before the acquisition 
increases the ownership to more than 50% after the event (Guest, 2008). Using a similar 
definition of acquisition where a sample firm is the acquirer, we identify 8247 acquisitions 
in the sample period of which 946 were international.
Merger 0 processes may involve significant involvement of the CEOs of both the firms 
in pre-merger negotiations and can potentially induce bias in estimation of the effect of 
mergers on CEO pay and CEO turnover (Buchholtz, Ribbens and Houle, 2003, Mikkel- 
son and Partch, 1997). The CEO turnover and CEO pay decisions may be endogenous 
in mergers because such decisions are usually arrived at the pre-merger negotiations in­
volving the CEOs of both the firms. Also, mergers are often undertaken for business 
synergy rather than for disciplinary purposes . Thus mergers may not reflect the disci-
5 Any event of corporate restructuring funded by com m on stock and classified as "Merger" in the databases and financial 
press are defined as mergers.
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plining effect of the external market for corporate control (Buccholtz et al, 2003). We 
exclude mergers from our analysis. Similar arguments may hold true for some acquisi­
tions where the CEO of the target firms may exert influence over the post-acquisition pay 
and turnover decisions. In some friendly acquisitions, the CEOs of target firms are often 
inducted in the Board of Directors and sometimes as the Chairman of the Board. This 
can induce some bias in estimating post-acquisition performance and turnover decisions. 
We attem pt to circumvent the endogeneity arising from such scenarios in our estimations. 
If the CEO of a target firm in our sample is inducted in the Board of Directors following 
an acquisition, we do not treat such an event as a turnover. This is because such events 
may not be performance related and can result from pre-acquisition negotiations.
Further, we exclude events of bankruptcy and delisting from our definition of corporate 
restructuring. In chapter 4 and chapter 5, we discuss the classification of corporate 
restructuring in greater details.
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Table 3.3: C lassifications of A cquisitions and Takeovers 
D ata  Source: T hom son O ne Banker, 
A cquisition W eekly and Forbes 
Com pany D atabase
1993-2010
No. of Takeovers 1311
No. of International Takeovers 169
No. of Acquisitions 8247
No. of International Acquisitions 946
3.4  C onclusion
We employ Execucomp as the primary dataset for our analysis which provides us with 
a wide range of information of level and structure of CEO pay, CEO tenure and board 
memberships. Additional datasets have been used to augment our main dataset with 
information on firm performance, board size and composition and events of corporate 
restructuring. We have frequently used financial press (Financial Times, The Wall Street 
Journal, etc.) to supplement our database and check for possible da ta  errors and missing 
observations. A range of databases have been employed to minimize om itted variable 
bias in our empirical analysis.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics 
Data Source: Wharton Research Data Services’ Exeeucomp, 
CRSP and RiskMetrics
N Mean Median SD Max Min
CEO pay (’000 US$) 15121 4329.13 1610.22 10252.03 295136.40 0.01
Salary (’000 US$) 15121 600.92 543.84 335.25 5613.20 40.00
Bonus (’000 US$) 15081 564.06 191.82 1678.68 76951.00 0.00
Cash Compensation (’000 US$) 15121 1164.98 800.00 1782.24 77926.00 70.00
Non-Cash Compensation (’000 US$) 15121 1725.24 920.80 2486.75 69850.63 -12465.61
Tenure (Years) 15121 9.33 7.81 10.95 43.93 2.57
ROA (’000 US$) 14748 2.53 3.81 43.38 3551.35 -1314.88
Average Value 14765 0.0033 0.0115 0.0494 0.1105 -0.1846
weighted Return
Termination Payment 15081 1393.78 0.00 7272.403 241089.80 0.00
( ’000 US$)
Sale (’000 US$) 15121 4137.88 9259.39 13858.90 42507189.00 0.00
CEO Share 15081 0.7022 0.00 3.83 87.60 0.00
Ownership (%)
Board Size 11522 9.52 9.00 2.63 34.00 3.00
Outside Directors (%) 11522 70.38 71.35 16.87 92.30 55.60
No. of Directorships 11522 2.73 3.10 8.61 14.00 0.00
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics: Sub-Period
1993-2001 2003-2010 1993-2010
No. of firms 
No. of CEOs 
No. of CEO exits 
% of CEO exits 
Total Observations 
External CEO 
Mean Tenure (in Years)
Median Tenure (in Years)
Mean CEO Pay (’000 USS)
Mean Salary (’000 USS)
Mean Bonus (’000 USS)
Mean Cash Compensation (’000 USS)





Mean Sale ( ’000 USS)
Mean CEO Share 
Ownership (%)
Mean Board Size
Mean Outside Directors (%)






















Are CEOs Replaced For Poor 
Performance? Effects of Takeovers 
on CEO Turnover
4.1 In trod uction
Over the last two decades, the dynamics of executive pay setting and corporate gov­
ernance have gained importance in both the economic literature and financial media. 
Boards of Directors have been criticized for weak governance and concerns are raised 
about misaligned incentives of the CEO with shareholder value. The growing concern 
over corporate governance has led to the promulgation of a number of governance and 
accounting regulations, notably the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) and the Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board pronouncement 123R (2004)1.
*FASB (123) refers to article no. 123 of Financial Accounting Standards Board of U nited States of America that laid 
down accounting norms for stock based com pensation. This was subsequently revised in Decem ber 2002 in article no.
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The recent literature on executive pay focuses on the determinants of CEO pay growth 
and agency problems in CEO compensation contracts whereas the dynamics of CEO 
turnover has received relatively little empirical attention. If optimal contracting holds, 
poorly performing CEOs will be replaced by the board of directors. The probability of 
being dismissed as CEO can be a major constraint on CEO behaviour as the cost of 
job loss is manifest in the form of loss of managerial reputation, prolonged period of 
unemployment, working for smaller firms and loss of future earnings (Fama 1980; Fee 
and Hadlock 2004). If the governance of the board of directors is effective, the CEO 
pay would be closely tied to firm performance and poor performing managers will be 
replaced.
Poor performing firms are more likely to be taken over and therefore the CEOs of 
poorly performing firms may face higher risk of being dismissed (Jensen 1988, Mikkelson 
and Partch, 1997). Empirical evidence suggests th a t takeovers are associated with a 
higher than  average rate of CEO turnover (Walsh 1988, Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). 
During times of strong market for corporate control, the executives of firms with poor 
pre-takeover performance are the ones more likely to depart post takeover (Walsh and 
Ell wood, 1991).
In a recent study, Kaplan and Minton (2012) finds secular increase in annual turnover 
rates for both board-driven turnover and post-takeover turnover in the sample period 
1992-2007.
In this chapter, we analyze the nature and determinants of CEO turnover in S&P 1500 
firms in the sample period 1993-2010. We estimate and compare the risk of CEO exit 
due to internal reasons (poor performance, active shareholders, etc.) and in the events of 
their firm being taken over. Our sample period, 1994-2010 overlaps with the fifth (1992-
148 in response to the financial irregularities and accounting scandals surrounding Enron Corporation. W orldcom, T yco  
International, etc. A rticle 148 was superseded by FASB (123r) in 2004.
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2000) and the sixth (2003-2008) merger waves and also with the last decade of intense 
regulatory scrutiny on corporate governance, particularly since the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(2002) and the NASDAQ and NYSE reforms (2002). Thus we analyze whether board 
characteristics and composition has an impact on CEO turnover probability. Finally, we 
test the effectiveness of the corporate governance regulations on the dismissal function.
The central finding of our analysis suggests th a t CEOs are being increasingly replaced 
for poor performance. This is consistent with the principal-agent view th a t CEOs are 
disciplined by an implied probability of dismissal.
CEOs of target firms of a takeover face higher probability of exit. We attem pt to 
control for potential endogeneity arising from the fact tha t poor performing firms may 
have a higher probability of being acquired. Our findings suggest th a t there is a strong 
negative association between pre-takeover firm performance and the probability of CEO 
exit of the target firm. This is qualitatively similar to the findings of Mikkelson and 
Partch (1997) but controlling for a wider range of governance param eters, we find a 
higher magnitude of impact of takeover on turnover probability. We also find evidence 
th a t controlling for performance, CEOs of target firms face a higher probability of exit 
if the acquiring firm is overseas than  CEOs of target firms whose firm is acquired by a 
domestic firm.
Further, we examine the evolving effect of corporate governance and the effects of 
recent regulations (Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002) on the likelihood of CEO exit. We find th a t 
a smaller, and more independent board, increases the hazard of internal turnover by 3% 
but has no significant effect on post-takeover CEO turnover. Our evidence suggests th a t 
the monitoring of boards and market for corporate control could act as alternate forces 
on managerial discipline. We find evidence tha t the post-SOX period is characterized 
by a significantly shorter average CEO tenure, higher hazards of internal and external 
turnover and a stronger sensitivity of hazard of turnover with firm performance.
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This chapter contributes to several strands of research on executive labour market 
and corporate governance. While similar studies on CEO turnover exists for the UK 
(Gregory-Smith, Thompson and Wright, 2009), we present a comprehensive analysis of 
the dynamics of CEO turnover for the US with updated data  and a wider range of 
governance controls. Consistent with the findings of Kaplan and Minton (2012), we note 
th a t there has been a secular rise in the hazard of CEO turnover in the last two decades. 
Poorly performing CEOs are increasingly being replaced by the board. This is the first 
study to  control for the geography of the acquiring firm and provide evidence th a t CEOs 
face a higher probability of exit in the event of a takeover by a foreign acquirer.
Finally, the findings of this chapter are relevant to the debate on the impact of cor­
porate governance regulations on managerial discipline. Consistent with the findings of 
Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) and Kaplan and Minton (2012), in the post-SOX period, 
median CEO tenure is 4.8 years, significantly lower than the CEO tenure in the overall 
sample (7.83 years). Thus the period of rapid pay increase in CEO pay is also char­
acterized by a higher likelihood of CEO turnover. In addition, CEO stock and option 
grants are currently valued using Black Scholes (1979) model which assumes ten year 
vesting period of these options. A shortening CEO tenure may mean an overestimation 
of current CEO compensation measures.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows; Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
relevant literature on CEO turnover, the effect of acquisitions on probability of CEO exit 
and the use of duration models for estimating hazards of CEO exit is provided. Section 
3 discusses the data  and presents the descriptive statistics. In Section 4 we discuss 
the duration model specification and robustness issues. Finally, Section 5 presents the 
empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.
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4.2 T h eory and L iterature R ev iew
4.2.1 CEO Turnover and Firm Performance
A potent instrum ent of aligning the interests of the shareholders and the CEO is the 
ability of the board of directors to dismiss the CEO for poor performance (Zajac, 1990; 
Lin, 1996). Being dismissed may have a significant negative impact on the future income 
of the CEOs and may impede career growth. Fee and Hadlock (2004) provide evidence 
th a t forced turnover has a detrimental effect on both career growth and pay of the CEOs. 
Using a sample of 443 large US firms from 1993-1998, they suggest th a t only a fraction 
of dismissed executives obtain new employment but those th a t do find new employment, 
it is mostly in an inferior job at a smaller firm and accept a pay cut of about 20% on 
their previous pay. The strength of the dismissal-threat will depend on the degree of 
monitoring of CEO performance. However, CEO’s effort and contributions are often 
difficult to quantify and measure. Therefore, the likelihood of dismissal depend on the 
observed firm performance:
Pr (Dismissal) =  p(II) (4-1)
where n  is firm performance and dD ism issa l/dU  < 0.
Conyon (1998) and Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) find evidence tha t the risk of CEO 
dismissal responds to firm performance. However, they report a weak influence of gov­
ernance on CEO turnover risk. These papers, however, are largely based on data  sets 
prior to the year 2002 and hence do not capture the effect of increased regulation and 
monitoring of CEO performance and pay tha t characterizes the last decade. In a recent 
study, Kaplan and Minton (2012) examine a sample of US firms from 1992-2007 and re­
port a secular increase in annual CEO turnover rates for poor performance. They report
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an average CEO tenure of just over seven years which reduces to under six years in the 
second sub-period of the sample, indicating th a t CEOs are increasingly being replaced 
for poor performance.
Since the dismissal probability depends on the strength of monitoring, the size, struc­
ture and composition of the board are likely to be an im portant determ inant of CEO 
turnover. From a managerial power perspective, a Chairman CEO may be expected to 
have greater influence on the governance process and have a higher degree of entrench­
ment. A pr ior i , it may not be reasonable to assume that a smaller board size will have a 
similar strength of vigilance as tha t of a larger board. The board of directors is composed 
of executive (inside) directors and non-executive (outside) directors. An executive direc­
tor may have closer ties to an incumbent CEO or may be easily influenced by her and may 
not have sufficient interest to replace her for poor performance. The outside directors 
may have better experience in governance and may want to signal their competence to 
the market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, the outside directors may have 
little financial stake in the firm to ensure effective monitoring (Weisbach, 1988). Further, 
the directors are members of boards for multiple firms at the same time. A higher number 
of board membership for a director may reflect her competence and expertise. It may 
also lead to dilution in her monitoring and vigilance skills. Thus the effects of outside 
directors on the board and the average number of board membership of the directors are 
ambiguous.
4.2.2 Post-Takeover CEO Turnover
CEOs can be replaced by the board of directors for poor performance. Alternatively, firms 
with persistent poor performance may be taken over, thereby increasing the probability 
of post-takeover CEO departure (Jensen 1988, Denis and Denis, 1995). Theoretical
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propositions on the post-takeover CEO turnover often focus on three perspectives.
First, M artin and McConell (1991) suggest that the market for corporate control has 
a disciplining effect on governance and CEOs of target firms with poor pre-takeover per­
formance are more likely to be replaced (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). This assumes an 
efficient market for corporate control as an alternate force of governance to dismiss ineffec­
tive and entrenched CEOs. Consistent with the market discipline argument, Hambrick 
and Cannella (1993) found empirical evidence suggesting th a t poor firm performance 
leading up to takeover increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. Mikkelson and Partch 
(1997) analyse executive turnover during the active takeover market of 1984-1988 and 
the less active market of 1989-1993 in the US. They find that sample firms experience a 
5% higher rate of CEO turnover during the active takeover market and th a t poor firm 
performance is associated with the higher rate of exit during the active takeover mar­
ket. Thus they conclude tha t strength of external takeover market acts as a measure 
of “management discipline” . Phan and Lee (1995) argue th a t once the target firm is 
acquired, the acquiring firm may look for a different skill-set (Hambrick, et al. 1993) and 
want to remove the CEO of the target firm for his embeddedness in the firm (Hambrick 
and Fukutomi, 1991). Kaplan and Minton (2012) report a shortening CEO tenure and 
increasing likelihood of post-takeover CEO turnover but find no significant association 
of firm performance and the probability of turnover probability of CEOs of the target 
firms.
Second, from a relative standing perspective, Hambrick and Cannella (1993) suggest 
th a t CEOs of acquired firms may not always be dismissed but may also voluntarily 
resign after acquisition. CEOs of target firms are more likely to resign due to loss of 
status in the new organizational hierarchy or face the prospect of a power struggle with 
the management of the acquiring firm. Change in corporate control also increases the 
likelihood of voluntary turnover of long serving CEOs because of firm specific human
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capital investment and psychological investment tha t is associated with long tenure may 
also have less importance (Brockner, 1985).
Finally, an alternative explanation of takeover related CEO turnover can be made 
from a human capital perspective. Human capital theory distinguishes between general 
human capital, which can be used in a variety of jobs, and specific human capital, which 
is useful in a specific setting (Becker, 1962). CEOs and firms invest in a wide range 
of firm-specific and industry-specific human capital during a CEO’s tenure (Harris and 
Helfat, 1997). When a firm is taken over, the importance of the firm-specific and industry- 
specific human capital is altered. As discussed in Section 2.4, Buchholtz et al. (2003) 
argue th a t if the acquiring and the target firm are in a closely related industry, the 
specific human capital of the CEO may become redundant and the acquiring firm may 
feel little need to retain the target CEO. Further, they find tha t CEOs with lower tenure 
in the firm (and younger CEOs) have lower investment in firm-specific human capital and 
a lower opportunity cost of job loss and hence are more likely to be replaced or resign 
after takeover. Similarly CEOs nearing retirement tend to lose little in future income 
and the possible requirement of a different skill-set to manage the new firm may explain 
the higher probability of post-acquisition departure.
Studies on the effect of CEO ownership on post-takeover CEO turnover suggests a 
lower likelihood of CEO exit if the CEO has a large ownership in the target firm. Brunello 
et al (2003) draws on the managerial power hypothesis of CEOs entrenchment to argue 
th a t significant ownership of the CEO weakens internal monitoring and it would be costly 
for the acquiring firm to replace him. Jensen (1993) reports th a t CEO duality affects the 
board’s independence and their response to failure of the top management. A change 
in corporate control is generally associated with the change in board composition and 
hence increases likelihood of post-takeover CEO exits. Core, Guay and Verecchia (1999) 
provide an alternative argument suggesting tha t CEO ownership in a firm aligns the
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interest of the CEO with th a t of the shareholders and maximizes firm value. Therefore 
a CEO with higher ownership in the firm will have greater incentive alignment.
The impact of cross border acquisitions on CEO turnover has received little empirical 
attention. Cross border acquisitions may be associated with a higher degree of infor­
mation asymmetry and involve differences in currency, regulatory and capital market 
structures and organizational culture. In such events, the knowledge and skills of the 
CEO of the target firm may be depreciated.
Most studies of post-takeover CEO turnover assume proportionality of the turnover 
hazard with respect to duration of CEO tenure. However, some studies suggest th a t the 
hazards may not be proportional but vary with CEO tenure (Buchholtz et al. 2003) and 
tha t there may be little justification for using parametric duration models to study the 
hazard rate over the duration of CEO tenure.
4.2.3 CEO Turnover and Governance Reforms
There has been sustained scrutiny of CEO pay and corporate governance over the last 
two decades, particularly since the financial crisis of 2007. The corporate scandals sur­
rounding Enron led to the promulgation of a number of corporate governance regulations, 
most notably the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and the NYSE and NASDAQ re­
forms 2002. The stock market reforms set down guidelines for the proportion of outside 
directors in listed firms and aimed at making corporate accounting more transparent. 
The main objectives of SOX were to increase corporate accountability (e.g. Section 404 
on internal controls to prevent financial frauds) and boost investors’ confidence in capital 
markets. Post-SOX, CEOs are faced with higher penalties leading up to criminal prose­
cution for non-compliance with financial reporting norms. In addition, Sections 302 and 
304 of SOX require the CEO to refund any incentive based compensation in the event
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of subsequent identification of financial misstatements. These regulations alter the risk 
profile of CEO jobs and have potential effects on compensation structuring and corporate 
governance.
The effectiveness of governance policies in aligning the interest of the CEO to th a t of 
the shareholders is much debated in the literature. Weisbach (2007) argues tha t if a CEO 
is entrenched in the firm, then it is not inconceivable th a t s/he may be able to influence 
the compliance with regulations to shield his interests.
There has been academic interest in the analysis of the effect of SOX and the economic 
cost of SOX (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008; Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2007). Zhang (2007) 
reports a decline in market capitalization of all firms traded in US stock exchanges by 
USS 1.4 trillion. The decline may be a result of compliance costs to the firm or adopting 
low-risk corporate strategies. Firms with weak corporate governance shield the CEO from 
increased risk by increasing the weightage of low-risk performance measures for bonus 
payouts (Wang, 2005; Carter, Lynch and Zechman, 2007). The exogenous shocks on 
governance and disclosure regulations may have a significant impact on the CEO labour 
market by changing the risks associated with the CEO job and the compensation level 
and structure.
4.3 D a ta
The sample of firms is drawn from S&P 1500 indices2 for the period 1993-2010. Execu- 
comp provides information on 3016 CEOs in th a t sample period. 302 firms do not report 
either the CEOs or the start date and date of turnover of their CEOs (in case of the event 
of turnover) and have been dropped from the study because their duration of exposure
2S&P 1500 contains S&P 500 firms (500 firms), S&P M idcap (400 firms) and S&P Sm all Cap (600 firms). In the 
beginning of the sam ple period, Execucom p covers 1157 S&P 1500 firms. From 1997, Execucom p covers all firms in SfeP  
1500.
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to turnover hazard couldn’t  be determined. We also drop observations on firms which 
are in the sample for only one year. This leads to the omission of 12 more firms from the 
analysis. Probit regressions to analyse sample selectivity (reported in Table 4.3) were 
performed using firm performance and CEO pay measures but none of the param eters 
were estimated to be statistically significant and hence there seems to be no evidence of 
systematic non-disclosure of information. The remaining 2755 organizations, observed in 
the period 1993-2010, are included in the analysis. Thus the final sample contains 15121 
CEO-year observations for 2703 CEOs. The number of CEOs is smaller than the number 
of firms. This is because our sample consists of firms listed in S&P 500, S&P Midcap and 
S&P Smallcap firms. There is considerable movement of CEOs among these cohorts of 
firms. CEOs change jobs within the S&P 500 firms but also take up CEO jobs at smaller 
firms listed in the S&P Midcap and S&P Smallcap indices. Thus we have 2703 unique 
individuals who are appointed as CEOs in the sample firms in our sample period.
The firms are observed from the first year they appear on the Execucomp database 
until the end of the study period or until the firm drops out of the sample due to mergers 
and acquisitions or delisting from the S&P indices and stock exchange. The firms th a t 
we lose from observation within the sample period are not omitted to avoid survivor bias.
Events of CEO turnover are identified from the Execucomp database, Fortune 500 
and Fortune 1000 lists, the Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis Business news database. 
Consistent with the definition used by Huson et al. (2004), turnover is defined as an 
event of a CEO relinquishing/being discharged of his duties at any particular time in the 
study period. Thus turnover in a given year of observation, t, means tha t a CEO who is 
observed in a firm on 1st day of October of year, t, would no longer be observed in the 
same firm on 1st day of October of year, t+ 1 .3
Using the afore mentioned databases on executives and press releases around the events
3W e use October-Septem ber cycle to overlap with the D E F 14 A filing cycles.
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of turnover, we identify 855 events of CEO turnover of which we can classify 381 events 
to have occurred within two years of takeover.4 Further, there were 144 instances where 
following takeover, the CEO of the target firm ceases to be the CEO but continues to  be 
an executive member and/or Chairman of the board. These situations are ambiguous as 
the CEOs have been replaced but continues to be in senior management of the governance 
committee. This may reflect the fact th a t removal from a CEO position may not be due to 
performance related reasons, a change in human capital requirements or a power-struggle. 
In our research, we do not treat these events as turnover.0
We classify two types of CEO turnover, internal turnover, associated with the perfor­
mance of the firm and board of directors and external turnover where events of turnover 
occur within two years from an event of a takeover.6 Internal turnover are further clas­
sified into Resignations, Retirements and Forced Turnovers. Thus the forced turnover 
variable does not include those CEOs who exit their job following an event of takeover 
because it is classified as a performance-related board driven internal turnover. CEO 
turnover for which the press reports tha t the CEO was fired, forced out through retire­
ment or resigned due to policy differences or internal pressures are classified as events 
of "Forced Turnover ".The events of CEO turnover which explicitly mentions th a t the 
CEO has resigned to pursue other interests or join another firm are categorized as "Res­
ignations" and if the CEO retires on attainm ent of retirement age or for health-related 
reasons, we classify those events as "Retired". Using this definition we identify 360 Forced 
Turnovers, 66 resignations and 48 retirements in our sample period/
In the event of CEO turnover within a financial cycle, Execucomp reports the com­
4There have been 6 instances of incum bent C E O ’s death within the sam ple period. T hese events are not treated as 
events of turnover. If a CEO resigns from a firm due to poor health and subsequently expires, we treat the events as 
turnover.
5 As a measure of robustness we include these 144 events in our definition of post-acquisition CEO turnover. T he results 
are qualitatively similar but the hazard of turnover increases.
6 Turnover due to bankruptcy and delisting from stock exchange are classified as internal turnovers. If the delisting is 
preceded by a takeover within 24 m onths, we classify the events as turnovers due to takeover.
7R obustness check was performed with reclassifying the modes of turnover and is discussed in Section 5.3.
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pensation of the CEO who has been in office for the longer period of time. We identified 
such events and care was taken to map the CEOs and corresponding pay.8 Further, the 
severance pay entitlement in the event of involuntary turnover is used to  control for the 
cost of CEO replacement. The data  for severance payment and change in control pay­
ments are obtained from Execucomp and annual DEF 14A filings of the firms. In USA, 
typical severance plan provides 6 to 24 months of pay (including bonus) for general sev­
erance and 12-36 months for severance arising out of change in control. Severance in the 
event of change in control also allows the CEO immediate vesting of the stock options at 
the grant price. However, there is no m andatory sta tu te  on the prevalence and amount 
of severance payments tha t a CEO can be eligible for. About 36% CEOs in the sample 
have severance pay provisions with mean (median) severance pay of US$ 1.4 million (US$
0.00).9 The median CEO pay of USS 0 means th a t the effect of severance pay on turnover 
hazard reflects the differential effect for only the CEOs having a severance pay eligibility.
Using information on the CEOs date of assuming office and the date of turnover, we 
construct a measure of CEO tenure (in years). To account for potential non-linearity in 
the tenure effect (Gregory-Smith et al. 2009) we use the quadratic function of tenure. 
The median tenure of a CEO in a firm in the sample is 7.83 years. This is consistent 
with the estimates of Kaplan (2012) who reports an average CEO tenure of ju st over 
seven years for Fortune 500 firms in the period 1992-2007. We use a bigger sample of 
S&P 1500 firms and for a longer period (1992-2010). In the sub-period 2003-2010, the 
median CEO tenure is 6.53 years. Execucomp also provides information on the date the 
CEO joined the firm. Using this information, we construct an indicator for outside CEO
8W e identified events of turnover w ithin a financial cycle. If the outgoing CEO has been in the office for the greater 
part of the year, we record an event of turnover in that year. On the other hand, if the new CEO is in office for the greater 
part of the year, we record an event of turnover in the previous year. In 8 occassions when the turnover occured around 
the m iddle of the financial period, we treat them as if the outgoing CEO has been in the office for greater part of the year.
9We seek to control for potential endogeneity in firms having provisions for severance pay. Probit estim ations were 
performed using an indicator for presence o f severance pay agreement as dependent variable, and firm size, firm performance 
and governance variables as independent variables. Coefficients of all independent variables were statistica lly  insignificant.
58
hire. If the date of joining the firm and becoming the CEO is the same, then the CEO is 
hired from outside and the indicator takes on a value of ’1’. Similarly, if the date joining 
the firm is earlier than the date of becoming CEO, then it is an internal promotion.
We identify events of takeovers using the Thomson Financial Securities D ata’s SDC 
P latinum ™  Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Forbes company data­
base. For the purpose of this study, takeover is defined as an event whereby a firm owning 
less than  50% of the voting shares of a target firm before the acquisition increases the 
ownership to more than  50% after the event (Guest, 2008). The date of announcement is 
used as the year of the event for our analysis. This is because the CEOs are exposed to 
higher risk of turnover from the time the takeover is announced. We identify the events 
where a target firm in our sample is taken over by another sample firm or a firm outside 
the sample. In the sample period, we identify 1311 events of takeover of a sample firm or 
a major subsidiary of the sample firm. Following the sample selection method of Lehn 
and Zhao (2006), the sample of takeovers for this study was drawn from the database 
using the following criteria: (a) The takeovers were announced between January, 1, 1992 
and December, 31, 2010; (b) both the acquiring and target firms are publicly listed10; 
(c) the deals are categorized as Tender Offers; (d) the deals are “completed” ; and (e) 
the size of the target firm, measured as natural logarithm of total assets, is at least 10% 
of th a t of the acquiring firm.11 These filters help in identifying 844 events of takeover 
of target firms. 840 firms in the sample witness at least one event of takeover 12. In 
the sample period, 1915 firms do not take part in any takeover related activities and are
10 A lthough Thom son's databases do contain inform ation of privately held firms, we only base our analysis on listed  
firms. T his is because inform ation on privately held acquiring firms not listed in the US are not easily available and may  
not be consistent.
11 T he central objective of our study is to analyze the likelihood of post-takeover CEO turnover. Hence, the events of 
m anagem ent buy-outs are not considered as post-acquisition CEO dism issal.
12In the sam ple period, there have been four instances when a target firm (T) is acquired by another firm (A ) in the 
sam ple and subsequently the acquiring firm (A) is taken over by a third firm (X ). However, these events of sequential 
takeovers are not in close proxim ity in tim e so as to have confounding effect on probability of exit. Only one of these four 
instances result in a CEO turnover.
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used as a reference group. Takeovers are classified as international if the acquiring firm 
is not listed in US stock exchanges. Using this definition, we identify 118 international 
takeovers. Consistent with Buchholtz et al (2003) we exclude mergers from our analysis 
since the CEOs may have some degree of influence over pre-merger negotiations.
CEO pay for each year is calculated as the sum of the salary, annual bonus payout, 
Black-Scholes value of stock and option awards granted in the year, non-equity incentives, 
value of restricted stock grants (RSUs) and long term  incentives (LTIP) due th a t year 
and all other cash compensation paid in th a t year. The nominal CEO pay is converted 
to 2000 US dollars by using Consumer Price Indices published by the US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics. The natural log of CEO pay is used in the analysis as an explanatory 
variable.13 Total Pay is skewed with a mean (median) of USS 4.3 (1.7) million.
Firm performance measures were obtained from S&P’s COMPUSTAT Research Tape 
whereas the stock price data  was merged from the Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database at the 2-digit. SIC code level. Based on existing literature (Buccholtz, 
Ribbens and Houle, 2003, Hambrick and Cannella, 2004, Jensen, et al, 2004), we use 
Return on Assets (ROA) as the accounting measure of firm performance, 14 and we 
use natural logarithm of sales as a measure of firm size.10 Firm performance may not 
always be a reflection of managerial effort but may be significantly influenced by industry 
wide shocks. We construct a measure of relative performance to control for industry 
shocks. First, we calculate the yearly average of the value weighted returns on the firm’s 
stock from monthly data. The annual average value weighted return for a firm is then 
benchmarked to the average annual value weighted return of the median firm in the same
13T he estim ations are robust to  alternate specifications of CEO pay, w ithout using the LTI and RSU. "All Other Total" 
paym ents include severance payout that may have been made in an year and has been excluded from the analysis.
1‘‘ Estim ation with Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and Earning Per Share (EPS) yield qualitatively similar 
results.
15 A lternate specification of firm size using natural log of total assets was used as a measure of robustness. T he estim ations  
were statistica lly  indifferent from the estim ations with log Sales as measure of firm size. The results are not presented here 
and is available on request.
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industry. Further, to control for the risk in firm’s operating and information environment, 
we use the volatility in firm’s stock returns by using the standard deviations of monthly 
value-weighted returns on a firm’s stock in a given year.
A pr ior i , we may expect the strength of corporate governance to have an impact 
on the probability of CEO dismissal. D ata on corporate governance were obtained from 
the Risk Metrics database (formerly IRRC). The number of directors on a board and the 
percentage of outside directors are used as measures of board size and board independence 
respectively. If the CEO also acts as the Chairman of the board (CEO duality) and/or 
has higher stock holdings in the firm, she may enjoy some degree of power over the board 
of directors. We also control for a "busy board" using the average number of board 
memberships of the directors of a given firm in a given year.
Corporate governance data  is available for 1996-2010 and hence specifications with 
corporate governance controls contain 11522 firm-year observations. The summary sta­
tistics of the reduced sample in provided in Panel B of Table 4.1.
Table 4.2 lists figures for turnover and takeover for the two sub-periods of the sample. 
The overall rate of turnover reported in this study is higher than  the estimates in the 
existing literature. Overall turnover is 31.63% in the entire sample period. Studies by 
Jensen et al. (2004) and Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) report CEO turnover at 10.2% in 
1970s, 10.0% in 1980s and 11.3% in 1990s. Kaplan (2006) reports 16.5% level of CEO 
turnover in the period 1998-2005, which is consistent with our estimates for the second 
sub-period of our sample. Our sample contains observations from the decade 2000-2010. 
This period, concurrent and after the formulation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), 
and stock exchange reforms on corporate governance, is characterised by an increased 
focus on corporate governance measures. The turnover rate in the seven post-SOX years 
is 13.75%. In this chapter, we estimate the effect of change in corporate governance 
regulation on the baseline hazard of CEO exit.
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4.4  M eth od ology
Our sample comprises CEOs who began their tenure prior to the s tart date of the sample 
period (left-truncation) and CEOs whose tenure extends beyond the end of sampling 
period (right truncation). The existing literature on CEO turnover has used probit 
regression models or Cox-Proportional Hazards models to account for a left truncated 
and right truncated sample (Gregory-Smith, et al., 2009, Buchholtz, Ribbens and Houle, 
2003). In our sample, we observe firms which drop out of the sample but reappear after 
a few years. Thus, in addition to left truncated and right truncated observations, we also 
have interval truncated observations and delayed entries. The interval truncation results 
from sample firms dropping out of S&P 1500 listings and subsequently reappearing after 
a gap. We do not follow the firms after they drop out of the S&P 1500 listings and hence 
during the period they are not in the listings, we do not observe them in our sample.
Heckman and Singer (1984) argue th a t events occur in continuous time and there is 
no naturally discrete time period for occurrence of events. However, in practice, time 
is generally measured in discrete units (hours, weeks, years, etc.). For events occurring 
frequently in small intervals of discrete time (seconds, minutes etc.), a continuous time 
approach is a reasonable assumption. If the time intervals are large (months, years etc.), 
the continuous time assumption may be a strong one. Discrete time analysis is more 
suitable than continuous time models in the following situations (Allison, 1982):
1. If the events occur only after discrete time points.
2. If the process is observed to be discrete but the underlying process is continuous.
To deal with events occurring in discrete time but having an continuous underlying 
process, Prentice and Gloecker (1978) proposed discrete time proportional hazard mod­
els. This class of models can deal with the discrete time nature of the events but can 
also readily handle the continuous time assumption of the underlying process within its
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framework. Further advances in this method are made by Han and Haussman (1990) 
and Jenkins (1995). Discrete time models can be obtained from grouping the continuous 
failure times into half open intervals [0= t0 ti), [t2, t 3).... [tk- i , t k = oo) , and the probability 
of exit for \th individual in the j 4/l interval is:
Pr { T e l t ^ . t j ) }  =  P . . =  $(*._,! * ._ , )  -  S{t,  | *,.) (4.2)
where S ( t j_ 1 | Xj) is the survivor function at the s tart of the interval [t,-_i,i,) i.e. the
probability of not failing until time and S(tj \ Xj) is the survivor function at the end
of the time interval.
Equivalently, the survivor function can be given by:
In [ -  In (1 -  h^it))] =  x f i  +  7j.(t) (4.3)
The above expression, a complementary log-log transform ation follows from the pro­
portional hazards model without any further distributional assumption (Narendranathan 
and Stewart, 1993). By introducing separate parameters, y(t). for each half-open duration 
interval, the above specification can be estimated non-parametrically. The specification 
is non-parametric because it does not impose a functional form on the baseline hazard, 
which can take any shape. However, within each time interval, the baseline hazard is 
assumed to be exponentially distributed and the param eter 7(t) for each time interval 
can be estimated with the structural parameters, {3.
The duration data  used in this analysis are measured in discrete time units of years, 
and hence we employ discrete time duration models. In a sample period characterized 
by an increasing rate of CEO turnover and decreasing tenure, the assumption of propor­
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tionality of hazards of exit with tenure (or age) may be debatable.10 Little theoretical 
and empirical evidence exists to suggest that the distribution of hazards of CEO turnover 
and the effects of the covariates are proportional or parametric. The median CEO tenure 
is lower in the second sub-period (2003-2010) of our sample, indicating th a t assuming a 
non-parametric distribution of the hazard may be most appropriate.
The hazard of exit for an individual CEO, i. to an exit state can be described as:
hi (t) =  ho (£) exp (z'/3) (4.4)
where/io (t) is the baseline hazard and x is a vector tha t controls for observable para­
meters and ^ is a vector of estimated coefficients. If each individual exits through a given 
exit state  in the interval [t0 t i) ,  the discrete time hazard is given by
hi (t ) =  1-exp J h i  (u ) =  1-exp { —exp (x[/3) 7 (£)} (4.5)
where the baseline hazard is of the form:
1^
7 ( t ) = J h 0 (u)du  (4.6)
to
No distribution assumption is imposed on 7 (t) and the model is estimated semi- 
parametrically. The log likelihood contribution of a spell of length (tenure) di is:
16 The proportional hazards assum ption is that changing any explanatory variable has the effect o f m ultiplying the baseline  
hazard by a constant. Equivalently, the estim ated baseline hazard parameters are independant to all other explanatory  
variables. This further im plies the use of random effects terms to control for unobserved heterogeneity (discussed further 
below).
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Li  — C{ In hi (di) +  In {1-hi  ( t ) }  (4.7a)
t= 1
=  Ci In ( l - e x p  [-exp  { 2 7  (d i)'/?  +  7  (d i) } ] )  (4.7b)
di-1
- ] T e x p { x ' /?  +  7 (t)}
t=l
where Ci is a censoring indicator which takes the value ’1’ if di is uncensored and zero 
otherwise, ai denotes the length of tenure of an individual CEO. For incremental increase
in tenure (bi), the total duration can be expressed as d, =  a{ +  bi , which can be either
censored or uncensored. Hence, the above equation can be expressed as:
a. j+bi-1
L i  — Ci In hi (a,i +  bi) +  ^  ln { l - / i i ( t ) }  (4.8a)
=  Ci In ( l - exp [-exp  (x i  (di)'/? +  7  (ai +  6 i)}])  (4.8b)
c i i + b i - 1
-  e x p  {x'i/3 +  7  ( t ) }
i = a j + l
7 's can be interpreted as the log of a non-parametric baseline hazard. This constitutes 
a panel for each individual j  =  1,2 . . .di  observations.
We specify a baseline discrete duration model of the following form:
cloglog(hsi j)  =  l n [ - l n ( l  -  h s ij )] =  a ^ u j  H h
Otpdpij . . . -|- • * ■ -|- f ipXpi j  (4.9)
The hazard of a subject facing a certain event ( hsij ) is calculated using a complemen­
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tary log-log model. du j—dpij are yearly spells of CEO tenure in a given firm and X 1 i j . . . X pij 
controls for the effects of all observables on the baseline hazard.
We use cloglog estimation technique in our analysis. The choice of logit, probit of 
cloglog estimation technique is unlikely to affect the results, although Beck, Katz and 
Tucker (2008) indicates the symmetric nature of logit and probit models around a median 
probability (A =  0.5). The estimates of cloglog models can be interpreted as semi­
elasticities. To ascertain tha t our results are not mere artefacts of the choice of estimation 
technique we also conduct a logit estimation of our baseline model.
The dependent variable in this analysis is “Turnover” tha t takes on the value of ‘1’ in 
the time period when an event of CEO exit is observed and ‘O’ otherwise. Turnover as a 
binary variable to identify events of CEO exit are commonly used in literature (Gregory- 
Smith et al. 2009, Conyon, 1998). Our dependent variable comprises of events of turnover 
through dismissal, retirement or resignation. CEO exit after interim appointments and 
cases where an incumbent CEO leaves the job but continues as the Chairman of the 
Board are not treated as turnover.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Buchholtz et al. argue tha t probability of CEO exit is 
a function of CEO age. Younger CEOs with lower firm-specific human capital and higher 
mobility face higher hazard of exit. Similarly, CEOs close to the retirement age also face 
a higher probability of turnover because the changing industry conditions may require 
different skill set. In our analysis, CEO age is strongly and significantly correlated with 
tenure (p =  0.632) and therefore we control for only CEO tenure in our analysis.
There are contrasting views on the appropriate measures of firm performance. Choice 
of stock returns as a measure of firm performance (Couglan and Schmidt, 1985) reflects 
the expected value created by a CEO but is subject to market noise. On the other 
hand, accounting measures only partially reflect the value created by the existing CEO 
and the remainder is reflected as future earnings (Engel et al. 2003). Further, Tirole
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(1988) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue for using performance measures relative to 
the industry to control for demand, productivity and technology shocks. Therefore we 
control for performance using both accounting and stock market performance. Return on 
Assets,_ROA*t. is used to control for accounting performance17. The accounting measure of 
performance is not benchmarked to the industry. We use average annual value weighted 
returns on a firm’s stock as alternate measure of firm performance. The average annual 
value weighted returns are calculated from the monthly value weighted returns. The 
annual value weighted return of firms are then benchmarked to the returns on the stock 
of the median firm in the same 2-digit SIC code.18
Further, we control for the lagged firm performance(Geddes and Vinod, 1997). It can 
be argued th a t CEO dismissals not only result from contemporaneous firm performance 
but also from the past performance of the firm. Annual Sales of a firm is used to control 
for firm size.19
The board of directors are entrusted to align the shareholders’ and the CEO’s in­
terests (Jensen, 1993). The board of directors may design incentives by making CEO 
pay contingent on firm performance or by replacing poor performing CEO. Thus board 
characteristics are potentially im portant determinants of hazard of CEO turnover. We 
control for the size and composition of the board as proxies for strength of corporate 
performance. The number of directors on the board in a given year and the percentage 
of outside directors on the board are used to control for board size and board indepen­
dence, respectively. It may not be reasonable to assume that a smaller board size will 
have a similar strength of vigilance. The board of directors are composed of executive
’ ’ A lternate measures of performance like Earning Per share and Pre-tax Income have been used as robustness check. 
T he results are qualitatively similar and have been om itted for brevity.
18 We estim ate alternate specifications using equal weighted returns as measures of performance. T he estim ates (not 
reported) from both the m odels are similar in m agnitude and significance.
,9 W c m ade a conscious choice of using Sales over Assets as a measure o f firm size because visual inspection revealed that 
som e firms w ith relatively large Sales volum e have lower assets, notably firms in IT industry and proportion of such firms 
increases towards the later half of the sam ple period. However, we checked for robustness of our measure of firm size and 
find no significant difference in the effect of firm size by using log of assets as the control.
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(inside) directors and non-executive (outside) directors. Executive director may have 
closer ties to the incumbent CEO or may be easily influenced by her and may not have 
sufficient interest to replace her for poor performance. The outside directors may have 
better experience in governance and may want to signal their competence to the market 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, the outside directors may have little fi­
nancial stake in the firm to ensure effective monitoring (Weisbach, 1988). Further, the 
directors are members of boards for multiple firms at the same time. A higher number of 
board membership for a director may reflect her competence and expertise. It may also 
lead to dilution in her monitoring and vigilance effort. Thus the proportion of outside 
directors on the board and the average number of board membership of the directors may 
have significant effect on the strength of corporate governance. We also control for CEO 
duality- if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, he may have significant influence 
over the monitoring and vigilance of the board.
Turnover hazard may be correlated with unobservable CEO characteristics like skill 
and ability. To account for unobservables, we control for a range of CEO characteristics.
First, we control for previous experience as CEO in another firm to account for CEO 
skills and competence. A CEO with previous experience may have a different skill set and 
competence compared to a newly promoted CEO. Second, we use an indicator variable 
for external hires to control for whether the CEO has been hired externally or has been 
promoted from within. We also control for the percentage share holding of the CEO in 
the firm. A pr ior i , we may expect tha t a CEO promoted from within and having higher 
equity ownership in the firm will have higher firm specific knowledge and higher degree 
of entrenchment. Thus CEO share-ownership and the mode of hire may have significant 
impact on turnover hazard. We don’t for CEO gender because it may not be apparent 
how gender may impact turnover behaviour and small proportion (6 out of 2703) of 
female CEOs.
We estimate the following empirical model for our analysis:
c\og\og(Turnoverit) =  a  +  (3-^Duratioriit +  {32ROAit +  P3IndustryAdjustedValueW eightedReturnsit +  
/3ASalesit +  P5X it +  /36Governanceit +  eit (4-10)
In equation (4.10), Duration^ refers to the annual spells of CEO tenure. We create 
indicator variables for each year for which an incumbent CEO is in office. These indicator 
variables capture the effect of each unit increase in CEO tenure on the hazard of exit 
and circumvent distributional assumptions. The use of multiple time spells may lead to 
a loss of degrees of freedom and fluctuations in hazard functions.
The vector X it controls for all other observable CEO and firm characteristics tha t 
may be associated with CEO turnover. /35 captures the contemporaneous effects of these 
param eters on hazard of CEO exit. j36 reflects the effect of governance varibales on 
the baseline hazard. If badly governed firms are associated with a lower CEO turnover 
hazard, the signs of the coefficients on board independence, CEO duality and percentage 
share ownership of the CEO can be expected to be positive.
To estimate the effect of takeovers on the probability of CEO turnover, we modify the 
baseline hazard by adding an indicator for events of takeover and estim ate the following 
equation:
c\og\og(Turnoverit) =  a +  /31Durationit +  /32ROAit +  P3RelativeValueW eightedReturnsit+
/34Salesit +  P5X it +  /36Governanceit +  /3rTakeoverit +  eit (4.11)
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The dummy Takeoverit takes the value of ‘1’ if an event of a sample firm being ac­
quired in a particular year and ‘0’ otherwise. To capture the lagged effects, we also use 
T a k e o v e r and Takeoveritt_2 dummies for the years following an event of takeover.20 In 
alternate specifications, we use contemporaneous and lagged indicators for takeovers by 
foreign acquiring firms.
The CEOs and firms in this study may have some unobserved characteristics th a t in­
fluences outcomes for instance, some firms more may be more prone to have tender offers 
and some CEOs more prone to face the hazard of turnover. If unobserved heterogeneity 
between the subjects due to omitted variables is not accounted for, the duration depen­
dence of the baseline hazard will be overestimated (if it is a negative relationship) or 
underestim ated (if it is a positive relationship). Observations with high frailty fail faster, 
ceteris paribus, so survivors at any given time would be have increasing proportions of 
subjects who face lower hazards. So, as discussed in subsection 4.4.2, we seek to  control 
for unobserved heterogeneity.
4.4.1 The Com peting Risk Approach
In the above analysis we make an implicit assumption th a t an individual in a given state  
(j) either exits through failure in state (k) or remains in state (j) across a given time 
interval t. This may imply that hazard of CEO exit are similar across all modes of CEO 
exit i.e. the hazard of dismissal is the same as the likelihood of retirement over a CEO ’s 
tenure. However, such assumptions may not reveal the underlying dynamics of CEO 
exit as CEOs exit the firm through various mutually exclusive states viz. resignation, 
retirement, dismissal, etc. These states are competing in the sense th a t they censor each 
other. To account for that, we require a modelling approach th a t allows for individuals to
20 In som e cases, the target firms are integrated with the acquiring firm in the year of the event and ceases to exist as 
before. The lagged effects could not be calculated for such events. However, visual inspection suggests that all these events 
resulted in the dism issal of the CEO of the target firm in the; year of turnover.
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exit through multiple failure states and allows for right hand censoring. 21 The competing 
risk models are often used to model multiple exit states in duration analysis.
Alternatively, a single risk state can be modelled while controlling for each exit state 
as covariates. Although simple in computation and easier to interpret, this approach 
linearizes all other covariates across exit states. In the context of CEO turnover, it will 
imply th a t over the tenure of a CEO, the hazard of exit through retirement may not be 
the similar to the hazard of being dismissed. From managerial entrenchment perspective, 
an entrenched CEO will reduce her risk of being dismissed but the risk of retirement will 
rise with increasing CEO tenure. Therefore, we use competing risk models in our analysis 
to account for the probability of CEOs making exit through multiple failure states.
Exit states denote an exit to a different destination state. For each failure state, 
observations at all time intervals di are zero except the last, where the last is equal to 
’1’ iff the individual exits to tha t state. Hence, there is a hazard for each j  time period 
for each exit state. For each exit state (m), we can estimate equation (4.10). We assume 
proportionality of hazards and estimate complementary log-log model.
The likelihood of exit to a given failure state m (nm) and the survival time until 
failure via state m (rm) both depend on hazards to each failure state, through the overall 
survival function:
oo oo /  M
IIm =  ^  ] hmt St-1 • Tm= — ^ ' thmt St-1, S t= I 1- ^  ' hms
t= 1  m t= 1  5 = 1  V 7 7 1 = 1
W here s is the survival function at time t.
We can estimate the probability of exit via state m conditional on exiting during 
interval t  :




. t o  =  1,2  M. (4.13)
The baseline hazards can be specified as:
(4.14)
where x is the sample mean.
4.4.2 Controlling for Unobserved H eterogeneity
We have controlled for many of the conceivable param eters th a t may impact on the 
probability of post-acquisition CEO turnover. However, it may still be possible to have 
om itted variable bias resulting from some other param eter th a t simultaneously effects the 
probability of being taken over and the probability of CEO dismissal such as the nature of 
the industry the firm operates in. Due to the heterogeneity of the different industries, the 
CEOs may be exposed to higher risk of post-takeover exit in some particular industries 
than  in others. It may also be argued that targets of acquisition are hardly a random 
sub-sample of firms. If unobserved heterogeneity is not accounted for, the shape of the 
baseline hazard and the param eter estimates can be severely biased (Flinn and Heckman, 
1982; Heckman and Singer, 1984).
Assuming unobservables are constant over time, frailty models were estimated to  con­
trol for heterogeneity at the industry and firm levels .
A random intercept cloglog model allows for the difference of survival times of subjects 
th a t can be grouped at industry and firm levels. Conditioning on the covariates, a  positive 
random intercept term, for each group is added in the cloglog model.
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where
Ci: d i j , X i j~N (0. ip) (4.15)
The hazard function is therefore modified as:
hij(t) =  1 -  exp[-Cj exp(xi/3 +  7,-(*))]
= 1 -  exp[- exp(xifi + 7 j(t) + «i)] (4-16)
where u =  logC and has a density gv(v) for the random variable v (v > 0) introduced to  
capture the effects of unobservables, so that:
h(t) =  h0(t) exp — h0(t) exp (a^ /3 + (4.17)
h0(t) represents the baseline hazard. The discrete time likelihood for turnover of an 
individual CEO will therefore be:
L i ( / 3 > 7 ) =  f  h = 1 Y [ h j ( t  \ x , U i ) y i j [l -  h j ( t  \ x . U i ) 1 - ^ ] ]  g ^ u j d u t  (4.18)
J — OO
with hj(t | x. q) = 1 — exp[— exp(xi/3 + 7 j(t) + «i)]
The exponentiated random intercept, exp ( ( {), is the shared frailty of the subjects
belonging to  a certain grouping classification. Since we do not observe the heterogeneities,
in principle equation 4.18 cannot be estimated. This problem can be circumvented by
assuming a param etric distribution of the frailties. Stewart (1996) discusses several
functional forms to estimate the maximum likelihood in presence of frailty terms. The 
most commonly used distributions are Gamma (Lancaster, 1979) and Gaussian (Behrman
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et al. 1990; Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993). The Gamma distribution assumption 
yields a closed form solution for the likelihood function but the Gaussian assumption 
does not.
In this chapter, we use both the Gaussian quadrature technique and Gamma frailty 
estimations to control for unobserved heterogeneity and the effects of om itted variables. 
We acknowledge tha t the choice of heterogeneity distributions may effect the param eter 
estimates and a non-parametric strategy suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) may 
overcome the distribution restrictions. However, in addition to being computational 
intensive, the Heckman and Singer (1984) methodology has been criticized for being 
sensitive to the specification of the hazard (Trussell and Richards, 1985). For our analysis, 
we use firm performance measures tha t are relative to the median firm in the industry. 
Hence, we partially control for unobserved industry-wide fluctuations in our performance 
measures. Therefore, we believe tha t the choice of distribution of heterogeneity would 
not significantly alter our results.
4.5 R esu lts
The hazard function of CEO dismissal with tenure is presented in Figure 4.1. The hazard 
of CEO exit in the early years of tenure rises with tenure and then starts declining. The 
CEO hazard function is likely to increase in information asymmetry (Jovanovic, 1979). 
Once all the poor performers are revealed, the hazard of CEO exit decreases with the 
decrease in information asymmetry and only the better performers survived. An alternate 
argument is th a t after the initial years, the CEOs entrench themselves in the firm by 
exerting their managerial power, thereby reducing the hazard of turnover (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003). This is consistent with the human capital perspective th a t CEOs early in 
their career have lower firm-specific human capital and lower opportunity cost of job loss.
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Therefore the likelihood of CEO departure or dismissal is high during the early years of 
tenure and falls with further increase in tenure. In the following sections we present the 
results of our estimations.
4.5.1 Are CEOs replaced for Poor Performance?
Table 4.4 documents the results of our baseline turnover model. The estimates reported 
are the hazard ratios. A hazard ratio greater than  ’1’ indicates a positive association 
of the independent variable with the turnover hazard and a hazard ratio less than  ’1’ 
indicates negative effect of a covariate on the baseline hazard. Additionally, we report 
marginal effects in Table 4.14.
We report estimates with the accounting measures of firm performance (column 1) 
and benchmarked value weighted return of the firm (column 3). Column (2) and (4) 
additionally controls for governance measures. The estimates reported can be interpreted 
as elasticities.
Our results are consistent with the principal-agent perspective. The measures of 
performance show a significant negative association with the hazard of turnover. A 
unit decrease in accounting performance, measured as ROA, increases the likelihood of 
CEO turnover by 3.4 percentage points. Similarly, a percentage point decrease in value 
weighted return in the firm’s stock with respect to the median firm in the industry in­
creases the hazard of exit by 1.3%. Our results are comparable with the estimates of 
Kaplan and Minton (2012). CEO replacement decisions may not be solely based on 
firm performance in the current period but may also be influenced by past performance. 
Therefore, we control for lagged firm performance. Past performance significantly affects 
the hazard of CEO turnover. However, the magnitude of the effects are smaller than  th a t 
for contemporaneous performance. This effect persists till the second lag of performance. 
The effects of third lags of performance measures are insignificant at conventional lev­
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els. The statistically significant estimates on industry-benchmarked returns suggest th a t 
CEOs are increasingly being replaced for poor performance relative to the industry. Our 
results suggest th a t CEOs are increasingly being replaced for poor accounting perfor­
mance as well as poor industry-adjusted returns. There may be potential non-linearities 
in the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover decisions. We examine the effects 
of the performance quartiles on internal CEO turnover and turnover following takeovers. 
The results are reported in Table 4.12. There is no suggestion of non-linear effects of 
performance on takeover-driven turnover. For internal turnover, CEO of a firm in the 
upper quartile of firm performance is twice as likely to be replaced for poor performance 
than  CEO of firm in the lower quartile. CEOs of firms having an ROA over 7.75 is more 
likely to be replaced. Thus there is evidence of non-linearity in the effect of performance 
on CEO turnover.
Further, the risk in firm’s operating and information environment may have an impact 
on the hazard of CEO turnover. We control for firm risk with the volatility in firm’s 
monthly value weighted returns over the period of a given year. We find a positive 
association of firm risk with hazard of turnover. A percentage point increase in firm risk 
increases the hazard of turnover by 1.47%.
We control for a range of CEO characteristics tha t may impact the dismissal function. 
First, we use CEO pay as a covariate to control for the fact th a t high paid CEOs may 
face a higher hazard of turnover due to higher performance expectations. Our results 
suggests th a t CEO pay has an insignificant effect on the hazard of CEO turnover.
Second, we test for the effect of firm size on the hazard of turnover. We find an 
insignificant impact of firm size on the baseline hazard. Thus CEOs of bigger and smaller 
firms in the sample face similar hazards of CEO exit for poor firm performance.
Further, the estimates on previous CEO experience in another firm in the same uni­
verse of firms, used as a proxy for CEO ability, has been estimated to be statistically
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insignificant. Thus, controlling for performance,previous CEO experience doesn’t  appear 
to reduce the hazard of turnover for a CEO.
Finally, we control for the cost of CEO removal. A p rio r i, we may expect a higher 
cost of CEO replacement to lower the hazard of CEO exit. We find term ination payment 
entitlement to be negatively associated with the hazard of CEO exit across all specifi­
cations, indicating th a t higher cost of CEO removal may lower the hazard of exit for 
non-performing managers.
To control for managerial power and governance, we augment the baseline specifica­
tions with a range of governance parameters in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 4.4. If 
the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, he may have a disproportionate influence on 
the pay setting and dismissal process. Similarly, a higher equity ownership of the firm 
may lead to higher degree of managerial entrenchment. A higher ownership of the CEO 
also makes it costly to replace her post-takeover (Brunello, et al. 2003). Alternatively, a 
higher equity ownership may also expose the CEO to greater firm risk.
From the results in column (3) and (4), a higher percentage of stock ownership of 
the CEO reduces the hazard of exit by 4.7%. A similarly pronounced effect is observed 
for CEO duality wherein all other things held constant, a Chairman-CEO faces a 3.7% 
lesser risk of turnover. Our results suggest partial managerial entrenchment. We further 
analyze the impact of governance in mitigating managerial entrenchment.
We find evidence tha t smaller boards are associated with a higher hazard of turnover. 
Smaller boards may involve more rigorous evaluation of performance and enforcement 
of dismissal mechanism. The Board Independence variable sheds light on the role of 
outside directors on CEO turnover mechanism. Consistent with Conyon (1998) and Ka­
plan and Minton (2012), we find tha t a higher percentage of external directors on the 
board increases turnover hazard by 9.2%. Further, we examine the effect of busy di­
rectors on boardroom monitoring. For each percentage point increase in the average
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number of board memberships of the directors of a firm, the hazard of turnover reduces 
by 2.1%. According to the efficient market hypothesis a higher number of board mem­
berships would imply greater competence of the director. However, our results suggest 
th a t higher numbers of board membership may dilute boardroom vigilance and decrease 
the likelihood of CEO replacement for poor performance.
The SOX and NYSE and NASDAQ reforms of 2002 arguably has led to a more 
demanding governance regime. We test if these governance regulations had an impact 
on the baseline hazard of CEO turnover. The results are presented in Table 4.4.
In the second sub-period of the sample (2003-2010), CEOs are exposed to  33% more 
hazard of turnover due to poor performance. This suggests partial effectiveness of SOX 
and stock market reforms in aligning interests of the CEO and the shareholders. Board 
independence has an insignificant effect on CEO turnover hazard in the first sub-period 
(1992-2001) but in the second sub-period (2003-2010), an independent board is more 
likely to replace a non-performing manager. This finding provides support to the effec­
tiveness of the Board independence regulations formulated by NASDAQ and NYSE in 
2002. Thus, over the period of study, increasing strength of corporate governance has 
made CEO jobs more risky.
C om p etin g  R isks
At every point in her tenure, a CEO faces risk of various exit states. These exit states are 
mutually exclusive and may have different time paths. Since the events censor each other, 
they are often referred to as competing events. Geddes and Vinod (1997) circumvent 
this issue by excluding subjects tha t experience competing events. Gregory-Smith et al 
(2009) employs competing risk estimation to compare the hazards of competing events 
by estimating a proportional hazard model stratified by each risk type. For this analysis, 
we use competing risk estimates for our discrete event-time panel data. We identify three
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different exit states for internal turnover: Retirement, Resignation and Forced turnover.
The variation of turnover hazard with CEO tenure is presented in Figure 4.2. Retire­
ment is the least likely exit state in the early years of tenure but the likelihood increases 
steadily and is the most likely outcome in the later years of CEO tenure. The likelihood 
of turnovers through resignation and forced exit seems to follow similar trends over a 
CEO ’s tenure. The likelihood of resignation and forced turnover increases and then de­
creases in CEO tenure. These results are consistent with findings of Gregory-Smith et 
at. (2009).
The results are presented in Table 4.8. Columns (l)-(3) reports the effects of the 
covariates on the baseline hazards for Forced Turnover, Retirement and Resignation, 
respectively. From column (1), firm performance is negatively associated with the prob­
ability of forced turnover. A percentage point decrease in firm performance leads to a 
4.5 % increase in the likelihood of CEO dismissal. This effect is larger than  the effect 
of performance on the probability of CEO exit through retirement and resignation in 
specifications (2) and (3). Consistent with an optimal contracting perspective, firm per­
formance increases the hazard of forced exit for the CEO. However, firm performance is 
significant and positively associated with the probability of resignation. A better per­
forming CEO has a greater likelihood of resigning and presumably accepting other job 
offers. A high performing CEO may also tender resignation after accumulating enough 
wealth and leaving for different challenges. The positive association of performance with 
likelihood of resignations may be driven by the CEOs in very high performing firms. 
This could be investigated using a categorical variable for performance quartiles and 
testing the effect of performance quartiles on the probability of resignations. We could 
address this issue in future research by using a categorical variable for the quartiles of 
firm performance and examining the effect of each quartile of firm performance on the 
likelihood of CEO resignation. The effect of performance on the likelihood of retirement
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is insignificant at all conventional levels.
Chairman-CEOs are less likely to be replaced or resign than their non-Chairman 
counterparts. Similarly, CEOs with higher equity holdings in the firm face a lower hazard 
of exit through dismissal or resignation. A larger equity holding in the firm may increase 
the opportunity cost of resignation. Higher CEO ownership may also lead to  greater 
managerial power or better incentive alignment and thereby lower the likelihood of being 
dismissed. CEO stock ownership and CEO duality are not significantly associated with 
the hazard of retirement.
Further, we examine the effects of governance on the baseline hazard for each exit 
state. Our measures of board characteristics and composition have statistically significant 
association with forced turnovers only. The effect of governance param eters on hazard of 
retirement and resignation are statistically insignificant. Controlling for performance, a 
smaller and more independent board is more likely to dismiss a CEO. Similarly a more 
busy board is less likely to dismiss a CEO for poor performance. Gregory-Smith et al. 
(2009) reports significant negative association of percentage of outside directors on the 
board to the probability of forced departure. We find evidence th a t board size and board 
busyness are also significant predictors of forced turnover.
M anagerial E ntrenchm ent vs In form ation  assym etry
From the previous discussion, the hazard of exit varies with CEO tenure, increasing in 
the initial years of tenure, peaking at just over 5 years and decreasing subsequently. 
This hazard profile may have competing explanations from managerial entrenchment 
and information revelation perspectives. In the early years of tenure, the information 
asymmetry between the firm and the CEO is likely to be high. If the job-incumbent 
match is not optimal, there may be some early dismissals and resignations. Over the 
period of tenure, information asymmetry is likely to decrease, leading to survival of the
better fit incumbents. Alternatively, increasing CEO tenure may lead to managerial 
entrenchment and captured boards, thereby reducing likelihood of exit. To investigate 
these alternative explanations, we split our sample at the median CEO tenure of 7 years. 
In Table 4.9, we report the results of our competing risk models for CEOs with tenure 
less than  7 years (columns 1-3) and CEOs with tenure greater than 7 years (columns 
4-6). In column (1) and (4), we estimate the effects of covariates on hazard of forced 
turnover and in columns (2) and (5) we estimate the hazard of resignation.
In this analysis, we use alternate measures for performance to test for possible effects 
of managerial entrenchment on performance parameters. A risk-averse and entrenched 
CEO will try  to maximize her utility by decreasing the turnover hazard and increas­
ing pay. This objective can be facilitated by adopting a low-risk performance criteria 
for evaluation. Using accounting and benchmarked stock return performance, we test 
for possible switching of performance criteria. In columns (1), (2), (4) and (5), we use 
benchmarked value weighted return and ROA as measures of firm performance. In spec­
ifications (3) and (6), we use return on assets as a measure of performance to  test for 
possible switching effects for all internal exit modes combined together.
For CEOs with a tenure greater than 7 years, firm performance has a marginal impact 
on the baseline hazard of turnover. The association of firm performance with the hazard 
for forced turnover and resignation are stronger when CEOs are in office for less than  7 
years. A poor performing CEO is more likely to be dismissed in the first 7 years of her 
tenure. Similarly, a high performing CEO is more likely to resign in the first 7 years of 
tenure. The effect of firm performance on the hazard of resignation is only marginally 
significant at 10% level. Further, the lagged measures of performance are estimated to 
be insignificant, indicating tha t long serving CEOs can shield themselves from effects of 
poor past performance.
We find evidence of possible switching in performance evaluation criteria. For tenure
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less than  7 years, the estimates of both benchmarked value weighted return and return 
on asset are significant across specifications (1) and (3). However, for tenure greater 
than  7 years, only ROA is strongly associated with the hazard of exit. The estimates of 
benchmarked value weighted return in specifications (4) and (5) are lower than  th a t in 
(1), (2) and (6) and are borderline significant. It seems then tha t long serving CEOs can 
successfully switch from more risky performance evaluation measures (benchmarked value 
weighted return) to low-risk measures of performance (Return on Assets). According to 
the managerial power hypothesis, a long-serving CEO may entrench herself in the firm 
and thereby reduce the probability of being dismissed. Our results suggest th a t one 
way a CEO can achieve this is by switching the benchmark performance to a low-risk 
performance indicator. The param eter estimates on governance variables retain their 
usual sign and significance.
In summary, our results suggest tha t poor performing CEOs are increasingly likely 
to be dismissed. Small and more independent boards are more effective in replacing 
poor performing CEOs. We also find evidence of a possible managerial entrenchment 
effect whereby lower likelihood of dismissal for CEOs with high tenure can be partially 
attribu ted  to  managerial entrenchment and possible switching to low-risk performance 
evaluation measures.
4.5.2 Do Takeovers increase the hazard of CEO turnover?
The market for corporate control may have an impact on replacing poor performing 
managers. A poor performing firm may have a higher risk of being taken over, leading 
to higher likelihood of CEO turnover. We analyze the effects of takeovers on the baseline 
hazard for CEO exit by using an indicator variable for takeover in the year of the event.22
22In cases where the takeover was com pleted over a period of more than year, we recorded takeover to have occured in 
the year of tender offer.
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However, the CEO turnover due to takeover may occur at a lag and hence we control for 
lagged effects of takeover on CEO turnover hazard. The results are presented in Table 
4.5.23 If takeovers affect the hazard of CEO exit, it can be expected th a t poor performing 
managers are more likely to be replaced. In our analysis, we control for accounting 
measure of firm performance in column (1) and relative share return performance in 
column (2). Figure 4.1 shows th a t takeovers shifts the hazard function upwards, signifying 
a higher degree of hazard faced by CEOs in the events of their firms being taken over.
Consistent with the findings of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and Buchholtz et al. 
(2003), we estimate tha t takeovers double the likelihood of CEO exit. In the event of a 
takeover, the CEO of the target firm is 129% more likely to be replaced in the year of ten­
der offer or in the year following the takeover. However, the hazard of exit due to takeover 
is insignificant for the second lag. CEOs in poorly performing firms are more likely to 
be replaced post-takeover. Both measures of firm performance employed are significant 
and negatively associated with the turnover hazard. The performance sensitivity of CEO 
turnover in the events of takeover is similar to the performance sensitivity of internal 
turnovers. Kaplan and Minton (2012) find no significant association of firm performance 
to probability of CEO turnover. Using a larger dataset, we suggest th a t takeovers act as 
external force of management discipline and replace non-performing managers. This is 
consistent with the disciplinary nature of takeovers in the sixth merger wave (2003-2008).
To test the effect of the nationality of the acquiring firm on post-takeover CEO hazard, 
we use indicators for domestic takeovers (if the acquirer is listed on an US stock exchange) 
and international (if the acquirer is not listed in US stock exchange). CEOs in firms 
th a t are acquired by an overseas firm are about 50% more likely to be replaced than  in 
target firms acquired by US firms. This may be attributed to differences in organization 
culture, geographic differences, and higher probability of managerial hubris (Duru and
23 Marginal effects are reported in Table 4.14.
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Reeb, 2002).
Finally, we control for the change in control payment, th a t is, the monetised value 
of the compensation due to a CEO for involuntary turnover in the event of takeover. 
The cost of replacing the CEO of the target firm is negatively associated with hazard of 
post-takeover CEO exit. The results are consistent with the findings of Hambrick and 
Cannella (1993) and Buchholtz et al. (2003) and robust to different firm performance 
specifications. Thus ’Golden Parachute’ schemes partially shield the CEOs from being 
replaced after takeovers.
In section 4.5.1, we reported evidence in favour of partial managerial entrenchment. 
We analyze whether managerial entrenchment has any significant effect on the hazard 
of post-takeover turnovers. If CEO entrenchment does not effect the likelihood of post­
takeover turnovers, then it may seem th a t market for corporate control is more effective 
in replacing entrenched CEOs than  internal controls. Our results are inconclusive on 
this. Unlike the results for internal turnovers, CEO duality is unrelated to  post-takeover 
turnover hazards. However, higher stock-ownership of the CEO in the firm reduces the 
hazard of post-takeover turnover by 4.8%. The lower turnover hazard for CEOs with 
ownership may be due to either managerial entrenchment or higher cost of replacing the 
CEO.
Augmenting our baseline model with the indicator for takeover, we find board inde­
pendence and board busyness to have insignificant effects on hazard of turnover. The 
effect of board size is borderline significant, with a smaller board being associated with 
higher hazard of post-takeover exit. These results, in conjunction with the performance 
sensitivity of post-takeover exit, suggests th a t effects of governance controls and takeovers 
in replacing non-performing managers are susbstitutes to some degree.
Thus, our results suggest tha t takeovers increase the risk of CEO exit, particularly 
for poor performing managers. We also provide first evidence on the effect of nationality
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of the acquiring firm on hazard of post-takeover CEO exit and note th a t target CEOs 
are more likely to be replaced by an international acquirer than by a domestic acquiring 
firm.
U nob served  H eterogen eity  C orrections
It may be argued th a t target firms are not a random sub-sample and the likelihood 
of being taken over may be driven by some unobserved endogenous factors. This can 
arise out of disproportionate takeover activities in different industries. Similarly, certain 
geographical clusters may be have a more active takeover market due to strategic reasons. 
In our analysis we test for unobserved heterogeneity in different industry classifications 
to control for endogenous likelihood of takeovers by omitting industry dummies in the 
frailty analysis.
We use param etric estimations of unobserved heterogeneity and estimate random ef­
fects cloglog models and Gamma frailty models to control for potential endogeneity in 
takeovers and CEO exit. The results are presented in Table 4.6.
The p-value of the likelihood test in random effect cloglog estimation is 0.496, which 
is not significant at conventional levels. Therefore, the null hypothesis of frailty estimate 
is equal to zero cannot be rejected and this result confirms tha t there is no significant 
frailty in the model. Similar results were obtained from gamma frailty tests. Likelihood 
tests indicate th a t there is no significant frailty and the param eter estimates are in the 
same order when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
In Table 4.6, the models are simplified by omitting the lags of the financial param eters 
and the dummies for domestic and international takeovers. This simplification is neces­
sary because the random components models are otherwise difficult to converge. Thus, 
industry classification of the firms does not seem to be a source of bias in our estimation.
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4.5.3 Robustness Issues
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results to alternate choice of variables, 
classification of turnovers and estimation methods.
First, the classification of turnover based on reports in the financial press may in­
duce bias in estimation (Parrino, 1997). We use alternate classification of turnovers to 
estimate the competing risks. Peters and Wagner (2012) argue tha t the financial press 
follows certain types of firms and industries more than others and hence the reporting of 
reasons and analysis for CEO turnover may not be consistent across industries. Thus, we 
construct an alternative indicator of forced turnover which indicates a forced turnover if 
the departing CEO is less than 55 years of age and the reason for turnover is not classi­
fied as death, ill-health or immediate employment as CEO in another firm. This m ethod 
of classifying forced turnover overestimates the number of forced turnover below the age 
threshold and underestimates the number of forced turnover above the age threshold with 
respect to our first method of classification. Using this method, we classify 368 forced 
turnovers, 58 resignations and 48 retirements. The competing risk estimation results 
are tabulated in Table 4.10. There is no significant difference in estimated effects and 
significance from our earlier estimation.
Second, to confirm that our results are not simply an artefact of the complementary 
log-log model, we use Cox Proportional Hazard estimation for our baseline specification. 
The present the proportional hazards results in Table 4.11. We observe some differences 
in significance levels of some estimates but the effects are qualitatively similar.
Third, we test the robustness of our results across the distribution of firm performance 
and board characteristics. We use a categorical variable to capture the effect across 
different performance quartiles. The results are reported in Table 4.12. The results are 
not significantly different for the different quartiles of firm performance. Firms in the
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75th percentile of performance has stronger performance sensitivity of turnover hazards 
for forced turnovers and resignations. However, the estimates for the median and the 
25th percentile are also significant at 5% levels. Thus, the performance sensitivity of our 
estimations are not driven by outliers in firm performance.
The effect of the board size in the 25th percentile on forced turnover probability is 
insignificant. This may suggest tha t while larger boards dissipate the monitoring and 
vigilance of the board, a very small board size may not also have the desired effect. If the 
board size is too small, the directors may be overworked and not be able to be vigilant 
about wide range of governance m atters These results indicate th a t there may exist a 
optimum range for board size for effective monitoring. We don’t address this issue in this 
research. Similar results are obtained for board busyness. The effects of busy board in 
the 25th percentile on CEO turnover probability is insignificant. While a small number 
of directorships held by the directors may not dissipate the strength of governance, or 
may indeed reveal the competence of the directors, a larger number of board membership 
of the directors reduce the strength of monitoring and vigilance.
Finally, we were concerned tha t the estimated hazards may be driven largely by me­
chanical association in industries with more active takeover market and higher turnover 
rates. Therefore, we re-estimate our model excluding the High Tech industry which 
has the highest proportion of takeovers and highest turnover rate the sample period. 
Technology as an industry in our classification consists of 45 SIC codes for high tech 
manufacturing (SIC codes: 35XX, 36XX, 38XX), communications services (SIC codes: 
48XX), and software and computer-related services (SIC codes: 73XX). We recognize 
tha t this may not be the exhaustive classification of high tech industries and some allied 
industries may have been omitted but we believe th a t this would not make significant 
difference to  our results. The results of estimation with the reduced sample presented in 
Table 4.13 are not significantly different from our original estimation.
Thus, our results appear robust to alternate classification of turnovers, across the 
distribution of firm performance and governance variables and to choice of alternate 
estimation techniques.
4.6  C onclusion
The domain of CEO turnover, particularly around the events of change in corporate 
control is under represented in economic literature. In this chapter, we analyze the 
determ inants of internal and post-takeover CEO turnover for S&P 1500 firms from 1992- 
2010 .
There has been a secular rise in CEO turnover hazard in the sample period. Total 
turnover in the sample period is 31.63% indicating average CEO tenure of 7.83 years. In 
the later sub-period of our sample, concurrent with the period after the promulgation 
of Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 and the stock market reforms, there has been a decrease 
in the median CEO tenure and higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. 
These results indicate partial effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in enforc­
ing managerial discipline. Thus, the CEO job has become increasingly risky and th a t 
the lifetime earning of a CEO has decreased. 24
Takeovers significantly increase the hazard of CEO turnover. Controlling for perfor­
mance, CEOs in target firms are twice as likely to be replaced with respect to firms 
which have not had a tender bid. Further, cross border acquisitions are associated with 
higher hazards of exit compared to domestic takeovers. In conjunction with findings of 
Guest (2009) on the effects of target nationality on post-acquisition CEO pay, my result 
makes fundamental contribution to the literature on CEO labour market. The perfor­
24 If the severance pay lias increased consistently to com pensate for decreasing tenure, the life tim e earning may not
have decreased significantly. However, in our later chapters, we find that the severance pay provisions have only increased  
m odestly.
mance sensitivity of both internal and post-takeover turnovers are similar, indicating th a t 
takeovers act as an alternate "force of managerial discipline " (Mikkelson and Partch, 
1997). Further, we find evidence of the indexing of CEO turnover to industry perfor­
mance. Bebchuk and Fried (2002) criticizes board of directors for lack of performance 
indexing in CEO pay. Our evidence suggests tha t decisions on CEO replacements may 
be made on the basis on industry-benchmarked performance.
Consistent with the managerial power hypothesis of Bebchuk and Fried (2004), CEO 
duality and higher equity ownership of the CEO reduces the hazard of turnover. A more 
independent board on the other hand increases the performance sensitivity of turnover. 
In addition, we find evidence tha t CEOs with longer tenure may be able to switch the 
evaluation criteria to a low-risk performance measure (viz. Return on Assets).
The results of this paper have a number of policy implications. Consistent with the 
findings of Hermalin (2005) and Kaplan and Minton (2012), we provide evidence th a t the 
recent decade of high CEO pay growth is also characterized by a higher risk of turnover. 
In addition, the post-SOX period is characterized by a significantly shorter CEO tenure 
and sensitivity of turnover to performance, highlighting the role of SOX and stock market 
reforms in enforcing corporate discipline.
A higher percentage of outside directors on the board and a smaller board increases the 
performance sensitivity of turnover but the effect is negated if the directors are members 
of multiple boards. Thus a strong case can be made for having a higher representation of 
external directors and lower number of directorships for each individual director on the 
board to ensure stronger monitoring and performance sensitivity.
Finally, as suggested initially by Kaplan and Minton (2012), a decreasing tenure and 
higher performance sensitivity may imply a lesser effective value and a shorter effective 
vesting period of CEO option grants. Current valuations of stock and option grants are 
calculated using Black-Scholes (1979) methodology which is not flexible to such modifi-
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cations. Hence an alternative stock option valuation method may be useful to calculate 
the effective worth of CEO option grants. Execucomp uses a 7-year vesting period. If 
the CEO tenure is falling, this may lead to overestimation of CEO pay.
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Figure 4-1: Summary Statistics of Full sample and Sample with Governance Controls
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Figure 4-3: CEO Turnover Over Time
■  Total T urnover F o rc e d  T u rn o v e r
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Year
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Full Sample and Sample with Governance Controls
Panel A: Full Sample
N Mean Median SD Max Min
Tenure (Years) 15121 9.33 7.83 10.95 43.93“ 2.57
ROA (’000 US$) 14748 2.53 3.81 43.38 3551.35 -1314.88
EBIT (’000 US$) 14872 364.89 66.79 2214.70 83397.00 -108761.00
Average Value 14765 0.0033 0.0115 0.0494 0.1105 -0.1846
weighted Return 
Termination Payment 15081 1393.78 0.00 7272.403 241089.80 0.00
(’000 US$) 
Change in control 15081 3111.11 0.00 12448.36 525360.10 0.00
payment (’000 US$) 
Sale (’000 US$) 15121 4137.88 899.39 13858.90 42507189.00 0.03
CEO Share 15081 0.7022 0.00 3.83 87.60 0.00
Ownership (%) 
Board Size 11522 9.52 9.00 2.63 34.00 3.00
Outside Directors (%) 11522 70.38 71.35 16.87 92.30 55.60
No. of Directorships 11522 2,73 3.10 8.61 14.00 0.00
CEO pay (’000 US$) 15121 4329.13 1610.22 10252.03 295136.40 0.016
Panel B: Reduced Sample for Governance Controls
N Mean Median SD Max Min
Tenure (Years) 11522 8.65 7.03 9.29 43.93 2.57
ROA (’000 US$) 11522 8.61 11.20 39.71 3551.35 -1053.14
Average Value 11522 0.0109 0.0226 0.0094 0.1105 -0.1846
weighted Return 
Termination Payment 11522 1567.50 0.00 6757.20 241089.80 0.00
(’000 US$) 
Change in control 11522 5275.50 0.00 11092.33 525360.10 0.00
payment ( ’000 US$) 
Sale (’000 US$) 11522 5371.66 9879.15 9024.67 42507189.00 2190.03
CEO Share 11522 0.7022 0.00 3.83 87.60 0.00
Ownership (%) 
Board Size 11522 9.52 9.00 2.63 34.00 3.00
Outside Directors (%) 11522 70.38 71.35 16.87 92.30 55.60
No. of Directorships 11522 2.73 3.10 8.61 14.00 0.00
CEO pay (’000 US$) 11522 5016.63 3661.76 9724.10 295136.40 1348.88
“The longest serving CEO in the sample is Warren Buffet of Berkshire Hathaway 
who has been the CEO since 1970.
bDr. Myron W. Wentz of Usana Heath Services Inc. did not take any compensation for 
the year 2004 as reported by Execucomp and cross checked with the DEF-14A  
filings of Usana Heath Services inc. for 2004.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics by Sub-Periods
The sub-periods are designed to examine the effects of governance 
regulations and stock market reforms of 2002.
1993-2002 2003-2010 1993-2010
No. of firms 1632 1884 2755
No. of CEOs 1614 1860 2703
No. of CEO exits 366 489 855
% of CEO exits 22.67% 26.299% 31.63%
No. of Takeover related exits 197 184 381
% of Takeover related exits 12.21% 9.89% 14.10%
Number of Forced exits 104 256 360
% of Forced exits 6.63% 13.76% 13.42%
No. of Resignations 36 30 66
% of Resignations 2.23% 1.61% 2.44%
No. of Retirements 29 19 48
% of Retirements 1.80% 1.02% 1.78%
No. of Internal Turnovers 169 305 474
% of Internal Turnovers 10.47% 16.39% 17.5%
Total Observations 6923 7271 15121
No. of Takeovers 409 435 844
No. of International Takeovers 76 42 118
External CEO 691 1044 1412
Mean Tenure (in Years) 10.73 7.89 9.33
Median Tenure (in Years) 8.79 6.53 7.83
Mean CEO Pay (’000 US$) 2583.84 6166.02 4329.13
Mean Salary (’000 US$) 477.66 719.34 600.92
Mean Bonus (’000 US$) 494.47 620.39 564.06
Mean Cash Compensation (’000 US$) 972.13 1339.74 1164.98
Mean Non-Cash Compensation (’000 US$) 2024.54 1506.53 1725.24
Mean Annual Value 0.0021 0.0053 0.0033
weighted Return
Mean Termination 1137.66 1911.21 1393.78
payment (’000 US$)
Mean Sale (’000 US$) 2530.35 5739.32 4137.88
Mean CEO Share 0.1738 1.288 0.7022
Ownership (%)
Mean Board Size 11.23 9.31 9.52
Mean Outside Directors (%) 64.58 76.21 70.38
Mean No. of Directorships 1.99 2.88 2.73
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CEO Pay -0.000048 0.0000856
Tenure -0.001848 0.048716
One Observation 0.23068 0.1466667
Dependent variable is an indicator which equals ’1’ if there 
is non-reporting of data and ’0’ otherwise.
We use probit estimation to test for selective non-reporting.
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Table 4.4: Duration Model Estimates: All Turnover
(2) (3) (4)
















Weighted Returnt_i (0.044) (0.038)
Benchmarked Value 0.994 0.990
Weighted Returnt _ 2  
CEO Pay
(0.137) (0.114)
0.950 0.991 0.953 0.948
Firm Size (Ln Sales)
(0.240) (0.252) (0.335) (0.350)
0.938 0.988 0.971 0.967
(0.400) (0.385) (0.360) (0.360)

















































(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO turnovers and ’0’ otherwise.
Column (1) and (2) estimates the sensitivity of turnover hazard to accounting measures
of firm performance. Column (3) estimates the stock price elasticity of hazard and
Column (4) estimates the sensitivity of hazard to benchmarked
performance of firm’s stocks. The hazard ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive
association of the variable with the dependent variable. Models are
estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.5: Effect of Takeovers on the Hazard of Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
ROA 0.978** 0.973**
(0.010) (0.007)
Benchmarked Value 0.979** 0.982**
Weighted Return (0.016) (0.020)
Takeover it 2.296*** 2.275** 2.287*** 2.280**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Takeovert_i 1.177** 1.162** 1.171** 1.169**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Takeovert _ 2 1.138 1.141 1.139 1.144
(0.202) (0.178) (0.207) (0.181)
International 3.799** 3.780** 3.744** 3.761**
Takeover^ (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003)
CEO Pay 0.946 0.940* 0.950 0.944
(0.110) (0.090) (0.110) (0.110)
Firm Size (Ln Sales) 1.001 0.947 0.951 0.948
(0.174) (0.160) (0.162) (0.160)
Previous CEO experience 0.984 0.966 0.987 0.991
(0.422) (0.400) (0.425) (0.433)
& V W R 1.177** 1.119** 1.162** 1.112**
(0.017) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
External CEO 1.059 1.027 1.064 1.033
(0.226) (0.187) (0.234) (0.193)
Change in Control 0.939** 0.921** 0.944** 0.952**
Payment (0.004) (0.021) (0.020) (0.050)
Percentage Stock 0.986** 0.973**
Holding (0.005) (0.003)
CEO Duality 0.972 0.979
(0.249) (0.221)
Board Size 0.973** 0.975**
(0.040) (0.037)
Board Independence 1.129 1.122
(0.140) (0.110)
Board Busyness 0.997 0.985
(0.360) (0.330)
The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO turnovers and ’O’ otherwise.
Column (1) and (2) estimates the sensitivity of turnover hazard to accounting measures 
of performance. Column (3) estimates the stock price elasticity of hazard and 
Column (4) estimates the sensitivity of hazard to benchmarked stock. The hazard ratios 
are greater than 1 indicate a positive association of the variable with the dependent 
variable. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.6: Frailty Estimates
Base Model Takeover Model Random Effects Gamma Frailty
Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
Benchmarked Value 0.987* 0.982** 0.980** 0.984**
Weighted Return (0.072) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009)
Takeover jt 2.310*** 2.319** 2.300**
(0.000) (0.013) (0.003)
Percentage Stock 0.953*** 0.983** 0.958** 0.959**
Holding (0.000) (0.004) (0.041) (0.025)
CEO duality 0.967*** 0.969 0.966 0.966
(0.000) (0.127) (0.143) (0.121)
& V W R 1.136** 1.119** 1.122** 1.125**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.015) (0.009)
External CEO 1.091** 1.027 1.018 1.023
(0.031) (0.187) (0.189) (0.166)
Change in Control 0.939** 0.938** 0.929**
Payments (0.004) (0.011) (0.018)
CEO pay 0.950 0.946 0.949 0.938
(0.240) (0.110) (0.118) (0.122)
Firm Size 0.937 1.001 0.993 0.997
(0.400) (0.174) (0.160) (0.162)
Board Size 0.973** 0.979** 0.977 0.982**
(0.003) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005)
Board Independence 1.132** 1.126 1.124 1.129
(0.045) (0.120) (0.110) (0.111)
The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO turnovers and ’O’ otherwise, 
the indicator from ’0’ to ’1’. Models are estimated with robust standard errors 
to control for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%
, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.7: Hazard Estim ates by Sub-Period




weighted return (0.020) (0.025) (0.031)
Takeover^ 2.295*** 1.971*** 2.414***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Size 0.973** 0.979** 0.968**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011)
Board 1.132** 0.989** 1.338**
Independence (0.045) (0.009) (0.035)
Number of 14699 6585 7954
Observations 
Log Likelihood 1690.071 -653.72 -1001.214
The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO turnovers and ’O’ 
otherwise. Estimates on controls for CEO characteristics and firm 
risk are not reported.
Models are estimated with robust standard errors
to control for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Benchmarked Value 0.954*** 1.719** 0.988**
Weighted Return (0.000) (0.007) (0.031)
Benchmarked Value 0.975** 1.014** 0.983*
Weighted Return4_ i (0.019) (0.009) (0.061)
Benchmarked Value 0.967 1.017* 0.988
Weighted Returnt_ 2 (0.141) (0.076) (0.164)
Firm Size 0.988* 0.961 0.971
(Ln Sales) (0.088) (0.234) (0.381)
Percentage Stock 0.979** 0.984** 0.996
Holding (0.006) (0.010) (0.166)
CEO Duality 0.966*** 0.979*** 0.993
(0.000) (0.000) (0.212)
& V W R 1.199** 1.214** 1.009*
(0.004) (0.012) (0.062)
External CEO 1.327** 1.114** 0.997
(0.021) (0.033) (0.231)
Board Size 0.979** 0.992* 1.076
(0.011) (0.077) (0.247)
Board 1.271** 0.984 0.999
Independence (0.023) (0.379) (0.128)
Board 0.992** 0.991* 0.993
Busyness (0.019) (0.092) (0.152)
No. of CEOs 2703 2703 2703
No. of Failures 360 66 48
Log Likelihood 1266.23 836.94 698.19
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Benchmarked Value 0.953*** 1.720** 0.988**
Weighted Return (0.000) (0.007) (0.031)
Benchmarked Value 0.975** 1.014** 0.983*
Weighted Returnt_i (0.019) (0.009) (0.061)
Benchmarked Value 0.967 1.017* 0.988
Weighted Returnt- 2 (0.141) (0.076) (0.164)
Firm Size 0.988* 0.960 0.971
(Ln Sales) (0.088) (0.238) (0.381)
Percentage Stock 0.981** 0.984** 0.996
Holding (0.008) (0.010) (0.166)
CEO Duality 0.962*** 0.979*** 0.993
(0.000) (0.000) (0.212)
& V W R 1.203** 1.214** 1.009*
(0.003) (0.012) (0.062)
External CEO 1.327** 1.114** 0.997
(0.021) (0.033) (0.231)
Board Size 0.979** 0.990* 1.076
(0.016) (0.073) (0.247)
Board 1.275** 0.984 0.999
Independence (0.020) (0.379) (0.128)
Board 0.992** 0.991* 0.993
Busyness (0.019) (0.092) (0.152)
No. of CEOs 2703 2703 2703
No. of Failures 368 58 48
Log Likelihood 1272.56 823.00 698.19
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.11: Cox Proportional Hazard Estim ates
(1) (2)
Internal Turnovers Post-Takeover Turnovers
Benchmarked Value 0.988** 0.986**
Weighted Return (0.031) (0.037)
Benchmarked Value 0.981* 0.977*
Weighted Returnt_ i (0.063) (0.059)
Benchmarked Value 0.989 0.992
Weighted Returnt_ 2 (0.231) (0.246)
Firm Size 0.977 0.972
(Ln Sales) (0.334) (0.389)
Termination Payment 0.962** 0.955*
(0.029) (0.022)
Percentage 0.981** 0.988**
Stock Holding (0.014) (0.009)






External CEO 1.441** 1.344*
(0.033) (0.057)




Board Busyness 0.975* 0.983*
(0.053) (0.067)
Dependent variable is an indicator for Forced Turnover, equals to ’1’ if a CEO 
is dismissed in a given year, ’O’ otherwise.
Column (1) estimates the sensitivity of turnover hazard to accounting measures 
of firm performance. Column (3) estimates the sensitivity of hazard to relative 
performance of firm’s stocks. Specifications (3) and (4) additionally control 
for board size and composition.
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.12: Turnover Hazards Across Performance Quartiles 
to test for association of turnover hazard 
with firm performance and governance parameters 
across the distribution
(1) (2)
Internal Turnovers Post-Takeover Turnovers
Benchmarked Value Weighted Return




Upper Quartile 0.981** 0.982**
(0.001) (0.006)
Firm Size 0.967 0.968
(Ln Sales) (0.360) (0.347)
Board Size




Upper Quartile 0.952** 0.952**
(0.009) (0.013)
Board Independence




Upper Quartile 1.134** 1.217**
(0.007) (0.015)
Board Busyness




Upper Quartile 0.973** 0.967**
(0.038) (0.042)
Models are estimated with controls for lagged performance,
CEO duality and CEO shareholding but are not reported for 
brevity.
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Benchmarked Value 0.971** 0.973**
Weighted Return (0.000) (0.057)
Firm Size 0.970 0.955
(Ln Sales) (0.281) (0.242)
& V W R 1.102** 1.115**
(0.009) (0.013)
Externally 1.004* 1.007*
Hired CEO (0.052) (0.077)
Takeover 2.252***
(0.000)
Percentage Stock 0.987** 0.981**
Holding (0.004) (0.002)
CEO Duality 0.964** 0.975
(0.001) (0.136)






Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.14: Marginal Effects of Covariates: All Turnover
(1) (2) "13) (4)
















Weighted Returnj_i (0.044) (0.033)
Benchmarked Value -0.00077 -0.00080
Weighted Return4_ 2 (0.138) (0.111)
CEO Pay -0.00138 -0.00145 -0.000133 -0.000146
(0.241) (0.249) (0.332) (0.352)
Firm Size (Ln Sales) -0.00134 -0.00129 -0.00131 -0.00133
(0.396) (0.389) (0.356) (0.349)



















































(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO turnovers and ’O’ otherwise.
Column (1) and (2) estimates the marginal effects using accounting measures
of firm performance. Column (3) estimates the stock price elasticity of hazard and
Column (4) estimates the marginal effects for benchmarked
performance of firm’s stocks. A value greater than zero indicates a positive
association of the variable with the dependent variable. Models are
estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 4.15: Marginal Effects of Takovers on Risk of CEO Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Marginal Effects
ROA -0.00079** -0.00077**
(0.010) (0.007)















(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)




International 0.0274** 0.0259** 0.0254**
Takeover^ (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002)
CEO Pay -0.00128 -0.00133 -0.00131 -0.00133
(0.111) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110)
Firm Size (Ln Sales) 0.00003 -0.00130 -0.00133 -0.00131
(0.177) (0.160) (0.166) (0.160)








& V W R 0.00448**
(0.017) (0.003) (0.015) (0.005)






-0.00356**Change in Control -0.00351**













Board Independence 0.0066 0.0060
(0.144) (0.116)
Board Busyness -0.0054 -0.0059
(0.365) (0.330)
The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO turnovers and ’0’ otherwise.
Column (1) and (2) estimates the marginal effects using accounting measures 
of performance. Column (3) estimates the stock price elasticity of hazard and 
Column (4) estimates the marginal effects of benchmarked stock. A coefficient 
greater than zero indicates a positive association of the variable with the dependent 
variable. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Chapter 5
The Impact of Acquisitions on CEO 
Pay
5.1 In troduction
The last decade has witnessed a proliferation of M&A activities of increasing financial 
values. In the year 2000, there were 20,000 M&A deals in the USA worth over USS 
2.5 trillion reaching up to US$ 5.6 trillion by the end of 2007 (Zephyr, 2009). However, 
acquisitions lead to a decline in firm profitability and shareholder’s wealth more often 
than  not (Hughes, 1989; Dickerson et al. 1997). Therefore the motivations of Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) to undertake acquisitions are called into question.
Empirical evidence on CEO pay establishes a strong, positive, and statistically signif­
icant, association between firm size and CEO pay (Conyon and Gregg 1994, Bliss and 
Rosen, 2001). This leads to a concern tha t the motivation behind acquisitions reflect an 
agency problem in CEO compensation contracts (Jensen, 1986; Harford and Li, 2007).
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Empirical studies report tha t CEOs of acquiring firms enjoy higher compensation post­
acquisition (Bliss and Rosen 2001; Grinstein and Hribar 2004). Evidence is inconclusive 
as to whether CEOs are rewarded differentially for good and bad acquisitions. Bliss and 
Rosen (2001) and Anderson, Becher and Campbell (2004) find no evidence of differential 
rewards to CEOs for “good” and “bad” acquisitions. Studies of US and UK firms by 
Khorana and Zenner (1994) and Girma, Thompson and Wright (2006) report decreases in 
CEO pay post ‘wealth reducing’ acquisitions. Their results suggest tha t the acquisition 
premium in CEO pay is contingent on the wealth effects of the acquisition.
If the CEOs undertake acquisitions to increase their pay by increasing firm size, such 
deviation from optimal contracting can potentially be mitigated by strong corporate 
governance. Empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance in post-acquisition 
CEO pay is inconclusive. Anderson et al (2004) finds no evidence th a t CEO share 
ownership or entrenchment has any effect on post-acquisition CEO pay, whereas Grinstein 
and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) report higher post-acquisition 
bonuses in firms with weak corporate governance.
Research on the effect of governance reforms, particularly the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of 2002 (henceforth SOX ), on the post-acquisition premium in CEO pay are few and 
provides inconclusive evidence. Little empirical evidence exists on the difference in CEO 
pay changes in the US for domestic and international acquisitions. This is particularly 
im portant since the fifth merger wave (1994-2000) overlapping with our sample period is 
characterized by a surge of cross border acquisitions. Existing literature uses cash-based 
payments (salary, bonus and other cash payments) as the definitions of CEO pay (Guest 
2009, Girma et al, 2006). The differential impact of acquisitions on equity and non-equity 
components on CEO pay may offer insights into the nature of any acquisition premium 
in pay.
In this chapter we study the effect of acquisitions on the pay of acquiring CEOs using
110
a sample of 1105 domestic and 305 international acquisitions completed by 1525 firms 
listed in S&P 1500 in the period 1992-2010. We examine the effect of acquisitions on 
post-acquisition CEO pay and analyze whether the pay premium is associated with the 
wealth effect of the acquisition. Further, we examine the impact of corporate governance 
and governance regulations, in particular SOX1 on post-acquisition CEO pay.
We contribute to the literature by analysing the effect of governance on CEO pay 
by employing a wider set of governance control. We also seek to estimate the effects 
of governance regulations on the acquisition premium in CEO pay. We control for the 
nationality of the target firm to analyze the effect of cross-border acquisitions on CEO 
pay. Evidence on the effect of cross-border acquisitions for UK firms exist (Guest, 2008) 
but no studies with US sample focus on the effect of target nationality. We seek to test 
the findings of Guest (2008) for US sample. Finally, we attem pt to analyse the effect of 
post-acquisition CEO turnover on the acquisition premium in pay.
Our results suggest a 4% premium in post-acquisition pay of acquiring CEOs which 
increases the pay of the mean CEO undertaking acquisition by US$ 173,000. Further, we 
also examine whether the acquisition premium in CEO pay is contingent upon the effect of 
the acquisition on shareholders’ wealth. In contrast to the findings of Girma, Thompson 
and Wright (2006) for the U.K., we find no evidence of a differential acquisition premium 
in pay for wealth-enhancing and wealth-reducing acquisitions. Finally, we examine the 
impact of governance and governance regulations on post-acquisition CEO pay. Our 
results suggest tha t a small and independent board is associated with a lower acquisition 
premium. The observed acquisition premium in CEO pay can be attributed in part to the 
strength of corporate governance. In the post SOX sub-period, the acquisition premium 
in pay is not significantly associated with the wealth effects of the acquisition, indicating
'T h e  effect of SOX can not be isolated from the effects of the NYSE and NASDAQ  reforms of 2002. However, since all 
these regulations aimed at more transperant governance, our results reflect the overall effect of governance regulations on 
CEO pay.
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a limited impact of governance regulations and systematic agency problems in current 
compensation contracts.
These results suggest tha t CEOs may have misaligned incentives to undertake ac­
quisitions to  increase their own pay. Higher post-acquisition CEO pay can be partially 
attribu ted  to poor corporate governance. We find no significant difference in acquisition 
premium in pay in the post-SOX sub-period. Therefore, we suggest limited success of 
the governance regulations in mitigating agency problems. Finally, our results suggest 
significant survivor bias in the acquisition premium. Controlling for post-acquisition CEO 
turnover, the acquisition premium in pay is reduced to 2%.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows- Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
relevant literature on the debate on firm size-CEO pay elasticity and the effects of M&A 
on CEO pay. Section 3 discusses the data  and in Section 4 we discuss the choice of 
methodology and robustness tests. Findings from empirical analysis are discussed in 
Section 5 whereas Section 6 concludes.
5.2 T heory and L iterature R eview
Two differing views on CEO compensation exist in the economic literature. The principal- 
agent view of incentive alignment suggests tha t CEOs are rewarded for their skills and 
contribution to company performance and tha t under the condition of incomplete moni­
toring, a reward structure should be designed to align the interests of the (risk-neutral) 
shareholders and the (risk-averse) CEOs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory posits 
a strong link between firm performance and CEO pay. Bebchuk et al (2003) argues th a t 
the optimal contracting framework is fraught with problems of moral hazard as moni­
toring and incentive alignments are only partial and often costly. Consistent with his
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argument, empirical evidence suggests that the statistical relationship between CEO pay 
and firm performance is weak and less robust to changes in specifications and functional 
form of the variables. Conyon and Leech (1994) finds weak pay-performance relationship 
in UK firms. Murphy (1999) notes that there exists a statistically significant but small 
positive association between CEO pay and firm performance. The performance sensitiv­
ity in CEO pay was estimated to be of the order of 0.12-0.16 (Coughlan and Schmidt 
1985; Murphy, 1999).
Hall and Liebmann (1998) used a wider definition of CEO pay to include stock and 
option grants for a sample of 478 US firms from 1980-1994 to report a stronger association 
of pay and performance. Omitting the variances of stock and option grants from the 
model is shown to create a downward bias in pay-performance sensitivity.
In contrast, a large body of literature reports a positive and robust association be­
tween CEO pay and firm size which is stronger than the CEO pay-firm performance 
elasticity (Bliss and Rosen 2001, Murphy 1999). These findings are consistent with the 
implications of tournam ent theory which predicts that compensation is a convex func­
tion of organizational levels (Lambert et al. 1993; Main et al, 1993). CEO pay-firm size 
sensitivity is of comparable magnitude (0.20-0.35) across different temporal, industry- 
specific and geographic dispersion of the sample (Rosen, 1992). This could be because 
firm size acts as an easily available and unambiguous yardstick for the board of directors 
and remuneration committees to benchmark CEO pay (Rosen 1992; Conyon 1997).
An alternative explanation for the high levels and rapid growth of CEO pay can be 
provided using arguments related to managerial power and rent capture. Core et al. 
(1999) and Harford and Li (2007) provide evidence tha t CEOs of firms with weaker 
corporate governance are systematically paid higher than their contemporaries in firms 
with stronger corporate governance. The dual role of CEOs as the Chairman of the Board 
significantly increases managerial influences over the board (Brickley et al. 1997) and
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reduces the degree of independent monitoring by the board (Jensen, 1994). Empirical 
studies also note th a t CEOs receive higher pay if they have a greater influence in the 
nomination and selection of board of directors (Main et al. 1993; Core et al. 1999).
The relationship between CEO pay and firm size, irrespective of reasons, has a po­
tential implication for the motivation of CEOs to undertake acquisitions. If CEO pay is 
strongly associated with firm size, then undertaking acquisitions provides the CEO with 
a viable option to increase her own pay, even at the cost of shareholders. Larger firms, 
along with tangible benefits to CEO wealth, also generate several non-pecuniary benefits 
to the CEO in terms of perquisites and lowering the probability of her own firm getting 
acquired (Singh, 1975). Completions of acquisitions also serve as signals of managerial 
ability and may have an impact on the long term  earnings of the CEO.
Most studies in U.K. and the U.S. on the impact of acquisition on CEO pay find tha t 
the CEOs of acquiring firms enjoy significant post-acquisition pay premiums. Khorana 
and Zenner (1998) find evidence that CEOs of acquiring firms enjoy 10.5% higher post­
acquisition cash compensation than CEOs of non-acquiring firms. They also report a 
persistent premium in CEO pay in the years following acquisitions. The impact on 
to tal compensation is estimated to be lower due to a decline in the average stock price 
following merger announcements2. In a recent study, Harford and Li (2007) find a positive 
and significant acquisition premium in pay for US CEOs. The wealth effects of the 
acquisitions was reported to have an insignificant impact on the pay premium. Girma 
et al (2006) report a "pure" acquisition premium in pay for UK CEOs after controlling 
for performance and the growth in firm size through acquisition. They argue tha t the 
post-acquisition premium in pay can be attributed to the signalling effect of managerial 
ability th a t is manifested in the completion of acquisitions. They also report a differential
2 The fall in share price may not impact upon CEO wealth contem poraneously as the CEOs have the discretion not to 
exercise their stock grants at that point but wait for the price to increase.
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impact of acquisitions on CEO pay contingent on the wealth effects. In contrast, Guest 
(2009) finds a positive acquisition effect on CEO pay irrespective of the effect it has on 
shareholders’ wealth and tha t corporate governance doesn’t have a significant impact on 
post-acquisition CEO pay in the UK. He also finds no evidence of a differential impact 
of target nationality on acquisition premium in pay.
Conyon et al (2006) suggest tha t acquisitions are often followed by spin-offs and di­
vestments. Therefore, any contemporaneous increase in CEO pay due to acquisition may 
have a downward adjustment in the following years due to a possible decline in sales. 
Thus, the effect of acquisitions on CEO pay may not only be contemporaneous but may 
be gradually adjusted to a higher level. The lagged increase in pay may also be due 
to deliberate smoothing of CEO pay rises to avoid attracting media and institutional 
shareholder attention.
Most noted US studies use sample periods up to the year 2000 and thus do not reflect 
the last decade’s increased scrutiny on CEO pay and corporate governance. Governance 
regulations aim at better incentive alignment and hence a priori  it may be expected tha t 
post-SOX, the acquisition premium in pay may have stronger association with the wealth 
effects of acquisition.
5.3 D ata
The data  used in this analysis is derived from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. 
The Execucomp database provides detailed information on executive salary, bonus, stock 
and option awards and a range of firm and CEO specific information, generated from 
the annual proxy filings (Def-14A) of listed US firms. It covers executive compensation 
data  from 1992 to 2010. The dataset contains firms listed in the S&P 1500 indices, 
representing about 90% of the US market capitalization.
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The study period for this analysis is 1994-2010. Execucomp identifies the CEOs of a 
firm in a given financial year and provides compensation details for 3016 CEOs in tha t 
sample period. 313 firms do not report the CEOs or the full compensation details and 
have been om itted from this study. Probit regressions to analyze sample selectivity (not 
tabulated) were performed using firm performance, firm size and CEO pay measures but 
none of the parameters was estimated to be statistically significant and hence there seems 
to be no evidence of systematic non-disclosure of information.
The remaining 2755 organizations are observed for the period 1994-2010. We also omit 
firms which are observed for less than 3 years within the sample period. This leads to 
omission of 3144 firm-year observations. Thus the final dataset contains 14767 firm-year 
observations for 2703 CEOs. The firms are observed from the first year they appear on 
the Execucomp database until the end of the study period or until the firm drops out of 
the sample due to mergers and acquisitions or delisting from the stock exchange.
CEO pay for each year is calculated as the sum of the cash and non-cash compensation 
paid in th a t year. The nominal CEO pay is converted to year 2000 dollars by using 
Consumer Price Indices published by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics. The natural 
log of CEO pay is used in the analysis as an explanatory variable.3 Total Pay is skewed 
with a mean (median) of 4.3 (1.7) million USD. Further, we use natural logs of cash 
compensation and non-cash equity based compensations separately to analyze changing 
compensation mix.
The firm performance data  is obtained from S&P’s COMPUSTAT Research Tape 
whereas the stock price data  is obtained from Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database. The databases were matched on the basis of the six digit CUSIP 
(Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures) numbers of the firms. A
■5The estim ations are robust to alternate specifications of CEO pay, w ithout using the LTI and RSU. "All Other Total" 
paym ents include severance payout that may have been made in an year and has been excluded from the analysis.
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second level matching was performed based on the ticker symbols of the firms. The 
industry performances are matched by the firm’s 2-digit SIC codes. We chose a set 
of firm performance measure based on discussions in existing literature (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2004) and use Return on Total Assets (ROA) as accounting measures of firm 
performance4. Firm  performance may not always be a reflection of managerial effort 
but may be significantly influenced by industry wide shocks. We construct a measure of 
relative performance to control for industry shocks. The annual average value weighted 
return for a firm is benchmarked to the average annual value weighted return of the 
median firm in the same industry. Further, to control for the risk in firm’s operating 
and information environment, we use the volatility in firm’s stock returns by using the 
standard deviations of monthly value-weighted returns on a firm’s stock in a given year.
Using Acquisition Weekly, Thomson One Banker and Forbes company databases, the 
events of acquisitions are identified and categorized as domestic or international acqui­
sitions. For the purpose of this study, acquisition is defined as an event whereby a firm 
owning less than 50% of the target’s voting shares before the acquisition increases the 
ownership to 50% or more after the event (Guest, 2008). In the sample period 8247 
acquisition deals are reported. Following the sample selection method of Lehn and Zhao
(2006), the sample for this study is selected using the following criteria: (a) The acqui­
sitions were announced between January, 1, 1992 and December, 31, 2010 (b) the deals 
are “completed” , (c) both the target and the acquiring firms are publicly listed0 and (d) 
the size of the target firm, measured as natural logarithm of total assets, is at least 10% 
of th a t of the acquiring firm. These requirements lead to 3243 acquisitions in the sample 
period. We use the year of completion of acquisition as the event year.
'U sing Earning Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and Earnings Per Share (E PS) as alternate measures of firm perfor­
m ance yields qualitatively similar estim ates.
5 A lthough Thom son's databases do contain inform ation of privately held firms, we only base our analysis on listed  
firms. This is because inform ation on privately held acquiring firms not listed in the US are not easily available and may 
not be consistent.
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To isolate the effects of individual acquisitions, we apply a m ateriality constraint 
of non-overlapping acquisitions, consistent with the definition used by Harford and Li
(2007). This restriction is necessary to understand the lagged effects of an individual 
acquisitions on CEO pay and account for the smoothing of the post-acquisition pay 
premium. An overlap is categorized as a gap of less than 24 months between the an­
nouncements of two M&A. This leads to elimination of 1793 acquisitions6.
The final sample consists of 1450 acquisitions undertaken by 1230 firms in the sample 
period. 1525 firms in the dataset do not take part in any acquisition in the given sample 
period.7 An acquisition is classified as international if the target firm is not listed in an 
US stock exchange. Using this definition, there are 1145 domestic acquisitions and 305 
international acquisitions.
A pr io r i , we may expect the strength of corporate governance to have an impact on 
the probability of CEO dismissal and the compensating differential paid for rising risk of 
turnover. D ata on corporate governance was obtained from the Risk Metrics database 
(formerly IRRC). Number of directors on a board and percentage of outside directors 
are used as measures of board size and board independence respectively. If the CEO 
also acts as the Chairman of the board (CEO duality) and/or has higher stock holdings 
in the firm, she may enjoy some degree of power over the board of directors. We also 
control for a busy board using the number of average number of board memberships of 
the directors of a given firm in a given year.
Corporate governance data is available for 1996-2010 and hence specifications with 
corporate governance controls contain 11522 firm-year observations.
0 R obustness check was performed including the overlapping acquisitions in the dataset. The estim ate on the contem ­
poraneous indicator for acquisition was (0.053) almost one-and-half percentage points higher than our baseline estim ates 
and significant at 1% level. The higher estim ated effect of acquisition on CEO pay possibly reflects the overlapping effects 
of closely tim ed acquisitions.
'R o ssi and Volpin (2004) reports the percentage of hostile takeovers in USA from 1990-2002 to be 6.44%. In this study,
I have not differentiated between hostile and friendly acquisitions because of the small proportion of hostile takeovers.
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5.4 M eth od ology
Recent studies on M&A and CEO pay in the context of UK samples have used a dynamic 
panel approach (Girma et al. 2006, Guest 2008). In the presence of time persistence in 
CEO pay, introducing a lagged dependent variable of CEO pay growth may help in cap­
turing the effect of smoothed increase in post-acquisition CEO pay. We test for the 
existence of serial correlation of CEO pay using Wooldridge (2002) test for auto correla­
tion in panel data. The test provides insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
of no first order auto-correlation in CEO pay (p =  0.6862)8. In the absence of first order 
autocorrelation in CEO pay, we employ a fixed effect estimation of the model for CEO 
pay. A Hausman test suggests the use of a fixed effect estimation over random effects (p 
= 0.000).
Using the various determinants of CEO pay identified in the existing literature and 
discussed in Section 2, we construct the baseline model to estimate the effect of M&A on 
the post-acquisition CEO pay for firm ‘i’ in time ‘t \
LnPayit~  P0+ ^ 1ROAit+P2Salesit+P3X it+ ^ 4Acquisitionit +  fi5(rnetit+ f i+ h t+ e u  (5.1)
In equation (5.1), P a y it is calculated as the sum of the salary, bonus, Black Scholes 
value of stock and option awards, non-equity incentives, value of Restricted Stock Grants 
and Long Term Incentives and all other cash compensation paid in tha t year9. To control
8Using natural log transform ations of CEO pay as the dependant variable, the W ooldridge’s test for autocorrelation  
is insignificant at 10% level . The use of monetary value of CEO pay yields no first-order autocorrelation in CEO pay. 
The significant autocorrelation in CEO pay as reported in UK studies may be due to the use of cash only measures of 
com pensation.
Drukker (2003) notes that the test may have less power in the presence of conditional heteroskedastic error in small 
sam ples. However, sim ulations on power and sample size for AR and MA show that for our sam ple size, the power of the 
test is 1.00.
9 Kaplan (2006) reports that Execucom p's Blaek-Scholes valuations may be overestim ate the values of the stocks and 
options if the tenure is less than seven years since the valuations are done with an assum ption of seven year vesting period. 
He proposed a binom ial tree valuation approach. The median tenure of CEOs in our dataset is over 7 years and hence we 
use the E xecucom p’s valuation of stocks and options. Execucom p also values restricted stocks with the assum ption of fully 
vested stocks which may overestim ate CEO pay. Lack of practicable alternatives and assum ing the effect to be similar for
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for smoothed increase of CEO pay, we estimate the lagged effects of acquisition on CEO 
pay(Girm a et al. 2006).
The coefficient /31 estimates the effect of firm performance on CEO pay. There are 
contrasting views on the appropriate measures of firm performance. Choice of stock 
returns as measure of firm performance reflects the expected value created by a CEO but 
is subject to market noise (Couglan and Schmidt, 1985). Accounting measures partially 
reflect the value created by the existing CEO in the given period and the remainder 
is reflected in future earnings (Engel et al. 2003). Therefore, we use both accounting 
measures of firm performance (ROAit) and stock price performance. We benchmark the 
annual average value weighted return on the firms stocks with respect to the annual 
average value weighted return of the median firm in the same industry (at 2-digit SIC 
level). This controls for the industry effects in firm performance. Consistent with the 
existing literature, historical firm performance is associated with post-acquisition pay up 
to two lag periods and hence we control for two lags of firm performance (Geddes and 
Vinod, 1997; Girma, Thompson and Wright, 2006).
Salesu  is used as the measure of firm size.10 It is difficult to decompose the sales into 
"organic sales" and increases in sales due to acquisition particularly since acquisitions in 
the sample includes cross border targets for which data is often not available. Existing 
empirical studies predict a significant positive association of CEO pay with firm size. 
Thus, (32 reflects the effect of firm size on the acquisition premium, allowing /34 to capture 
the pure acquisition effect on CEO pay. If acquisitions are associated with a rise in 
CEO pay, then the coefficients on the Acquisition it (and its lags) will be significant and 
positive. Acquisitionit is an indicator which takes on values of ‘1’ if an acquisition is
all, I use Execucom p valuation for restricted stocks.
The estim ations are robust to alternative definition of Total Com pensation that excludes option grants and non-equity  
incentive as suggested by Bcbchuk and Fried (2002).
10 Q ualitatively similar results arc obtained using Number of employees and Total A ssets as measures of firm size.
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undertaken in a given year. The use of lagged indicators for acquisition are expected to 
yield qualitatively similar results to tha t obtained from dynamic panel models. Since the 
effects of acquisition on CEO pay may persist in the lags, the coefficient on Acquisitionit 
indicator only partially capture the impact. We also control for trend effects in CEO pay 
to isolate the pure acquisition effect. /33 captures the effects of all other observable firm 
performance measures contained in the vector, X it .
A set of year dummies, ht are used to account for any macroeconomic shocks. Natural 
log transformations of all monetary variables have been used in the estimation. The 
estimation reports robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level.
Next, we examine whether CEOs are rewarded differentially for expost ‘wealth-enhancing’ 
and ‘wealth-reducing’ acquisitions. In equation (5.2), we introduce interaction dummies 
of acquisition with negative annual return on the firm’s industry benchmarked stocks 
(Harford and Li, 2007). This is in contrast to studies th a t use 3-day or 7-day or 30-day 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR[-1.+1] , CA R[-3.+3] or CAR[-10.+20]) around the 
announcement date to categorize ‘wealth-enhancing’ and ‘wealth-reducing’ acquisitions 
(Girma et al. 2006, Lehn and Zhao, 2006). The horizon of the performance effect of the 
acquisition and the unvested equity options of the CEO may extend beyond few days 
around the announcement (Vijh 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Thus, the announce­
ment effect on stock returns is a short-term  statistic to use as a proxy for wealth effects 
of merger. Consistent with the arguments of Harford and Li (2007), we use industry- 
benchmarked annual value weighted return on a firm’s stocks of a firm as a metric to 
assess the wealth effects of acquisitions. P ositiveR etu rn it (N eg a tiveR etu m it) is an indi­
cator variable tha t takes the value of ’1’ if the change in annual value weighted return 
on the firm’s stocks are higher (lower) than the change in annual value weighted return 
of the median firm in the same 2-digit SIC level. The interaction of P ositive  Re tu m it 
(N ega tiveR etu m it)  with Acquisitionit are used to estimate the effects of wealth-enhancing
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(wealth-reducing) acquisitions on CEO pay. Using standard deviations over the previous 
two years monthly percentage stock returns, we control risk in firm’s information and 
operating environment, which is reported to be a significant determinant of CEO pay 
(Core et al. 1999).
LnPayit =  a  +  /31RO Ait +  (32a Retu +  j3zSalesit +  /34Acquisitionit-\- (5.2)
+  /35N egativeR eturnu  +  (36(Acquisitionit * N egativeR eturn u) +  
fi +  ht +  Bn
In the final specification, we control for the size and independence of the board of 
directors to examine the effect of corporate governance on post-acquisition pay premiums. 
If weak corporate governance is associated with higher post-acquisition pay increase, it 
may be suggestive of agency problems. We control for CEO duality, board size, board 
independence, board busyness and percentage of CEO shareholding in the firm. The 
number of directors on the board is used to control for board size. A board is classified 
as independent if it is constituted with more than 60% outside directors and the CEO 
is not the Chairman of the Board.11 A busy board may indicate a dilution in strength 
of monitoring or may also indicate that firms optimally choose directors who are highly 
skilled and hence are in short supply. We use the mean number of board memberships 
held by the directors of a sample firm to control for the dilution effect in governance.12
If acquisitions are undertaken efficiently, the controls for governance should have in­
11 Directors who are not em ployees, relatives of em ployees, former employees or em ployees, attorneys, solicitors and 
accountants of any other firm which has contractual relations with the sam ple firm are classified as outside directors.
12 T he results were robust to  alternate specifications of busy board where we use an indicator for busy board which takes 
on the value of ’1’ if more than 50% of the directors on the board have number of board memerships higher than the mean  
number of board memberships held by all directors in the sample.
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significant effects on the post-acquisition premium in CEO pay. The measures of gover­
nance should also not have an effect on the pay premiums for "bad" acquisitions. Using 
the indicator variable Acquisitionu * N ega tiveR etu m it * IndependentBoardu , we estimate 
whether a more independent board is associated with a lower post-acquisition pay pre­
mium for wealth-reducing acquisitions. Independent Board indicator equals to T ’ if the 
CEO is not the chairman of the board, the percentage of outside directors’ representation 
on the board is more than 60% and if the CEO is not the Chairman of the nominating 
committee and the compensation committee.
LnPayu  =  a  +  0 1ROAu +  P2a Retu +  fisSalesu  +  jdAAcquisitionu  +  f35N egativeR eturnu  
+  f3 qB oar d Si zeit +  ^IndependentB oardu +  (38BoardBusynessu  
+  /3g(Acquisitionit * N egativeR etu rn it * IndependentBoardu) +  fi +  ht +  eu (5.3)
The acquiring firms may not be a randomly selected subsample and the decisions to 
undertake acquisitions may be endogenous. We seek to circumvent this problem in two 
ways. Firstly, we use firm fixed effects in the model to mitigate potential biases due to 
time invariant omitted variables.
Secondly, the probability of a firm undertaking an acquisition is instrumented using 
CEO tenure and an indicator for whether the firm has undertaken acquisition(s) in the 
previous two years. AcquisitionH istory equals one if a sample firm has undertaken one or 
more acquisition in the previous two years and zero otherwise. We chose these instruments 
because CEO tenure may affect the entrenchment of the CEO and hence his decision 
to undertake acquisition. Similarly, prior acquisition history may be a predictor of the
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likelihood of future acquisition. Thus the baseline first stage model is specified as follows:
Pr {Acquisition) =  qq +  a i BOA +  a^R et^ +  cx3Sales +  a^Board Si ze +  a^IndependentBoard +  
a^BoardBusyness +  a^CEOTenure +  a^AcquisitionH istory 
+ / i  +  ht +  £a (5-4)
In the second stage baseline specification we use the predicted probability of acquisition 
as a regressor:
L nP ayit — /30+ P 1RO Ait-\-f32Salesit-\-P3Xit+f3AAcquisitionit +  P5crRetit +
p(.Acquisition) +  f i+ h t+ e it (5.5)
where p is the association of probability of undertaking acquisition with CEO Pay. 
This helps us in estimating pure acquisition effect in the presence of bias due to en­
dogenous choice to undertake acquisitions. Results of Sargan Test (p=0.088) and tests 
for weak instruments [F =  138.31] suggest tha t the set of instruments used are valid and 
uncorrelated to the distribution of errors. The sample size for instrument variable esti­
mations are smaller because the history of acquisition is only available from the second 
acquisition of each firm. The results are presented in column 6 of Table 5.1 and columns 
2 and 4 of Table 5.2.
Further we control for the post-acquisition CEO turnover and the effect of such 
turnover on the acquisition-premium in CEO pay by using Heckman selection models. By 
not controlling for post-acquisition CEO turnover, the studies on effects of acquisition on 
CEO pay may be susceptible to survivor bias (Guest 2008; Girma et al. 2006; Harford
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and Li, 2007). These studies either limit their sample to acquiring firms whose CEO 
remain in post for at least one year from the date of announcement or assumes zero com­
pensation to the departing CEOs in the subsequent years. Harford and Li (2007) report 
no significant difference in turnover probability for acquiring and non-acquiring CEOs. 
The current literature either limits the understanding of the effect of CEO turnover or 
suffers from survivor bias and over-estimates the merger effect. In our estimations, sur­
vivor bias is controlled for using Heckman selection equations. Termination payment and 
change in control payments are used as additional variables.
The first stage of the model is a probit estimation of the probability of CEO reten­
tion post-acquisition using controls for contemporaneous and lagged firm performance 
measures, firm size, corporate governance measures, industry dummies and, term ination 
payment and change in control payment as exclusion restrictions. Termination payment 
is the payment eligibility of a CEO in the event of an involuntary turnover whereas 
change in control payment is the payment eligibility of the CEO in the event of invol­
untary turnover arising out of change in corporate control (viz. acquisitions). A pr io r i , 
it can be expected tha t a higher termination payment and change in control payment 
will increase the probability of CEO retention post acquisition. Turnover payment and 
change in control payment is only relevant when an event of turnover is under considera­
tion and effects the pay of a CEO only through its effect on survival probability. The tests 
for the validity of the exclusion restrictions are presented in the subsection 5.5.4. In the 
second stage, the predicted probability of CEO retention is used to estimate the effect of 
acquisitions on CEO pay using the same set of parameters as delineated in equation (2). 
We estimate the following model to control for endogenously determined CEO turnover 
decisions and hence control for survivor bias.
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L n P a y it=  a  +  /31R O A it+l32SaleSit-\-/33X i t +/34Acquisitionit+ f i + h t+ e i t  (5.6)
W here observations of P a y it are conditional on the outcome of the selection equation 
specified as
f r 1 +  uit > 0R e t e n t io n ^  { . (5.7)
0 O th e r w i s e
z it contains all the observable parameters of firm performance, firm size, CEO tenure, 
corporate governance measures and industry classifications that contribute to the prob­
ability of retention of the CEO in the event of an acquisitions.
Theoretically, Heckman selection models are identified when the same explanatory 
variables appear in the selection and the outcome equations. However, the identification 
is conditional upon distributional assumptions of the residuals and the non-linearity of 
the inverse mills ratio. Following (Sartori, 2003) we include two variables th a t hold 
theoretical significance in the selection equation but not in the outcome. These exclusion 
restrictions act as instruments of identification parameters the two equations without the 
rigid assumptions on distributions. It can be shown that in the presence of an exclusion 
restriction, Heckman selection models are identified at infinity.
5.5 R esu lts A nd A nalysis
5.5.1 Do acquisitions affect CEO Pay?
The estimation results are tabulated in Table 5.1with four different specifications which 
vary in terms of the compensation measures used as the dependent variable: (1) Salary,
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(2) Bonus, (3) Variable Pay, (4) and (5) Total Pay13. Estimations in column (4) and (5) 
report the post-acquisition premium in Total CEO pay using alternate measures of firm 
performance. Estimates in column (6) are corrected for endogeneity using instruments 
for undertaking acquisitions.
The effect of accounting firm performance on CEO pay is insignificant in specifications 
(l)-(4). In specification (5) we use industry-benchmarked stock returns as a measure of 
firm performance. The semi-elasticity of firm performance and CEO pay is estimated 
to be 0.029 which is significant at the 5%  level. This estimate is in the same order 
as the estimates on firm performance measures for US samples (Harford and Li, 2007) 
and UK samples (Girma et al. 2006). Thus, firm performance has a marginal impact on 
executive pay.14 In comparison, the effect of firm size on all the specifications of CEO pay 
is much larger. The effect of firm size is more pronounced for post-acquisition bonuses 
and variable pay. Overall, a one percentage point increase in firm size leads to a 0.41 
units increase in CEO pay, ceteris paribus.
From Table 5.1, the coefficient on the acquisition dummy is positive in specifications 
(4)-(6), after controlling for firm size (0.037-0.042). However, the estimates are only 
marginally significant for Total Pay and insignificant for specifications with bonus and 
salary. We find no contemporaneous pure acquisition effect on CEO bonuses and th a t 
the growth in post-acquisition CEO bonuses can be attributed to the increased firm size. 
Acquisitions have a negative contemporaneous effect on variable pay, probably as a result 
of declines in average stock price.
The coefficients on the indicators for lagged effects of acquisition are positive across 
all specifications. Controlling for firm size and performance, the acquisition effect on
13 Variable Pay =  All performance related pay com ponents- B onus+ Stock Grants +  Option Grants +  R estricted Stocks 
+  Long Term Incentives and all other annual pay
11 The estim ations are robust to specifications with alternate measures of firm performance like and E BIT  and annual 
value wighted return of firm’s stocks (not tabulated).
127
total pay persists for the next two years after the event, suggesting smoothing of post­
acquisition pay premium. The effect of acquisition on both salary and bonus in the 
first lag is positive and significant, indicating the absence of any substitution effect in the 
Total Pay design. The lagged positive effect of acquisition on the variable pay component 
counter-balances the decline in variable pay in the year of acquisition. The acquisition 
effect persists in the second lag although the effect weakens. Thus, after controlling for 
increases in firm size, CEOs are paid a 3.5-4% post-acqusition premium in total pay. The 
increase is driven not only by bonuses as suggested by Grinstein and Hribar (2004) but 
all the components of Total Pay as evident from the estimates in Column (l)-(5). In an 
attem pt to get a dollar value of the acquisition premium, we multiply the mean CEO pay 
of the sample with the percentage acquisition premium. Thus, a mean CEO undertaking 
an acquisition experiences an increase of US$ 4,329,000 X 4% i.e. US$ 173,000 in total pay 
in the year of acquisition and a comparable pay increase in the next year. The estimates of 
the indicator for acquisition are of similar order of magnitude across specifications (4) and 
(6). Thus the results appear to be robust to specification error arising out of endogenous 
choice to undertake acquisition. The predicted probability of undertaking acquisition 
is significant and positively associated with CEO pay. From the endogeneity corrected 
estimates in column (6), CEOs of acquiring firms are paid 4% more in the post-acquisition 
premium, increasing the pay of a median CEO undertaking acquisition by approximately 
US$ 4,329,000 X 4% or US$ 173,160. Lagged pay increases are of a comparable order. 
The estimates on the indicators for contemporaneous and lagged acquisitions are not 
significantly different from our central finding. The estimates of other control variables 
are qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates. Thus, our results do not seem to be 
driven by the potentially endogenous choice of firms to undertake acquisitions.
To test the effects of target nationality on acquisition premium in CEO pay, we employ 
an indicator variable for cross-border acquisitions th a t takes on the value of ’1’ if the
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target firm of the acquisition is not listed on a US stock exchange, and ’O’ otherwise. 
Consistent with the findings of Guest (2008), we find no differential effect of target 
nationality on post-acquisition CEO pay. The indicator for cross border acquisitions is 
estimated to be insignificant across specifications. This is the first study to separately 
analyze the effects of international and domestic acquisitions on CEO pay in the context 
of US firms. There is no evidence th a t acquisition of a foreign target has a differential 
effect on post-acquisition CEO pay.
A p r io r i , there is no reason to believe that the distribution of CEO pay is normal. The 
distribution of CEO pay is skewed as presented in Figures 5.1 to 5.3. To test for the effect 
of acquisition across the distribution of pay, we use quantile regressions. The results are 
presented in Table 5.4. The coefficient on the acquisition dummy for the 75th percentile 
is 0.056 (p-value =  0.000) and 0.023 for the 25th percentile (p value =  0.011). Both 
the estimates are significant at 5% significance level but the difference of the two point 
estimates is not statistically significant at usual levels of significance (p value =  0.137). 
Thus, the pure acquisition effect on CEO pay seems to persist across the distribution. 
The results are presented in Table 5.4.
In summary, we estimate a 4% post-acquisition increase in CEO pay, after controlling 
for the effect of increased firm size, firm performance and fixed effects. The pure acqui­
sition effect is estimated in all specifications and is persistent up to two years after an 
event. This suggests th a t acquisition premium in CEO pay is not only an idiosyncratic 
increase arising out of a higher bonus in the year of the event (Grinstein and Hribar, 
2004) but is a systematic increase in the components of Total pay. Lagged increase in 
pay is suggestive of smoothing in post-acquisition pay increase. We also find no differ­
ential increase in pay for international M&A, providing evidence that target nationality 
has insignificant effects on post-acquisition CEO pay.
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5.5.2 Are CEOs rewarded differentially for ‘w ealth-enhancing’ and ‘wealth  
—reducing’ acquisitions?
In this section, we examine whether the CEO pay increase post-acquisition is contingent 
on the effect of the acquisition on shareholder’s wealth. In other words, we examine 
whether CEOs may be motivated to carry out acquisitions for self-serving interests even 
if it reduces shareholders’ wealth10. From an agency-theory framework, CEO and firm 
performance is expected to be asymmetric for positive and negative firm performance 
(Harford and Li, 2007 and the references therein). We use indicators for positive (neg­
ative) benchmarked annual value weighted returns on the firm’s stocks in the year of 
announcement of acquisition which takes on a value of iV if the benchmarked annual 
value weighted returns on the firm’s stocks in the year of announcement of acquisition is 
positive (negative) or ‘0’ otherwise.
We measure the wealth effect of acquisitions by introducing an interaction variable. 
Acquisition^ * Negative Annual Return^ that takes on the value of ’1’ if a firm ‘i’ un­
dertakes an acquisition in the year, ‘t ’ , and there is negative annual return on its stocks 
in th a t year benchmarked to returns on the median firm in the same 2-digit SIC code, 
thus characterizing ‘wealth-reducing’ acquisitions. We also estimate the lagged effects of 
wealth-reducing acquisitions on managerial pay. If the coefficients on the Acquisition^ 
* Negative Annual Returnit dummy (and its lags) are positive, then the hypothesis of 
asymmetry of CEO pay-firm performance will not hold and CEOs undertaking acquisi­
tions will seem to be rewarded in the same way for good and bad acquisitions. Core et al. 
(1999) and Harford and Li (2007) indicates th a t risk in firm’s information and operating 
environment is a significant determinant of CEO pay, particularly in the events of acqui­
15W e acknowledge some ex-ante good acquisitions may turn out to be ex-post bad acquisitions and that there may 
be some degree of managerial hubris in undertaking acquisitions. However, we argue that if bad acquisitions result in 
differential pay im pacts, a C EO ’s risk-taking may be downward adjusted.
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sitions. A significant and positive coefficient on firm risk param eters will indicate th a t 
post-acquisition CEO pay change can be partially due to the change in the firms’ risk 
environment. We control for the risk in firm’s operating environment by using standard 
deviations of monthly value weighted return on firm stocks for the prior two years.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5.2. In column (1), we present estimates 
of the effects of wealth-reducing acquisitions on Total Pay and column (2) re-estimates 
specification (1) with correction for endogeneity. The estimations include year fixed ef­
fects with robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The effects of firm performance, 
firm size and acquisition are similar to the estimates reported earlier in Table 5.1. ROA 
has an insignificant effect on post-acquisition CEO pay. Firm size is significantly positive 
and has a stronger association with pay than ROA. The estimated coefficient on the mea­
sure of firm risk is positive and significant indicating tha t greater risk in firm’s information 
and operating environment increases the CEO pay. The coefficient on Acquisition^ is 
positive and significant indicating that there is a pure acquisition effect on CEO pay.
Using indicators for negative benchmarked returns, we find that in years of poor firm 
performance with respect to the median firm in the same industry, CEOs are paid lower 
compared to years of good performance. This result is consistent with the principal-agent 
model. The estimate on the interaction indicator of acquisition and negative bench- 
marked return is negative and insignificant. The lagged effects of the indicator variable 
is also estimated to be insignificant. The results suggest tha t while non-acquiring CEOs 
experience a lower pay growth for negative benchmarked performance, there is no dif­
ferential effect on pay for acquiring CEOs for undertaking bad acquisitions. Thus, the 
wealth effects of the acquisitions have an insignificant effect on the post-acquisition pay 
of CEOs. Controlling for endogeneity in column (2) produces qualitatively similar es­
timates. There seems to exist further incentives for CEOs to undertake self-serving 
acquisitions as their pay is largely decoupled from the wealth effects of the acquisition.
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5.5.3 How much of the acquisition prem ium  in CEO pay can be explained  
by poor corporate governance?
Next, we analyze whether the increase in post-acquisition CEO pay can be attribu ted  to 
agency problems. A priori, we would expect weak corporate governance to be associated 
with higher post-acquisition pay, if the weak association of firm performance and CEO 
pay is not contractually optimal. No unique measure for strength of corporate governance 
exists in the literature (see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for an overview). Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) and Harford and Li (2007) used CEO tenure as a proxy for the 
relative strength of the board and the CEO. However, this measure can also reflect the 
tenure effect on CEO pay.
We use a set of variables to proxy for board strength and board independence. Con­
sistent w ith the methodology of Harford and Li (2007), we use interaction variables, 
Independent Boards * Acquisition^ *Negative Annual Return^ to estimate the effect of 
governance on post-acquisition pay in events of wealth-reducing acquisitions. A negative 
coefficient on the interaction dummy would indicate th a t presence of an independent 
board leads to differential post-acquisition pay with respect to wealth effect of the acqui­
sitions. In other words, a negative relationship will imply tha t the post-acquisition pay 
premium of CEO can be, in part, a ttribu ted  to weak corporate governance and captive 
boards.
The estim ation results are presented in Table 5.2. Column (3) presents estimates with 
the individual measures of corporate governance while column (4) provides endogeneity 
corrected estimation results. The coefficient on board size is positive and significant. A 
smaller board pays lower than  a larger board. A higher percentage of outside directors on 
the board is associated with lower CEO pay. Board busyness16 and equity ownership of
10 B anding the average number of board memberships held by the directors of the board of a sam ple firm yields qualita­
tively sim ilar results.
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the CEO has insignificant effects on CEO pay. Controlling for the governance param eters 
does not change the acquisition premium in CEO pay.
Next, we test if stronger corporate governance leads to differential post-acquisition 
CEO pay contingent on the wealth effects of the acquisition. The coefficient on Indepen­
dent Boards*Acquisition^* Negative Annual Return^ is negative and significant. This 
indicates th a t ceteris paribus, CEOs in firms with independent corporate governance are 
paid less for wealth reducing acquisitions and the acquisition premium in CEO pay can 
be partially a ttribu ted  to weak and captive boards.
Further, we test the effect of regulatory changes in corporate governance on post­
acquisition CEO pay. Using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), and NASDAQ and NQSE 
reforms of 200217 as exogenous changes in corporate governance regulations, we test the 
effects of governance regulations on the post-acquisition pay premium in CEO pay. In 
column (5), we use an indicator variable which is equal to ’1’ for the post-SOX sub pe­
riod of the sample (2003-2010) and ’O’ otherwise. Also, in this specification we do not 
use the year dummies. The coefficient on SOX dummy is positive and significant indi­
cating higher pay for CEOs in the post-SOX period. The effects of firm size and firm 
performance are similar to the estimations is specifications (l)-(4). The pure acquisition 
effect is smaller but comparable to the estimates in specification (5) indicating a consis­
tent acquisition premium in CEO pay in the post-SOX period. However, the estimate 
on Negative Annual Return*, is insignificant in specification (5) which may suggest tha t 
in the post-SOX period, CEO pay increase is insignificant for negative benchmarked 
return  on firm’s stocks. Post-SOX, the acquisition pay premium seems to  be contingent 
on the wealth effects of acquisition to some degree. The coefficient on, Independent
17 SOX m andates enhanced accounting disclosure, independence of audit com m it te and disclosure of stock swap deals. It 
also makes the executives liable to forfeit bonus and com pensation in the events of m aterial non-com pliance in disclosure 
and im poses criminal penalties for corporate' fraud.
N A SD A Q  ami NQ SE reforms includes stringent director and board independence standards on public com panies.
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Boards* Acquisition^ *Negative Annual Return^ is negative and of the same order as 
specification (4). The interactions of firm performance measures, acquisition dummy and 
the measures of corporate governance with SOX are all estim ated to be insignificant at 
10% significance level. This may indicate no significant difference of acquisition premium 
in pay in the post-SOX period. However, SOX may have led to better benchmarking of 
pay premium to firm performance outcomes with respect to the industry.18
5.5.4 CEO Turnover and Survivor-Bias
Finally, we seek to examine the effect of post-acquisition CEO turnover on CEO pay. We 
control for post-acquisition CEO turnover, and estim ate the post-acquisition premium on 
CEO pay, conditional on the probability th a t a CEO retains her job, by employing a two- 
stage Heckman selection model. In this analysis we use the severance payment eligibility 
of the CEO in the event of involuntary turnover arising out of change in corporate control 
as the exclusion restriction. There are no readily available tests for instrument validity 
for Heckman selection models. However, regression estimates of the exclusion restriction 
on CEO pay and probability of CEO turnover suggests th a t term ination pay eligibility 
in events of change in control is significantly (and negatively) associated with probability 
of CEO turnover (p value =  0.006) but has an insignificant effect on CEO pay (p value 
=  0.108). Although this is marginally significant, this was the best instrum ent available. 
Further, the exclusion restriction accounts for 5.7%' of the variation in the probability of 
CEO turnover following acquisitions. Thus, eligibility of change and control payments is 
used as valid exclusion restrictions for the Heckman two stage models.
Estim ates of Heckman models may suffer from heteroskedastic errors. S tata can read­
ily yield unbiased standard errors for Heckman selection models. To check the robustness 
of our estimates, we also used bootstrapped standard  errors. The results obtained are
1 s Tho post-SO X  period overelnps with the financial crisis of 2007 and it is not possible to  decoup le  these effects.
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similar to th a t of the non-bootstrapped models. For brevity, we do not include the 
non-bootstrapped estimates.
The estimates of the Heckman selection models, presented in Table 5.3 are qualita­
tively similar to the results from our earlier estimations. In column (1) we tabulate the 
results of the baseline specification of the Heckman selection model. In column (2) we re­
port the outcome equation and in column (3), we report the fixed effects estimation from 
column (5) of Table 5.1 for comparison. The association param eter [p] of the estima­
tion is significantly positive (p =  0.215) indicating th a t any param eter th a t increases the 
probability of retention in the event of an acquisition also increase the post-acquisition 
CEO pay. The association param eter has a robust standard  error of 0.04019. The Wald 
test of independent equations rejects the null hypothesis of p = 0 and suggests significant 
association of the two equations (p=0.000).
From the first stage of estimation, contemporaneous firm performance is significantly 
(and negatively) associated with the probability of retention in the event of acquisi­
tion whereas firm size (measured by sales and to ta l assets of the firm) has insignificant 
effects. The exclusion restriction is significant and positive, providing evidence tha t sup­
ports the hypothesis tha t higher change in control payment lowers the hazard of CEO 
exit. More importantly, acquiring CEOs have a higher probability of turnover. The 
estim ation results of the outcome equation suggest th a t acquiring CEOs enjoy a post­
acquisition premium in pay, after controlling for firm size, firm performance and turnover 
hazards. Increases in firm size due to acquisition partially accounts for this increase in 
pay. However, the acquisition premium in CEO pay in column (2) is significantly lower 
than  the fixed effects estimates in column (3). Thus, controlling for the strength of corpo­
rate governance and the hazards of post-acquisition turnover downward adjusts the pure 
acquisition effect in CEO pay. The results indicate th a t a part of estim ated premium 
in post-acquisition CEO pay can be a ttribu ted  to the survivor bias in the estimations.
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Strong corporate governance has an impact on both CEO pay and post-acquisition sur­
vival rates. This is further strengthened by the corporate governance regulations as 
evident from a small decline in post-acquisition pay premium in the post-SOX period 
compared to the full sample. The sub-period 2003-2010 is also associated with a higher 
pay-performance sensitivity than  the overall sample period, indicating some degree of 
effectiveness of SOX and stock m arket reforms in enforcing managerial discipline.
5.6  C on clusion
In this paper we use a sample of 2755 US firms from 1994-2010 to estimate the effect 
of acquisition on CEO pay. We also seek to determine whether CEOs are rewarded 
differentially for wealth reducing and wealth enhancing acquisitions and whether the 
post-acquisition pay premium can be a ttribu ted  to the strength of corporate governance. 
Previous studies are limited by their sample period up to 2000 and hence don’t reflect 
the last decade of increased regulatory scrutiny on CEO pay and corporate governance.
We find evidence suggesting th a t CEOs have a misaligned incentive to undertake ac­
quisitions, even at the cost of decline in shareholders’ wealth. Following the work of Guest
(2008), we examine if target nationality has an impact on the post-acquisition CEO pay. 
We find no evidence of higher pay increases for international acquisitions with respect 
to domestic acquisitions. This adds to the existing literature on executive compensation 
in the USA. Existing literature uses cash compensation as a measure of CEO pay. We 
provide a more detailed analysis of CEO pay. using a wider range of components of CEO 
pay. Our estimations suggest tha t CEOs experience a rise in salary post-acquisition, 
possibly through a renegotiation of the contract but the impact of acquisition on CEO 
bonus is due to the increased size of the firm. We also provide evidence th a t acquisitions 
reduce the valuation of the CEOs variable component of pay, due mainly to a decline in
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the average share price. However, as pointed out by Harford and Li (2007), the horizon 
of these grants are long term  and a short term  decline in their valuation are unlikely to 
have a m ajor im pact as CEOs have the discretion in tim ing the exercise of these options. 
Thus we find evidence th a t CEOs have an incentive to undertake acquisitions to increase 
their own pay.
One of the key concerns is agency problems in CEO compensation contracts tha t may 
provide the CEO with a misaligned incentive to undertake an acquisition, even if it at 
the cost of shareholders’ wealth. Using industry-adjusted measures of firm performance, 
we find no evidence th a t post-acquisition pay rise is related to the wealth effect of the ac­
quisition and CEOs enjoy an acquisition premium even for wealth-reducing acquisitions. 
Therefore there seems to be evidence of misaligned interests of CEOs in undertaking ac­
quisitions, even after controlling for the change in risk environment after an acquisition.
Another focus of our research is the role of corporate governance in aligning the 
interests of CEOs and shareholders’. Using a wider range of controls for corporate 
governance, we find evidence th a t strong and independent boards are associated with 
lower post-acquisition pay rises. CEO duality, higher percentage of equity holding of 
the CEO and a lower percentage of independent directors lead to magnification of the 
post-acquisition pay premium. However, we find no evidence of asymmetric benchmark­
ing of CEO pay depending on the wealth effects even in the presence of a strong and 
independent board. Thus, a strong and independent board seems to  partially mitigate 
the misaligned incentive in the current executive compensation system, we also find ev­
idence of the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations on managerial discipline. 
The post-SOX sub-period is associated with a higher pay-performance sensitivity and a 
lower pure acquisition premium in pay.
Our results appear to be robust to selection bias in the estim ation of post-acquisition 
pay premium. Controlling for post-acquisition CEO turnovers, we find evidence of a
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stronger role of corporate governance. This can be because a part of the role of board 
of directors to enforce corporate discipline is in replacing the non-performing managers. 
Thus by jointly estim ating post-acquisition CEO pay and CEO turnover, we find evidence 
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Table 5.1: Im pact of Acquisitions on CEO Pay
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Ln Salary Ln Bonus Ln VariablePay Ln TotalPay Ln Ln
TotalPay TotalPay
ROA 0.0871 0.003 0.003 0.00191
(0.126) (0.244) (0.127) (0.178)
Benchmarked Value 0.006 0.012** 0.037** 0.029** 0.032**
Weighted Return (0.233) (0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
O'Ret 0.013 0.119** 0.138** 0.091** 0.110** 0.110**
(0.112) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
Firm Size 0.104*** 0.604*** 0.656*** 0.434** 0.412*** 0.412***
(Ln Sales) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition^ 0.018** 0.098 -  0.096** 0.042** 0.037** 0.040**
(0.023) (0.147) (0.017) (0.037) (0.013) (0.042)
Acquisition^—i 0.017** 0.026* 0.097*** 0.052** 0.038** 0.043**
(0.013) (0.070) (0.000) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
Acquisition^ _ 2 0.002* 0.012** 0.018*** 0.027** 0.029** 0.027**
(0.056) (0.015) (0.000) (0.041) (0.038) (0.025)
International 0.043 0.203 -0.063 0.034 0.034 0.035
Acquisition (0.167) (0.179) (0.420) (0.573) (0.686) (0.531)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.30 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33
No. of Observation 14767 14697 14363 14767 14767 10239
Column (4) estimates the sensitivity of total pay to Return on Assets and 
Column (5) estimates benchmarked stock return-CEO pay sensitivity. 
Estim ation results in Column (6) are endogeneity corrected using 
instrumental variable method. Models are estimated with 
robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 5.2: Im pact of Wealth Effects and Governance on Acquisition on pay Premium
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROAif 0.016 0.018 0.016* 0.018* 0.016*
(0.108) (0.102) (0.090) (0.088) (0.060)
& vwr 0.110** 0.110** 0.114** 0.115** 0.122**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.003)
Firm Size 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.381*** 0.393*** 0.385***
(Ln Sales) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition^ 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.029** 0.030** 0.025**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Negative Annual Return^ -0.080** -0.080** -0.033** -0.031** -0.079**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.027) (0.020) (0.008)
Acquisition^* -0.350 -0.360 -0.301 -0.300 -0.297
Negative Annual Return^ (0.198) (0.199) (0.262) (0.255) (0.438)
Acquisition^ _  i * -0.077 -0.075 -0.071 -0.070 -0.056
Negative Annual Return^ _ i (0.260) (0.250) (0.312) (0.333) (0.414)
Acquisition^ _ 2  * -0.075 -0.074 -0.073 -0.071 -0.061
Negative Annual Returnjt_ 2 (0.269) (0.265) (0.290) (0.310) (0.450)
Board Size 0.022** 0.022*** 0.010**
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence -0.030*** -0.031** -0.035*
(0.000) (0.004) (0.055)
Board Busyness 0.008 0.007 0.009
(0.118) (0.104) (0.111)
Acquisition^ *
Negative Annual Return^ -0.154** -0.156** -0.151**








Negative Annual Return** (0.765)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Adj. R2 0.299 0.302 0.364 0.367 0.191
No. of Observation 14767 10239 11234 7927 14767
Dependent variable in all the specifications is LnPayjt 
Estimations in Column (2) and (4) are endogeneity corrected 
estimations. Specification (5) is estimations for the sub-period 
(2003-2010)
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 5.3: Estim ation of Acquisition Premium with Survivor Bias Correction
Full Sample (1992-2010) 2003-2010
Parameters Selection Heckman Fixed Selection Outcome
Equation Corrected Effects Equation Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmarked 0.031*** 0.014* 0.029** 0.044** 0.027**
Returns (0.000) (0.055) (0.018) (0.002) (0.018)
G vwr 0.137** 0.110**
(0.011) (0.005)
Firm Size 0.040* 0.388*** 0.412*** 0.043** 0.635***
(Ln Sales) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000)
Acquisition^ -0.366*** 0.018** 0.037** -0.409** 0.015**
(0.000) (0.003) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
A cqu isition^-! -0.233** 0.016** 0.038** -0.347** 0.012**
(0.035) (0.007) (0.011) (0.022) (0.009)
Acquisitionit_ 2 -0.210 0.015* 0.029** -0.329 0.0.010
(0.177) (0.064) (0.038) (0.212) (0.071)
International -0.094 0.022 0.034 -0.108 0.027
Acquisition (0.240) (0.434) (0.686) (0.237) (0.453)
Change in Control -0.016**
Payments (0.010)
P 0.219 0.214
The dependent variables in columns (1) and (4) is probability of retention and that 
in columns (2), (3) and (5) is LnPayjf .The estim ates in column (2) are 
survivor bias corrected and estim ates in column (5) is for the sub-period 2003-2010. 
Estim ates are marginal effects from the two-step estimation. Models are 
estim ated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Benchmarked Value 0.010* 0.020* 0.311**
Weighted Return (0.65) (0.057) (0 .022)
Firm Size 0.364*** 0.383*** 0.421***
(Ln Sales) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition^ 0.023** 0.036*** 0.056***
(0 .011) (0 .000) (0 .000)





 * * 0.029** 0.0340**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.009)
Board -0.027** -0.030** -0.039**
Independence (0.004) (0 .001) (0.003)
Board 0.007 0.013 0.018
Busyness (0.124) (0.155) (0.131)
Dependent variable: Ln Pay,7
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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C hapter 6
Are CEOs Paid a Com pensating  
Differential for Higher Turnover 
Risk?
6.1 In trod u ction
In his seminal work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the W ealth of Nations 
(1776), Adam Smith puts forward the proposition of compensating wage differentials 
whereby a worker needs to be paid a premium to m otivate her to do a job th a t involves 
risk of physical harm, mental fatigue and job insecurity. However, empirical evidence on 
this proposition has been "inconclusive with respect to every job characteristic except 
the risk of death" (Brown, 1980). Most studies on compensating wage differentials have 
relied on self-reported da ta  from workers about the risks involved in the job and the cross- 
sectional da ta  sets employed for these research inadequately controls for param eters like
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motivation, a ttitude  to risk and skill (Duncan and Holmland, 1983; Arnould and Nichols, 
1983).
In this chapter, we attem pt to test for the presence of compensating wage differentials 
in CEO pay. In the last decade, CEO compensation and corporate governance have been 
a topic of much debate among regulators, financial press and academics. Between 1990 
and 2005, corporate profit and average worker’s pay has increased by 106.7% and 4%, 
respectively. In the same period, the growth in to ta l CEO pay has been 298.2%. Over 
the last two decades there have been growing concerns over the rapid growth of and lack 
of performance sensitivity in CEO pay. Thus, CEOs may seem an unlikely worker-group 
to  m erit a compensating wage differential.
Under the conditions of optimal contracting, a poorly performing CEO should receive 
lower compensation or be replaced by the board of directors. Fama (1980) and Fee and 
Hadlock (2004) report th a t the high opportunity cost of CEO dismissal is manifest in 
the form of loss of managerial reputation, prolonged period of unemployment, working 
for smaller firms and loss of future earnings and thus the implied probability of earning 
loss is a m ajor constraint on CEO behaviour. In the last two decades when CEO pay 
and corporate governance has a ttracted  public outrage, there has been a secular increase 
in the rate  of CEO turnover and the average tenure for US has fallen from eight years to 
approximately six years (Kaplan and Minton, 2012). Empirical evidence also suggests an 
increasing likelihood of CEO dismissal (Peters and Wagner, 2012). This motivates the 
investigation of whether the increase in CEO pay can be partially attribu ted  to the rising 
likelihood of CEO dismissal1. A positive association of CEO pay with the probability of 
forced turnover will imply that the cost of being fired is reflected in the higher levels of 
pay. The prospect of compensating wage differentials as a possible reason of high growth 
in CEO pay has received little empirical attention.
1 W(> use "Dismissal" and "Foivod-turnovor" intnrcliangoablv.
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Using a dataset of US firms from 1993 to  2009. Peters and Wagner (2012) report 
a 10% increase in CEO pay for a percentage point rise in forced turnover risk. They 
suggest th a t under optimal contracting and a given reservation utility of the CEO, a 
rising risk of turnover is compensated with a pay premium. The basic premise of their 
analysis is th a t the probability of forced turnovers are predicted by firm and industry 
risk. It can be argued th a t firm and industry risk m ay be a predictor of both probability 
of dismissal and CEO pay. Hence, our paper differs from Peters and Wagner (2012) in 
using severance pay entitlements of the CEO as an instrum ent to examine the effect of 
increasing likelihood of CEO dismissal on CEO pay for a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs 
during the period 1993-2010.2 Our results suggest th a t the CEOs are paid a 2%-4% 
premium in pay for each percentage point rise in the  risk of dismissal, supporting the 
proposition of a compensating wage differential. In addition, we examine the potential 
change in compensation mix to compensate for rising dismissal risk and the possible 
effect of compensating wage differentials on performance sensitivity of CEO pay. We find 
evidence th a t the pay premium is driven by an increase in cash-based pay  suggesting a 
structural change in the composition of CEO pay to compensate for the higher risk of 
dismissal.
Further, we investigate the effects of corporate governance regulations, in particular 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (henceforth SOX), and enhanced disclosure requirements which may 
be expected to have an impact on the risk profile of CEO jobs. Our results suggest tha t 
in the  sub-period 2003-2010 which immediately follows the governance regulations, CEOs 
are paid higher compensating differentials, predom inantly in the form of cash payments. 
Thus, it seems the governance regulations may have had a negative effect on performance 
sensitivity of CEO pay by leading to a higher proportion of risk-free pay
2 Argum ents can bo m ade that the risk of turnover may l>e reflected in th e severance pay arrangem ents itself. W e discuss 
our choice' o f instrum ent in detail in Section 6.3.
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This study adds to several strands of research on executive compensation and corpo­
rate governance.
First, our findings suggest the presence of compensating wage differentials in CEO 
compensation. Controlling for a range of firm and CEO characteristics, we find evidence 
th a t CEOs are paid a premium for increasing uncertainty of their job. This is similar to 
Peters and Wagner (2012) who report a positive association between forced turnover risk 
and CEO pay. However, we use a different instrum entation strategy and find significantly 
lesser compensating differentials than  th a t reported by Peters and Wagner (2012). In the 
context of the recent debate on executive compensation, the compensating differentials 
in executive compensation due to increasing risk of dismissal is a m atter of interest for 
economists and policy makers alike.3 Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest managerial en­
trenchm ent as a m ajor determ inant of increasing CEO pay. Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
indicate firm size as a m ajor determ inant of CEO pay growth. We control for managerial 
entrenchment, firm performance and firm size in our analysis and find significant com­
pensating differentials in CEO pay for increased risk of forced turnover. Our findings 
add to the current literature on determ inants of CEO pay growth.
Second, our results suggest a changing pa\^ mix to compensate for the rising risk of 
dismissal. To compensate for increasing dismissal risk, the differential is more likely 
to be paid as risk-free cash compensation. However, such an arrangement may have 
implications for performance sensitivity and incentive alignment.
Finally, we contribute to the growing debate on the effect of SOX on CEO compen­
sation contracts. We find higher cash based compensation for higher dismissal risk in 
the post-SOX period. So, it may seem th a t even though SOX has resulted in a higher
3Kaplun and M inton (2012) report increasing riskiness o f CEO job but do not analyze the effect of risk on rising CEO  
pay. Agarwal and K noeber (1998) reports risk premium in CEO pay in industries prone to higher risk o f takeovers. This 
study is more closely related to Peters and W agner (2012) that analyzes the risk of forced CEO turnover and its effect on 
CEO Pay .
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probability of poor performing CEOs being replaced, the performance sensitivity of com­
pensation contracts may have declined due to increasing use of less-risky forms of cash 
payments. Our results suggest an inadvertent effect of governance regulations on the 
performance sensitivity of CEO pay design.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the relevant 
literature on CEO pay and CEO turnover; Section 3 provides an overview of the da ta  and 
in Section 4 we briefly discuss the methodology employed to  examine the forced turnover- 
performance relationship. Section 5 discusses the findings of empirical estimation and 
Section 6 Concludes.
6.2  T h eory  and L iterature R ev iew
6.2.1 CEO Pay and Pay-Perform ance Sensitiv ity
The Principal-agent view of incentive alignment suggests th a t CEOs are rewarded for 
their skills and contribution to company performance and th a t under the condition of 
incomplete monitoring, the reward structure should be designed to align the interests of 
the (risk-neutral) shareholders and the (risk-averse) CEOs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Firm  performance (n) will depend on C EO ’s performance (c ) and a chance random vari­
able (t>). The profit function
I I  =  f(e,  v)  (6 .1 )
is non separable in e and v.  Therefore managerial effort e is not directly measurable. 
Therefore, CEO ’s wage is contingent on the observed company performance
149
W  =  / ( n ) (6.2)
where firm’s profit is positively associated with CEO effort.
This theory posits a strong link between firm performance and CEO pay. A broad 
range of firm performance measures have been suggested. Total shareholder wealth is 
commonly used to  analyze alignment of incentives between shareholders and CEOs. How­
ever, it has been argued th a t W  for a risk averse manager should be contingent on 
accounting measures of performance (Holmstrom, 1979) and relative measures of firm 
performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lazear, 1995). These studies suggest th a t opti­
mal m anagerial compensation should be contingent on performance benchmarked against 
competitors to  control for effects of demand shocks and bullish markets. In such case,
W  =  /(II.  ©) (6.3)
where © is a measure of industry/com petitor performance.
From a tournam ent theory perspective (Lazear and Rosen 1981), CEO compensation 
is a convex function of organizational levels. Thus, high CEO compensation acts as 
an incentive not only for the CEO but also for the sub-ordinates to achieve th a t level. 
Empirical evidence exists tha t larger firms are associated with higher average pay (Brown 
and Medoff, 1989). If a larger firm has a higher average pay, then the CEO needs to be 
paid higher in a larger firm to m aintain the pay-differential with the next highest level 
and to  compensate the CEO for the loss of option value of promotion. Conventionally, 
organization levels are positively associated with firm size and hence optimum CEO pay 
should reflect the size of the firm. Thus,
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w  = /(n.e.A) (6.4)
where A is the size of the firm.
Empirical studies have focused on estim ating the nature and strength of statistical 
association between CEO pay and firm performance and firm size, empirical evidence 
suggests th a t the statistical relationship between CEO pay and firm performance is weak 
and less robust to  changes in specifications and functional forms of the variables. Conyon 
and Leech (1994) finds a weak pay-performance relationship using samples of UK firms. 
M urphy (1999) tests the hypothesis on US sample and notes th a t there exists a significant 
but small positive association of CEO pay and firm performance.
A large body of literature reports a positive and robust association between CEO pay 
and firm size with a higher m agnitude of elasticity than  the CEO pay-firm performance 
elasticity (Rosen 1992, M urphy 1999, etc.). Gabaix and Landier (2008) uses extreme 
value theory to suggest th a t the increase in CEO pay in the last two decades is an 
equilibrium outcome of growth in average firm size in the USA.
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argues th a t the optimal contracting framework is fraught 
with problems of moral hazard as monitoring and incentive alignments are only partial 
and often costly. Their managerial power hypothesis suggests th a t the CEO exerts her 
influence over the board of directors to increase her own pay. If managerial entrenchment 
drives high CEO pay, then strong governance and monitoring may be able to mitigate 
entrenchment effect. Consistent with this view, Core (1999) and Lehn and Zhao (2006) 
report th a t CEOs of firms with weaker corporate governance are systematically paid 
higher than  their contemporaries in firms with stronger corporate governance, although 
no standard measure for the strength of corporate governance has been identified in the 
literature. Some studies (Harford and Li, 2007) use CEO tenure as a proxy for relative
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strength  of corporate governance whereas some others (Zhao and Lehn, 2006) use the 
num ber of independent directors as measures of strength  of corporate governance.
These theories suggest th a t optimal CEO pay reflects firm performance, firm size, 
industry performance, managerial power and strength  of corporate governance.
6.2.2 CEO Turnover and Firm Perform ance
Principal agent theory suggests th a t CEOs may be m otivated to  act in the interest of 
the  shareholders by making CEO pay contingent on firm performance. Yet another 
instrum ent of incentive alignment is the ability of the board of directors to dismiss the 
CEO (Zajac, 1990). Being dismissed has a significant negative impact on the future 
income of the CEOs and may impede career growth. Fee and Hadlock (2004) provide 
evidence th a t forced turnover has a detrim ental effect on both  career growth and the pay 
of CEOs. CEO effort is often difficult to observe and measure. Therefore, the likelihood 
of dismissal may depend on firm performance:
Pr (Dismissal)  =  g(Tl) (6.5)
where dDi smissa l /dH  < 0.
The CEO turnover rate  has increased marginally over the last two decades (Jensen et 
al. 2004). Conyon (1998) and Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) find evidence th a t the risk of 
CEO dismissal is negatively associated with firm performance. However, an increasing 
body of literature questions the ability and willingness of the board of directors to replace 
under-performing CEOs (Jensen, 1993). Bebchuk and Pried (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen 
and, Ferrell (2004) argue th a t if the CEOs have a significant influence over the board of 
directors and the pay-setting process, the compensation contracts are not optimal and 
suffer from agency problems.
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In a recent study, Kaplan and Minton (2012) examine a sample of US firms from 1992- 
2007 and report a secular increase in annual CEO turnover rates th a t can be attributed 
to poor performance. Their results indicate an increasing frequency of performance 
related CEO turnover, particularly in the later part of their sample period. They report 
decreasing average CEO tenure throughout the sample period.
The structure and composition of the board of directors are likely to  be im portant 
determ inants of CEO turnover. A  p r io r i , it may not be reasonable to  expect th a t a 
smaller board size will have a similar strength of vigilance as th a t of a larger board. 
The board of directors are composed of executive (inside) directors and non-executive 
(outside) directors. The percentage of outside directors on the board are often used as a 
measure of board independence. (Herrnalin and Weisbach, 1998). Further, the number of 
boards an individual director is a member of may reflect her competence and expertise. 
Alternatively, it may also lead to dilution in her monitoring and vigilance effort.
The corporate scandals surrounding Enron led to the promulgation of a number of 
corporate governance regulations, most notably the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 
and the NYSE and NASDAQ reforms of 2002. The main objectives of SOX was to in­
crease corporate accountability and boost investors’ confidence in capital markets. Post- 
SOX, CEOs are faced with higher penalties leading up to criminal prosecution for non- 
compliance to financial reporting norms. In addition, Sections 302 and 304 of SOX require 
the CEO to refund any  incentive based compensation in the event of subsequent identifi­
cation of financial m isstatem ents. These regulations change the risk profile of CEO jobs 
and have potential effects on compensation structuring and corporate governance.
There has been academic interest in analyzing the effect of SOX and in calculating the 
economic cost of SOX (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008; Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2007). Zhang 
(2007) reports a decline in market capitalization of all firms traded in US stock exchanges 
by US$ 1.4 trillion in 2002-2003. The decline may be a result of compliance costs to the
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firm or of adopting low-risk corporate strategies. Firms with weak corporate governance 
may help shield the CEO from the increased risk by altering the performance sensitivity in 
pay. This can be done either by increasing the proportion of low-risk cash compensation 
or by making CEO pay contingent on low-risk measures of firm performance (Carter, 
Lynch and Zechman, 2009). Cohen et. al (2008) finds evidence th a t post-SOX, CEOs 
are paid more in bonus (cash-compensation) than  incentive compensation. This may 
shield the CEOs from some of the risk arising out of SOX regulations.
6.2.3 C om pensating D ifferentials In CEO Pay
From the standpoint of optim al contracting and principal agent theory, CEO pay ( w )  
should be contingent on the observed company performance measures (n), measure of in­
dustry /com petitor performance (0) and firm size (A ) (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lazear, 
1995; Eriksson, 1999; Gabaix and Landier, 2008).
W  =  f ( U . @ . A )  (6.6)
Empirical evidence suggests th a t the statistical relationship between CEO pay and 
firm performance is weak and less robust to choice of firm performance indicators. The 
performance sensitivity for US CEOs has been estim ated to be of the order of 0.12-0.16 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Coughlan and Schmidt 1985). However, a large proportion 
of studies on CEO pay-performance sensitivity use cash-based measures of CEO pay.
A large body of literature reports a positive association between CEO pay and firm 
size which is stronger and more robust than  the CEO pay-firm performance elasticity 
(Murphy 1999).
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue th a t the optimal contracting framework is fraught 
with problems of moral hazard as monitoring and incentive alignments are only partial
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and often costly. Their managerial power hypothesis suggests th a t CEO exerts her in­
fluence over the board of directors to increase her own pay. If managerial entrenchment 
drives high CEO pay, then strong governance and monitoring may be able to mitigate 
entrenchm ent effect.
If the entrenchm ent theory holds, turnover probability and CEO pay should be neg­
atively associated4. Such a situation would mean a deviation from optimal contracting 
and the breakdown of the corporate governance structure. On the other hand, from an 
efficient market point of view, since the CEOs face higher risk of being forced out of 
job in the recent times, the dismissal risk should be positively associated with CEO pay. 
Therefore, there may be a compensating differential in CEO pay to  compensate for the 
increased risk of forced turnover. The increase in pay over the last two decades may thus 
be partially  due to  the risk premium paid to the CEOs. The optim um  CEO pay can be 
expressed as:
W =  /(II. ©.A. $) (6.7)
where $ is the risk of being dismissed from job. Thus, a priori , dW/d$  > 0 indicating 
a compensating differential in CEO pay for increased risk of forced turnover.
Kaplan and Minton (2012) report shortening CEO tenure and rising risk of forced 
turnover for US CEOs in the period 1992-2007 and comment th a t the increasing risk of 
turnover offsets the rise in CEO pay over the same period of time but do not formally test 
for compensating differential. The first empirical work on risk premium in CEO pay was 
by Peters and Wagner (2012). The central them e of their work is th a t CEOs are more 
likely to be dismissed for changes in firm and industry risk. Using industry level equity 
volatility and credit ratings as instruments, they estim ate a 10% increase in CEO pay for
'For detailed discussion 01 1  entrenchment constraint and m ultiplicative preferences in the context of CEO pay see Peters 
and Wanner (2012) and Gabaix and handier (2008).
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each percentage point increase in dismissal risk for US CEOs in the period 1993-2009. 
The median CEO is paid US8 220,000 for one percentage point increase in risk of forced 
turnover. Peters and W agner’s (2012) study contradicts the simple entrenchment model 
whereby a CEO enjoys both higher pay and lower turnover risk. They suggest an efficient 
labour m arket model0 of compensating pay differential for higher job risk.
There is very limited empirical evidence on the m agnitude of compensating differen­
tials in CEO pay. Peters and Wagner (2012) is the only study in this domain. The effect 
of turnover risk on CEO compensation design and possible substitution effect in compo­
nents of CEO pay to  hedge the risks of dismissal can aid policy making on governance 
and CEO compensation. Further, it may be of interest to analyze the effect of SOX and 
corporate governance reforms on the risk of turnover and CEO compensation contracts.
6 .3  D a ta
The sample of firms are drawn from S&P 1500 indices6 for the period 1993-2010, which 
represents about 90% of the US market capitalization. The da ta  were obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. The database provides detailed information 
on CEO pay and its components, generated from the annual proxy filings (Def-14A) of 
US companies. The firms in the sample are large with a highly skewed distribution of 
annual Sales with mean (median) of US8 9.26 billion (US8 4.2 billion).
Execucomp provides information on 3016 CEOs in th a t sample period. 302 firms do 
not report either the CEOs or the s tart date and date of turnover of their CEOs (in case 
of the  event of turnover) and have been dropped from the study because their duration
5Efficient labour market, in thr context, refers to a system  whereby a poor performing CEO is dism issed and a high 
perform ing CEO is rewarded with higher pay.
6 S& P 1500 contains S&P 500 firms (500 firms). S&:P M idcap (400 firms) and S&P Sm all Cap (600 firms). In the  
beginning of the sam ple period. Execucom p covers 1157 SfcP 1500 firms. From 1997, E xecucom p covers all firms in SXrP 
1500.
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of being a t risk couldn’t be determined. We also drop observations on firms which have 
been represented for only one year in the sample period. This leads to the omission of 
12 more firms from the analysis. P robit regressions to analyse sample selectivity (not 
tabulated) were performed using firm performance and CEO pay measures but none of 
the coefficients was estim ated to be statistically significant and hence there seems to be no 
evidence of system atic non-disclosure of information. The remaining 2755 organizations, 
observed in the period 1993-2010, are included in the analysis. Thus the final sample 
contains 15121 CEO-year observations for 2703 CEOs. The firms are observed from the 
first year they appear on the Execucomp database until the end of the study period or 
until the firm drops out of the sample due to mergers and acquisitions or delisting from 
the stock exchange. The firms th a t drop out of the sample before 2010 are not omitted 
to  avoid survivor bias.
Events of CEO turnovers are identified from the Execucomp database, Fortune 500 
and Fortune 1000 lists, the Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis Business news database. 
Consistent with the definition used by Huson et al. (2004), turnover is defined as an 
event of a CEO relinquishing/being discharged of his duties a t any particular time in the 
study period. Thus turnover in a given year of observation, y, means th a t a CEO who is 
observed in a firm on 1st day of October of year, y, would no longer be observed in the 
same firm on 1st day of October of year, y+ 1 .' Classifying forced turnover is difficult 
as firms rarely sta te  the reason for a CEO exit as forced. Using the above databases on 
executives and press releases around the events of turnover, we identify 855 events of CEO 
turnover of which 3608 are classified as forced.9 CEO turnovers occurring around change 
of corporate control are not classified as forced turnovers as the central theme of our
7W c ust’ O etober-Septem ber cycle to overlap w ith the D E F 14 A filing cycles.
8 CEO turnovers for which the press reports that the CEO was fired, forced out or resigns due to policy differences or 
internal pressure's are classified as events o f forced turnover.
^Unavailability of official data may lead to a underestim ation of the forced turnover number. T he problem is persistent 
throughout the sam ple period. This will make our estim ates the lower bound of the actual com pensating wage differential.
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analysis is estim ating compensating differentials for forced dismissal. Our classification 
of turnover and forced turnover differs from Peters and Wagner (2012) in th a t they use 
an age-based algorithm to identify forced turnovers. Also, in our analysis cases where 
CEOs vacate the post but continue in the same firm as the Chairman of the board are 
not treated  as an event of turnover.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present the yearly variations in CEO pay and CEO dismissal 
through the sample period. In the events of CEO turnover within a financial cycle, 
Execucomp reports the compensation of the CEO who has been in office for the longer 
period of time. We identified such events and care was taken to map the CEOs and 
corresponding pay.10
CEO pay for each year is calculated as the sum of the salary, annual bonus payout, 
Black-Scholes value of stock and option awards granted in the year, non-equity incentives, 
value of restricted stock grants (RSUs) and long term  incentives (LTIP) due tha t year 
and all other compensation paid in th a t year. The nominal CEO pay is converted to 2000 
dollars by using Consumer Price Indices published by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
The natural log of CEO pay is used in the analysis as an explanatory variable.11 Total 
Pay is skewed with a mean (median) of 4.3 (1.7) million USD. Further, we use natural 
logs of cash compensation and equity based compensations separately to analyze changing 
compensation mix. Descriptive statistics for to ta l pay and the components of pay are 
presented in Table 6.2 for the full sample period and for the pre-SOX and post-SOX 
sub-periods.
Using information on the CEOs date of assuming office and the date of turnover, we
10We identified events o f turnover within a financial cycle. If the outgoing CEO has been in the office for the greater 
part o f th e year, we record an event of turnover in that year. On the other hand, if the new CEO is in office for the greater 
part o f the year, we record an event o f turnover in the previous year. In 8 occassions when the turnover occured around 
the m iddle of the financial period, we treat them as if the outgoing CEO has been in the office for greater part of the year.
11 T he estim ations arc1 robust to  alternate specifications of CEO pay. w ithout using th e LTI and RSU. "All Other Total" 
paym ents include severance payout that may have been m ade in an year and has been excluded from the analysis.
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construct a measure of CEO tenure (in years). To account for potential non-linearity in 
the tenure effect (Gregory-Smith et al. 2009). we use the quadratic function of tenure. 
Execucomp also provides information on the date the CEO joined the firm. Using this 
information, we construct an indicator for outside CEO hire. If the date of joining the 
firm and becoming the CEO is the same, then the CEO is hired from outside and the 
indicator takes on a value of T ’. Similarly, if the date joining the firm is earlier than  the 
date of becoming CEO, then it is treated  as an internal promotion.
Firm  performance measures were obtained from S& P’s COMPUSTAT Research Tape 
whereas the stock price da ta  was merged from Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database at the 2-digit SIC code level. Based on existing literature (Buccholtz, 
Ribbens and Houle, 2003, Hambrick and Cannella, 2004, Jensen, et al, 2004), we use 
Returns on Asset (ROA) as an accounting measure of firm performance12 and we use the 
natural logarithm of sales as a measure of firm size.13.
Peters and Wagner (2012) suggest th a t CEOs are only dismissed for industry-specific 
shocks. Therefore, we use an alternative industry-adjusted measure of performance to 
account for industry-specific shocks. The average annual value weighted return on a 
firm ’s stocks are benchmarked with the average annual value weighted return on the 
stocks of the median firm in the same 2-digit SIC code to  construct the relative measure 
of firm performance14. We also control for the volatility in firm’s stock returns by using 
the standard deviations of monthly value-weighted returns on a firm’s stock in a given 
year.
12E stim ation  w ith Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (E B IT ) and Earning Per Share (E P S ) yield qualitatively similar 
results. T he results are not presented but can be m ade available on request.
13 A lternate specification of firm size using natural log of tota l assets was used as a measure o f robustness. The estim ations 
were sta tistica lly  indifferent from the estim ations with log Sales as m easure of firm size. The results are not presented here 
and is available on request.
14 As a measure of robustness, we estim ate alternate specifications w ith equal weighted returns on a firm’s stocks. We 
also check for alternate benchm arking at 3-digit SIC code level. T he coefficient estim ates w ith equal w eighted returns are 
lower than the estim ates with value weighted return but the difference is sta tistica lly  insignificant. T he estim ations with 
benchm arking at 3-digit SIC code level are qualitatively sim ilar. T hese estim ations are om itted  for brevity but is available 
on request.
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The cost of CEO removal in the events of involuntary turnover (natural logarithm of 
the dollar value of the severance pay entitlement) is used as an instrum ent to circumvent 
the potential endogeneity in CEO dismissal and CEO pay. In USA, typical severance 
plan provides 6 to  24 months of pay (including bonus) for involuntary severance. Some 
firms allow the CEO immediate vesting of the stock options a t the grant price following 
dismissal. However, there is no m andatory sta tu te  on the prevalence and amount of 
severance payments th a t a CEO can be eligible for.
The data  for severance payment are obtained from Execucomp and annual DEF 14A 
filings of the firms. Severance pay eligibility is distributed with a mean (median) of US$ 
1.4 million (US$ 0.00). Richard S. Fuld, Jr. of Lehmann Brothers Holdings Inc. had the 
highest severance pay eligibility of US$ 241.1 millions among the sample firms.
All firms having a contractual severance agreement are m andated to disclose the in­
formation on severance agreement in the DEF-14A filings. However, some CEOs are 
granted an ad-hoc ex-post severance payment which has not been contractually agreed 
upon at the beginning of the tenure. In our analysis we only include the contractual 
severance pay eligibilities and not the final payouts. About 36% CEOs in the sample 
have severance pay provisions.
P robit estimations was performed using an indicator for presence of severance pay 
agreement as dependent variable and firm size, firm performance and governance variables 
as independent variables. Coefficients of all the independent variables were statistically 
insignificant, suggesting th a t firms having severance pay provisions for CEOs are not 
systematically grouped.
The severance pay entitlement prevalence and mean entitlement has not changed 
significantly over the sample period. In the sub-period 1993-2001, the mean (median) 
severance pay is US$ 1.13 million (US$ 0.00) whereas in the 2003-2010 sub-period the 
mean (median) severance pay is US$ 1.91 million (US$ 0.00). The difference in the two
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mean is statistically insignificant. This may suggest th a t the higher turnover risk is not 
significantly underw ritten by the severance pay guarantee.
A priori, we may expect the strength of corporate governance to  have an impact on 
the probability of CEO dismissal and the compensating differential paid for rising risk of 
turnover. D ata  on corporate governance was obtained from the Risk Metrics database 
(formerly IRRC). The number of directors on a board and percentage of outside directors 
are used as measures of board size and board independence respectively. If the CEO also 
acts as the Chairm an of the board (CEO duality) and /o r has higher stock holdings in the 
firm, she may enjoy some degree of power over the board of directors. We also control for 
a busy board using the number of average num ber of board memberships of the directors 
of a given firm in a given year.
Corporate governance da ta  is available for 1996-2007 and hence specifications with 
corporate governance controls contain 11522 firm-year observations. The summary sta­
tistics of the reduced sample in provided in Panel B of Table 6.1.
6 .4  M eth od o logy
The above discussion highlights th a t there is a significant cost to  the CEOs for job loss. 
In a competitive labour m arket such a risk of unemployment and loss of future earn­
ings needs to be compensated with higher pay (Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981; Heywood, 
1989). To analyze the causal effect of turnover risk on CEO pay we need to estimate 
the effect of turnover risk on CEO pay. However, turnover risk is potentially endogenous 
and CEOs are not randomly assigned to different turnover probabilities. The simultane­
ous increase in CEO pay and the probability of turnover may be driven by unobserved 
variables which may affect both the param eters, leading to endogeneity concerns. An 
instrum ental variable approach can be employed in an attem pt to  circumvent the en­
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dogeneity issue. Thus, we need to identify variables which are significantly associated 
with turnover probability but is uncorrelated with CEO pay, except through the effect 
on probability of turnover.
In the context of CEO turnover and pay, no specific robust instrum ents have been 
documented in the existing literature. Most conceivable determ inants of turnover hazard 
also impact upon pay. In the spirit of Peters and Wagner (2009), we use the conditional 
probability of CEO-firm m atch as an identification strategy. We designed a variable 
for the number of historic CEO turnovers of a sample firm upto the given year. This 
variable has been estim ated to  be insignificant and leads to  significant loss of degrees of 
freedom. In the later version of their paper (2012), Peters and Wagner argue th a t firm 
and industry risks are valid instrum ents for forced CEO turnovers. They use industry 
level equity volatility, semi volatility and credit ratings as exogenous change in firm and 
industry risk. We find firm and industry risks to be significantly correlated with both 
CEO pay and the probability of CEO turnover. The correlation of industry risk with 
the probability CEO turnover is 0.33 and th a t with CEO pay is 0.27. Similarly, the 
correlation of firm risk with the probability of CEO turnover is 0.24 and th a t with CEO 
pay is 0.22.
We use the severance payment entitlem ent of the CEO as an instrum ent for our 
analysis. Severance payment affects the probability of forced exit in th a t a high severance 
pay entitlement increases the cost of CEO replacement and is expected to  reduce the 
probability of forced turnover. However, this entitlement may not have any direct bearing 
on the CEO ’s pay on an yearly basis once the contract is negotiated at the beginning of 
the tenure, except through the effect on turnover hazard. The severance pay eligibility can 
be co-determined a t the beginning of the CEO tenure but the value option grants, which 
forms the m ajor proportion of CEO pay are determined by the stock price performance. 
Thus the yearly variation in CEO pay is not significantly correlated with the severance
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pay eligibility. The severance payout may be correlated to  the lagged pay because it is 
based as 6-24 months of the CEO pay. However, in our analysis we use the severance 
pay eligibility as the instrum ent and not the payout.
It may be argued th a t the severance pay provision partly  compensates for any rising 
risk of forced dismissal. If increasing risk of forced turnover is underw ritten in severance 
pay agreements then it should be reflected in the higher prevalence and provisions of 
severance pay over time. However, as presented in Table 6.2, the median provisions for 
severance pay over time has varied only marginally. This suggests th a t higher turnover 
risk is not significantly underw ritten in severance payment provisions. The correlation 
between severance pay and CEO pay is weak (0.18) and statistically insignificant10. In 
addition, we use a set of year dummies to control for macroeconomic fluctuations in the 
first stage of the analysis. We estimate the second stage of the regressions without the 
year dummies. This is because firms are more likely to fire a CEO during economic 
downturns but CEO pay may not vary significantly with tim e16. Further, we test for 
instrum ent validity using the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. We don’t find 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of joint exogeneity of the instrum ents (p=0.079). 
Tests for weak instrum ents were also performed. The cost of CEO removal (p=0.009) 
and the year dummies (p=0.000) are all significant at 5% level. The F-statistic of the 
first stage estimation provides further evidence [F (23.14790) =  32.03] to reject the null 
hypothesis of weak instrum ents. A similar result was obtained [F (18.14790) =  29.52] from 
the test of joint significance of the instruments. These results support the validity and 
reliability of the set of instrum ents used for this analysis.
We also report the results for the just-identified case with year fixed effects in both
15 Correlation between forced CEO turnover and severance pay eligibility is com paratively stronger (0.48) and statistica lly  
significant.
lfiWc regress CEO turnover w ith the year dum m ies and find significant association of turnover probability with year 
dum m ies. However, when we regress CEO Pay with year dum m ies as independent variables, only the indicators for 2001 
and 2003 art' significant.
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stages of estim ation and using severance pay eligibility as the only instrum ent. For the 
just-identified case, the first stage estim ation has an ^sta tis tics  of 66.23. Thus the null 
hypothesis of weak instrum ent is strongly rejected.
We control for variables th a t are potentially related to  the risk of forced turnover and 
CEO pay. As discussed in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, CEO pay and probability of dismissal 
are functions of firm performance. We control for both accounting measures and relative 
stock performance of a firm. The relative performance measure is benchmarked to the 
m edian firm in the same industry code and thus controls for industry wide demand, 
productivity and technology shocks. Using volatility of a firm ’s monthly stock prices, 
we control for firm level risk. Further, firm size is potentially associated with CEO pay 
(Gabaix and Landier, 2008) and may have a potential correlation with CEO skills. Thus 
we control for firm size in our models. Finally, in an a ttem pt to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we control for CEO tenure and percentage shareholding of the CEO in 
the firm. A higher CEO tenure may reflect higher competence of the incumbent or a 
higher degree of entrenchment. In either case, the unobserved effect can influence both 
probability of turnover and CEO pay. Similarly, higher shareholding of the CEO in the 
firm may result in better incentive alignment or entrenchm ent, which is likely to have an 
effect on turnover risk and CEO pay
However, the possibility of om itted variable bias cannot be completely over-ruled due 
to  unobserved heterogeneity in CEO ability, risk environment and power within the firm. 
W ith  controls for firm risk, CEO characteristics and industry-adjusted performance, we 
attem pt to control for any unobserved bias. The standard  errors are clustered at firm 
level.
From an agency theory and tournam ent theory perspective, a standard wage equation 
for CEO pay can be expressed as:
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P a y i t— j30+(31X i t +i32F i r m P  erf orm anceit +/33F ir m  Si ze +  v it (6.8)
where X it is a vector of CEO characteristics, the estim ate of j32 is the pay-performance 
sensitivity in CEO compensation contracts. However, if CEOs are paid a compensating 
differential for the increasing risk of exit, the probability of exit will be an im portant 
determ inant of CEO compensation contracts and (32 may be potentially over-estimated.
In this study, we control for the risk of turnover and estim ate its effect on CEO pay 
by using a two-stage least squares approach. In the first stage we estim ate the predicted 
probability of forced turnover and use it as a regressor in the second-stage wage model 
(Wooldridge, 2002).
We estim ate the  following linear probability model in the first stage:
F o r c e d T u m o v e r n — otQ-\-cxiXit-\'Ct2 X i t—lFot^cr -)- c t^ G o v c r n c in c e i tF y Z ^ P f  ^ 3—h ht3~€u (6-9)
In equation (6.9), the dependent variable F o r c e d T u m o v e r it is an indicator variable for 
events of forced turnovers in any given firm in year, 4t \  Angrist and Kreuger (2001) sug­
gests th a t using a probit or logit estim ation in the first stage may have a high possibility 
of misspecification errors and th a t using linear probability model with an indicator vari­
able generates consistent second stage estimates. (We estim ate logit models to test the 
robustness of our findings. The results are not qualitatively different from our preferred 
model)
The estimates of m reflect the effects of contemporaneous firm performance, firm size 
and other observable param eters associated on the probability of forced turnover. a2 
estim ates the lag effects of firm performance, firm size and other observables. We control
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for risk in firm’s operating and information environment by the standard  deviation of the 
monthly stock returns of a firm in the given year (a) .  Governanceit controls for board size, 
board independence (i.e. the percentage of outside directors on the board) and average 
number of directorships of the board members. Zit represents severance pay eligibility 
of individual CEOs and is used as the instrum ental variable. and ht controls for firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects respectively.
The wage equation in the second stage estim ates the effect of forced turnover hazards 
on CEO pay.
L n P ayit=  +  fiAGovernanceit+p(ForcedTurnoverit) +  f i+ v u  (6.10)
In equation (6.10), LnP ayit is the natural logarithm  of CEO pay in a given year. Payit 
is the summ ation of the salary, bonus, value of stock and option grants and long term  
incentives paid to a CEO in a given year 11. Vectors X it and X itt~i contains contempo­
raneous and lag effects of firm performance, firm size, governance param eters and other 
observables a is the standard deviation of m onthly returns on a firms stock in a given 
year and controls for firm risk. /34 estimates the effect of governance strength on CEO 
pay. We omit the year fixed effects in this stage as our identification strategy and use /* 
to  control for firm fixed effects. We don’t include industry dummies in both the stages as 
the firm performance measure is benchmarked to the industry returns. ForcedTurnoverit 
is the predicted probability of forced turnover estim ated from equation (1). p is the es­
tim ation for association of forced turnover risk and CEO pay and can be interpreted as 
percentage change in CEO pay for one percentage change in probability of dismissal. 18
'"For the equity based vehicles, we use the Black-Scholes valuation of the CEO's equity holdings at that given year as 
reported in Execucom p.
ihTo test for reverse causation of higher pay hauling to higher turnover, wo estim ate the difference in CEO pay in three
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We report estim ates with bootstrapped standard  error using 500 resampling.
6 .5  R esu lts  and A n alysis
6.5.1 Are CEOs dism issed for poor perform ance?
In Table 6.3, we present the results of the first stage linear probability estimations of 
forced turnover. Columns (1) and (2) report estim ates w ith alternate controls for firm 
performance: accounting measures of firm performance and benchmarked share price 
measures of firm performance, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of 
estim ations with both firm performance and corporate governance controls.
We control for both  contemporaneous and lagged firm performance as CEOs are as 
likely to  be replaced for historical poor performance as contemporaneous performance. 
The estim ated coefficients on the firm performance measures are negative and significant 
at 5% levels. However, the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover is weak for 
both  the measures of performance employed. The results suggest tha t CEO of a firm 
with return  on assets (benchmarked value weighted return) two standard deviation below 
the mean is about 1% (3%) more likely to be dismissed19 from the post. Our results are 
similar to  the findings of Kaplan and M inton (2012), Conyon (1998) and Gregg, Machin 
and Syzmanski (1993) who report a negative but weak association of CEO turnover with 
firm performance.
The above results also suggest th a t CEOs are more likely to  be dismissed for poor 
performance with respect to  the industry and suggests stronger emphasis on relative 
performance.
proceeding periods from forced turnovers and three preooeding periods from voluntary turnover and we find no significant 
difference (not tabulated).
19Standard deviation of ROA is 43.38 units. Thus the effect o f poor firm perform ance is calculated by 2 x 43.38 x  
0 .00011 .
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The lagged effect of firm performance on the probability of CEO turnover is of com­
parable m agnitude as th a t of contemporaneous firm performance. However, the second 
lags of performance measures are estim ated to be statistically insignificant.
Controlling for firm performance, the estim ated coefficient on firm size is insignificant. 
Thus, large firms and small firms are equally likely to  dismiss the CEO for a given level 
of performance.
It can be argued th a t CEO-firm matches are not random  and industries with high 
CEO turnover a ttrac t high-skilled risk-prone CEOs (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2010) . 
We control for the risk in firm’s operating and information environment and our results 
suggest th a t higher risk in firm’s operating environment increases the likelihood of forced 
turnover. This may be due to the fact th a t fast changing industry conditions alter the 
skill set required from the CEO. Our results are similar to Peters and Wagner (2012) who 
use industry and firm risks as instrum ental variable. However they argue that industry 
volatility doesn’t impact upon CEO pay. We examine this relationship in section 6.5.2.
Unobserved skills and risk-preferences of CEOs may lead to spurious correlation be­
tween probability of turnover and CEO pay. Thus we attem pt to account for unobserved 
skills by controlling for CEO tenure in the firm. Consistent with the findings of Gregory- 
Sm ith et al (2009), our results suggest th a t CEOs face a higher probability of dismissal 
with increasing tenure in the job. The coefficient on tenure is positive and significant 
across specifications. However, estim ating with a quadratic function, our results suggest 
th a t the risk of being dismissed peaks and eventually declines with tenure after 5 years.
In columns (3) and (4), we augment our basic forced turnover model with controls for 
CEO power and strength of corporate governance. We use two measures to control for 
CEO power, percentage stockholding of the CEO in the firm and CEO duality. Consistent 
with the managerial power hypothesis, the estim ates on both the measures are significant 
and negative. A Chairman-CEO is less likely to be fired compared to her non-Chairman
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counterparts. Similarly, a CEO with percentage stock holding in the firm one standard 
deviations above the mean are about 3% less likely to be dismissed. Additionally if the 
entrenchment effect operates, a pr io r i  we may expect CEOs promoted from within the 
firm to  have a higher probability of being entrenched than  CEOs hired from outside. 
This can be due to  higher firm-specific knowledge or higher political influence of an 
insider CEO. We find no significant difference in turnover probability for insider CEOs 
with respect to CEOs hired from outside. Thus, our results suggest partial managerial 
entrenchment.
The board room governance variables controls for the potential monitoring role of the 
board of directors in the CEO dismissal process. CEOs of firms with a larger board size 
face a lower likelihood of dismissal. Using the control for percentage of outside directors 
as a proxy for board independence, our results suggest th a t a higher proportion of outside 
directors increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Finally, a higher average number of 
directorships held by the directors lower the probability of forced CEO exit. However, 
the estimates on board busyness is only borderline significant at 5% levels.20
The evidence on board structure and composition suggests th a t a smaller and more 
independent board results in better monitoring and is more likely to dismiss a non­
performing CEO. However, our estimations also suggest th a t a busy board may dissipate 
the monitoring effect. Our results are different from the predictions of an efficient m ar­
ket for directors which suggests th a t the best-skilled directors are recruited on multiple 
boards. Our findings indicate th a t higher average number of board memberships may 
lead to a dilution of board vigilance and supervision or a t best, has marginal impact.
Termination payment eligibility of a CEO is negatively associated with the probability
20We follow Convon (1998) and introduce throe period lags on governance variables to  analyze the dynam ics of monitoring  
strength. T he idea is that the m onitoring strength of a newly constitu ted  more independent board may take tim e to evolve. 
T he estim ates on lags o f board size was significant but the lags on other two m easures of governance were estim ated to be 
insignificant.
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of exit; a higher cost of firing reduces the probability of firing. From our estimates, a 
CEO with a severance pay eligibility one standard  deviation above the mean is about 
30% less likely to be term inated. Thus, we estim ate a system of equations whereby the 
predicted value of the probability of CEO dismissal from first stage is used in the second 
stage Pay equation. The predicted probability from the first stage of estimation ranges 
from [0,0.77] with a mean and median of 0.015 and 0.027 respectively. The F-statistic 
of first-stage regressions are significantly higher than  the threshold level of 10 (Stock, 
W right and Yogo, 2002), thus suggesting th a t the instrum ents employed are not weak.
6.5.2 Are CEOs paid a prem ium  for higher risk o f turnover?
The results of the second-stage regressions are presented in Table 6.4. In the second 
stage of estimation, we use the predicted probability of forced turnover from the first 
stage of estim ation to estim ate the effect of turnover probability on CEO pay. In the 
specifications (l)-(4), the dependent variable is log to ta l pay whereas in specifications (5) 
and (6) the dependent variable is log Cash compensation and log Non-Cash compensation 
respectively. Turnover payment eligibility is used as an instrum ent and the year dummies 
are om itted from the second-stage regressions.
In the first two specifications in Table 6.4, We control for accounting measures of firm 
performance (ROA) and benchmarked share price performance respectively. In specifica­
tions (3) and (4), we additionally control for board characteristics and composition. The 
respective predicted probabilities of forced turnover from the first stage has been used 
in all the specifications. In specifications (5) and (6), we estim ate the effects of turnover 
hazards on the cash and non-cash components of the pay respectively to estimate the 
effect of risk of turnover on the cash and the non-cash components of the pay.21
21 Cash com ponent o f pay =  Salary +  Bonus +  All other cash paym ents in the year. Non-Cash com ponent of pay =  
Stock grants -f O ption s la n ts  +  RSU +  LTI
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Estim ates of second-stage regressions indicate th a t predicted probability of forced exit 
is positively and significantly associated with pay and the components of pay across all 
specifications. Thus, our results support the hypothesis of compensating differential in 
CEO pay for higher risk of forced exit. The CEOs are paid 1.5-2% more in Total 
Pay for a percentage point increase in turnover risk. Thus for a median CEO, one 
percentage increase in turnover risk leads to increase of Total Pay by (US$ 1.6mn * 
2%) US$ 32,200 and the mean CEO is compensated by (US$ 4.3mn * 2%) US$ 86,580 
for each percentage point rise in risk of turnover. Using severance pay eligibility as the 
instrum ental variable, we estim ate a significantly lower compensating differential in CEO 
pay compared to the estim ate of a 10% (US$ 220,000 for median CEO) risk-premium in 
CEO pay. In contrast to their suggestion th a t industry risk doesn’t have an impact on 
CEO pay, except through the effect on risk of turnover, we find a significantly positive 
association of industry volatility with CEO pay. Our estim ates suggest th a t CEOs of 
firms in highly volatile industries are paid higher. This result may be intuitive from an 
agency theory perspective whereby a risk averse agent may have to be compensated in 
excess for the bearing the risk of industry volatility (Garen, 1994). Controlling for the 
positive association of CEO pay with industry risk, w e  report a lower but statistically 
and quantitatively significant compensating differential in CEO pay.
Consistent with previous studies (Rosen 1992, M urphy 1999, etc.), CEO pay is strongly 
and positively associated with firm size. To compare with the risk-premium in CEO pay, 
in a firm which is one standard deviation larger than  the mean firm, the CEO pay is 
higher by ( US$ 13859 * 0.43) USS 5,682.
We report the results from the just-identified estim ation in Table 6.10. In this re­
gression, we use year fixed effects in both stages and severance pay eligibility as the 
only instrum ent. The estim ate of predicted probability of dismissal is comparable to 
th a t of our baseline estimates. Thus our choice of instrum ents do not seem to bias the
estimations.
CEO pay is significant and positively associated with firm performance, although 
the pay-performance sensitivity is weak. The estimations are robust to  alternate spec­
ifications of firm performance. CEO pay is more strongly associated with stock price 
performance of the firm, possibly arising out of the higher proportion of stock based pay 
in CEO compensation package. Strong past performance is associated with higher CEO 
pay. The pay-performance sensitivity is qualitatively similar for the first lag. However, 
the second lag of firm performance is insignificant across all specifications. Return on 
Assets one standard  above the mean will increase the pay of the CEO by US$ 43.38, 
indicating weak pay-performance sensitivity.
From these results, the compensating differential in CEO pay for turnover risk is 
significantly higher than  the firm-size and firm-performance effects on CEO pay.
Next, we control for managerial power and governance in specifications (3) and (4). 
CEO duality has a strong and significant effect on CEO pay. Similarly, higher percentage 
equity holding of the CEO is positively associated w ith to ta l CEO pay. In addition to 
the first stage estimates of lower probability of turnover, this indicates partial impact of 
managerial power in CEO entrenchment and pay. CEOs hired externally are paid more 
than  CEOs promoted from within. A possible explanation can be th a t CEOs hired from 
outside may have a higher bargaining power and may have to be compensated for the 
opportunity cost of foregoing the equity ownership from the previous job. An alternative 
comes from tournam ent theory whereby external hires may have a negative impact on 
the value of tournam ents for all in lower level. Therefore, the spread of the levels is 
increased by overpaying the external CEO.
Controlling for the size and composition of board, we find th a t firms with larger board 
size pay the CEO more. Boards with a higher proportion of outside directors pay the CEO 
lesser however the effect of board independence is statistically weak and is significant at
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10% level. Busy boards seem to dissipate the m onitoring effect of the board as busy 
boards are associated with higher CEO pay. Thus, rise in CEO pay can be partially 
a ttribu ted  to weaker corporate governance strength and busy boards.
Since the CEOs are paid a compensating differential for higher risk of turnover, it may 
be of interest to  know the change in compensation design th a t may result from the risk- 
premium in CEO pay. The results in columns (5) and (6) suggests th a t one percentage 
point increase in risk of dismissal increases cash compensation by ~ 3% and non-cash- 
compensation by ~ 1%. A percentage increase in risk of dismissal increases mean cash 
payment and mean non-cash payment by US$ 34,000 and US$ 17,252 respectively. The 
m ean risk premium in cash payment is almost twice the size of mean risk premium in 
non-cash payments. Thus it seems th a t higher turnover risk is compensated by increased 
risk-free cash-payments. This is consistent with Conyon et al. (2011) who report a 
decreasing trend in equity based compensation since 2001. They attribute this to the 
stock market crash of the early 2000s and the expensing of options under FASB(123r) 
as discussed in this thesis in section 3.3. We add to th a t literature in suggesting tha t 
a declining trend in use of stock-based payment may partially reflect the compensating 
differentials paid to the CEOs for higher risk of dismissal. Thus there may be a systematic 
shift in CEO compensation design over tim e to account for increasing risk of turnover. 
We examine this in greater detail in section 6.5.3.
The effect of firm performance on cash payments is weak and insignificant at 5% 
level. Firm  performance seems to have a stronger effect on non-cash payments which is 
an expected result as non-cash payments are designed to  be contingent on performance. 
The point estimates on firm size is bigger in column (5) than  in column (6), suggesting 
higher non-cash payments in larger firms. This is consistent with Core and Guay (1999) 
who report th a t CEOs of larger firms are likely to  have higher equity incentives. The 
negative association of CEO stock-ownership with cash payments in column (5) may be
further indication of substitution effects in CEO pay. Thus, a risk averse CEO may be 
paid a higher cash compensation and lesser in stock grants.
The effects of board vigilance and m onitoring has similar effects on cash and non-cash 
payments and are qualitatively similar to  the estimates in columns (l)-(4).
6.5.3 Has the risk-premium in CEO pay increased in th e  last decade?
We examine the effect of governance regulations laid down in SOX and the NYSE and 
NASDAQ reforms of 2002 on risk of turnover and CEO compensation contracts. These 
reforms aim at increasing managerial accountability and transparency in corporate gov­
ernance. However, since these reforms were promulgated in the same year, it is difficult 
to  isolate the effect of each reform separately. In our analysis we use SOX as an indicator 
of all the governance reforms of 2002 collectively.
We begin by dividing our samples in pre-SOX (1993-2001) and post-SOX (2003-2010) 
sub-samples and estimating the compensating differential for both  sub-periods. Further 
we analyze the effect of forced turnover-risk on the individual components of compensa­
tion and on the to tal compensation to investigate the substitution effect in compensation 
design. Cohen et. al (2007) finds evidence th a t post-SOX, CEOs are paid more in bonus 
(cash-compensation) than incentive compensation to shield the CEOs from some of the 
risk arising out of SOX regulations. We test for the effect of changing risk environment 
on the components of CEO pay.
A p r io r i , it can be expected th a t more stringent performance targets and governance 
regulations will make the job of the CEO more risky and may lead to a higher risk 
premium in pay. It may also be possible for firms to respond to the changing risk 
environment by altering performance targets to  less risky measures of performance.
Table 6.5 presents the estimates of the second-stage regressions by sub-periods. Col­
umn (l)-(3) replicates the estimations for the full sample from Table 6.4. The dependent
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variables for each specification is mentioned explicitly in the table. Columns (4)-(6) 
reports the estimations of the post-SOX sub period.
In the post-SOX sub-period, CEOs are paid 4%  more in Total Pay for each percentage 
point increase in risk of dismissal, which is about twice the compensating differential for 
the full sample. Thus, in the post-SOX period, a median CEO is paid ~  US$ 110,000 (4% 
* US$ 2.7 million) for a percentage rise in risk of getting fired. Consistent with Cohen 
et al (2007) we find evidence of substitution effect in CEO pay in the post-SOX period. 
A percentage increase in turnover risk is compensated by a 5% risk-premium in CEO 
pay. Thus, a median CEO in the post-SOX period is paid ~US$ 67,000 (5% * US$ 1.3 
million)- in cash payments for one percent rise in risk of forced turnover, which is twice 
as much the cash premium in CEO pay for the full sample period.
Further, the risk-premium in non-cash payments in the post-SOX period is insignifi­
cant. Thus, post-SOX, risk premium in pay seems to be largely driven by cash payments. 
Our results indicate tha t firms shield the CEOs from some of the risks of SOX regula­
tions by paying a higher compensating differential in pay. It appears, the regulations on 
corporate governance to m onitor growth in CEO pay may have led to further increase in 
CEO pay.
The other covariates retain their sign and significance and are qualitatively similar 
to the estimates for the full sample. There seems to be no significant difference in pay- 
performance sensitivity in the second sub-period as compared to  the full sample. The 
point estim ates on measures of performance are larger in the post-SOX period than 
th a t of the full sample but they are not significantly different. The objective of SOX 
regulations is to ensure better alignment of incentives and make compensation contracts 
more performance sensitive. This would have led to an increase in performance sensitivity 
in CEO pay. However, in response to the regulations, the firms may have restructured 
the compensation design and set low-risk performance targets for bonus payments.
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Our result is different from Cohen et al (2007) who reports the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to share holder wealth decreased post-SOX. Our measure of relative performance 
suggests th a t there has been no significant difference in pay-performance sensitivity post- 
SOX. Cohen et al. (2007) use da ta  from sample 1992-2006. Thus it may be possible tha t 
their result reflects the short-term  effect of SOX on pay-performance sensitivity whereas 
we report a longer term  effect.
Firms with larger boards pay more in cash compensation in the post-SOX period but 
the effect of board size on to tal pay and non-cash pay is not different from th a t of the 
full sample. The regulations post SOX and NYSE reforms of 2002 m andates a minimum 
percentage of independent directors on the board which may be reflected in the stronger 
effect of board independence on CEO pay in the post-SOX period.
This evidence suggests tha t the post-SOX period is characterized by a higher risk- 
premium in CEO pay. The dram atic growth in CEO pay in the last decade can partially 
be a ttribu ted  to the increasing risk of dismissal and increasing compensating differential 
in CEO pay. Also, the growth may in part be driven by increase in low-risk cash com­
ponent in CEO pay. The increase in cash-based compensation makes it challenging to 
increase the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation contracts.
6.5.4 R obustness
In this section, we discuss the alternative variables, classification of turnovers and esti­
m ation methods used as robustness check for our results.
First, there has been some debate on the appropriate measure of firm performance 
(see discussion in Section 6.2.1). Thus we use alternate measures of firm performance 
to  estim ate pay-performance sensitivity. Using (i) Earnings Per Share (basic-excluding 
extraordinary items), (ii) Pre-Tax Income and equal weighted returns on firm stocks as
measures of performance, we find qualitatively similar estimates for pay performance sen­
sitivity. All the estim ated coefficients are low and negatively associated with probability 
of forced turnover and positively associated with CEO pay. The results are not reported 
for brevity.
Second, to confirm th a t our results are not simply an artefact of the linear probability 
model, we use logit estim ation for the first steps. The results of the first stage are 
presented in Table 6.6. The results report the marginal effects and not the coefficient 
estimate. The results are very similar to the estimations using linear probability model. 
However, there are differences in the significance level of some variables but his doesn’t 
change the central findings of our analysis.
Third, in the spirit of Peters and Wagner (2012) we use an alternative age-based classi­
fication of forced turnover. Peters and Wagner argues th a t financial press follows certain 
types of firms and industries more than  others and hence the reporting of reasons and 
analysis for CEO turnover may not be consistent across industries. Thus, we construct an 
alternative indicator of forced turnover which indicates a forced turnover if the departing 
CEO is less than  55 years of age and the reason for turnover is not classified as death, 
ill-health or immediate employment as CEO is another firm. This m ethod of classifying 
forced turnover overestimates the number of forced turnover below the age threshold and 
underestim ates the number of forced turnover above the age threshold with respect to our 
first m ethod of classification. Using this classification, we identify 368 forced turnovers. 
The second stage results are tabulated in Table 6.7. The param eter estim ate on predicted 
turnover probability is lower (1.84) but the difference of the estim ate with our original 
estim ation (1.98) in Table 6.4 is not significant. Thus, our results are robust to alternate 
classification of forced turnovers.
Fourth, we test the validity of our results across the distribution of firm performance, 
board size and board busyness. We generate categorical variables to test for the effect
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of dismissal risk across the quartiles of these variables. The results for these regressions 
are reported in Table 6.8. The results are not significantly different for the different 
firm performance. However, the effect of the board size in the 25th percentile on forced 
turnover probability and CEO pay is insignificant. This may suggest th a t while larger 
boards dissipate the monitoring and vigilance of the board, a very small board size 
may not also have the desired effect. If the board size is too small, the  directors may 
be overworked and not be able to be vigilant about wide range of governance m atters 
These results indicate th a t there may exist a optim um  range for board size for effective 
monitoring. We highlight this as an area of future research. Similar results are obtained 
for board busyness. The effects of busy board in the 25th percentile on CEO turnover 
probability and CEO pay is insignificant. While a small number of directorships held 
by the directors may not dissipate the strength of governance, or may indeed reveal the 
competence of the directors, a larger number of board membership of the directors reduce 
the strength of monitoring and vigilance.
Finally, we were concerned th a t the estim ated compensating differential in pay may be 
driven largely by mechanical association in industries with high turnover rates and high 
CEO pay. Therefore, we re-estimate our model excluding the High Technology industry 
which has the highest turnover and the finance sector which has experienced the highest 
growth in CEO pay in the sample period. The High Tech industry in our classification 
consists of 45 SIC codes for high tech m anufacturing (SIC codes: 35XX, 36XX, 38XX), 
communications services (SIC codes: 48XX), and software and computer-related services 
(SIC codes: 73XX). We classify four broadly defined SIC codes to constitute banking and 
finance industry, viz. National Commercial Banks, Credit Unions, Federally Chartered, 
Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered and Security Brokers, Dealers and Flotation 
Companies. The SIC codes for the first three sectors are 60XX and for the fourth sector 
is 62XX. We recognize th a t this may not be the exhaustive classification of high tech
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industries and some allied industries may have been om itted but we believe th a t this 
would not make significant difference to our results. Omission of these two industries 
reduces our sample to 9244 firm-year observations. The results of estimation with the 
reduced sample presented in Table 6.9 are not significantly different from our original 
estimation. However, the point estim ate of compensating differential is lower (1.87) than 
the estim ate with the full sample (1.98). Even if CEOs in industries th a t face higher 
turnover are paid a higher compensating differential, this is not influencing our findings 
significantly and the robustness tests collectively support our central finding th a t the 
large growth in CEO pay may be partially a ttribu ted  to  the compensating differential in 
pay for the higher risk of forced turnover.
6.6  C onclusions
There has been sustained interest in the dynamics and determ inants of executive com­
pensation. Various theories have been put forward to explain the growth in CEO pay in 
the recent decades. Kaplan (2004) suggests th a t CEO pay is largely driven by market 
forces. Indicating th a t a significant proportion of to ta l CEO pay is equity based, Hall and 
M urphy (2003) argue th a t CEO pay is driven by stock market valuations. Some suggest 
th a t the recent growth in CEO pay may be a ttribu ted  to  the growth in average US firm 
size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) indicate the possibility of 
m anagerial entrenchment to explain the rapid growth in CEO pay. Our results add to 
the literature and suggest tha t the rise in CEO pay in the last decade may be partially 
a ttribu ted  to the risk-premium in CEO pay to compensate for the rising risk of being 
dismissed from the job.
We estim ate compensating differentials in CEO pay for a sample of US firms in the 
period 1993-2010. Empirical evidence suggests th a t the growth in CEO pay can be
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partially a ttribu ted  to the rising hazards of forced turnover. CEOs are paid 1.5-2% 
premium in pay for each percentage point increase in turnover risk, i.e. the median 
CEO is paid US$ 32,200 for one percentage point rise in turnover. Further our results 
indicate possible substitution effect in compensation design. The differential in pay is 
driven largely by the increase in risk-free cash component of the to tal CEO pay.
We find a higher risk-premium in CEO pay (~ 4%) in the post-SOX period (2003- 
2010). In the post-SOX period we find a greater association of turnover risk with cash 
compensation. This is consistent with Cohen et al. (2007) who reports a higher preva­
lence of cash compensation in the post-SOX period.
We examined the effect of governance on CEO turnover and CEO pay. Firms with 
larger and more busy boards are less likely to dismiss the CEOs and pay more. Higher 
proportion of outside directors seems to have a positive effect on monitoring strength of 
the board.
Our results have a number of policy implications. Firstly, it furthers the understanding 
on the dynamics of CEO pay setting by estim ating significant premium in CEO pay for 
increasing risk of exit. Our results suggest partial managerial entrenchment in the form of 
lower risk of forced turnover for Chairman-CEOs and CEOs with higher equity ownership. 
CEO duality and higher equity ownership also increases CEO pay.
Next, our results indicate the board characteristics th a t may m itigate agency problems 
and enhance board room vigilance and monitoring. Finally, we contribute to the debate 
on SOX. Empirical evidence suggests a higher risk-premium in CEO pay in the post- 
SOX period, indicating th a t whilst the CEO pay and turnover probability are becoming 
increasingly performance sensitive, CEOs are paid a higher premium as compensating 
differential for rising risk of being dismissed.
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■ T o ta l Turnover  
■ F o rced  Turnover
Year
Figure 6-2: N um ber o f Turnovers and Forced Turnovers: 1993-2010
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Table 6.1: Sample Characteristics 
Panel A: Full Sample
N Mean Median SD Max Min
CEO pay (’000 US$) 15121 4329.13 1610.22 10252.03 295136.40° 0 .0 1 b
Salary (’000 US$) 15121 600.92 543.84 335.25 5613.20 40.00
Bonus (’000 USS) 15081 564.06 191.82 1678.68 76951.00 0 .0 0
Cash Compensation (’000 USS) 15121 1164.98 800.00 1782.24 77926.00 70.00
Non-Cash Compensation (’000 USS) 15121 1725.24 920.80 2486.75 69850.63 -12465.61
Tenure (Years) 15121 9.33 7.81 10.95 43.93 2.57
ROA (’000 USS) 14748 2.53 3.81 43.38 3551.35 -1314.88
Average Value 14765 0.0033 0.0115 0.0494 0.1105 -0.1846
weighted Return
Termination Payment 15081 1393.78 0 .0 0 7272.403 241089.80 0 .0 0
( ’000 USS)
Sale (’000 USS) 15121 4137.88 9259.39 13858.90 42507189.00 0.03
CEO Share 15081 0.7022 0 .0 0 3.83 87.60 0 .0 0
Ownership (%)
Board Size 11522 9.52 9.00 2.63 34.00 3.00
Outside Directors (%) 11522 70.38 71.35 16.87 92.30 55.60
No. of Directorships 11522 2.73 3.10 8.61 14.00 0 .0 0
Panel B: R educed Sam ple for G overnance Controls
N Mean Median SD Max Min
CEO pay (’000 USS) 11522 5016.63 3661.76 9724.10 295136.40 1348.88
Salary (’000 USS) 11522 699.35 603.00 276.30 5613.20 320.00
Bonus (’000 USS) 11522 891.88 553.49 1241.05 76951.00 379.99
Cash Compensation (’000 USS) 11522 1621.21 1201.50 1450.10 77926.00 713.50
Non-Cash Compensation (’000 USS) 11522 3444.55 2080.67 1884.39 69850.63 -12465.61
Tenure (Years) 11522 8.65 7.03 9.29 43.93 2.57
ROA (’000 USS) 11522 8.61 1 1 .2 0 39.71 3551.35 -1053.14
Average Value 11522 0.0109 0.0226 0.0094 0.1105 -0.1846
weighted Return
Termination Payment 11522 1567.50 0 .0 0 6757.20 241089.80 0 .0 0
(’000 USS)
Sale ( ’000 USS) 11522 5371.66 9879.15 9024.67 42507189.00 2190.03
CEO Share 11522 0.7022 0 .0 0 3.83 87.60 0 .0 0
Ownership (%)
Board Size 11522 9.52 9.00 2.63 34.00 3.00
Outside Directors (%) 11522 70.38 71.35 16.87 92.30 55.60
No. of Directorships 11522 2.73 3.10 8.61 14.00 0 .0 0
The highest CEO pay in any given year our sample is that of Mr. Barry Diller of IAC Corporation 
in 2005.
Dr. Myron W. Wentz of Usana Heath Services Inc. did not take any compensation for 
the year 2004 as reported by Execucomp and cross checked with the DEF-14A  
filings of Usana Heath Services inc. for 2004.
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Table 6.2: Sample Characteristics: Sub-Periods
1993-2001 2003-2010 1993-2010
No. of firms 
No. of CEOs 
No. of CEO exits 
Number of Forced exits 
% of CEO exits 
% of Forced exits 
Total Observations 
External CEO 
Mean Tenure (in Years)
Mean CEO Pay (’000 USS)
Mean Salary (’000 USS)
Mean Bonus (’000 USS)
Mean Cash Compensation (’000 USS)





Mean Sale ( ’000 USS)
Mean CEO Share 
Ownership (%)
Mean Board Size
Mean Outside Directors (%)





















1.99 2 .8 8 2.73
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Tenure 0.000019*** 0 .0 0 0 0 1 1 ** 0.000016*** 0.000013**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0.004) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 2 )
Tenure2 -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00007 -0.00006
(0.118) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0.223) (0 .2 1 0 )
ROA -0 .0 0 0 1 1 ** -0.00013**
(0.038) (0.018)
R O A t_i -0 .0 0 0 1 0 ** -0 .0 0 0 1 1 **
(0.035) (0.030)
ROAf_ 2 -0.00006* -0.0008*
(0.060) (0.058)
Benchmarked Value -0.00042** -0.00073**
Weighted Return (0.025) (0 .0 2 2 )
Benchmarked Value -0.00039** -0.00065**
Weighted R eturnt_i (0.028) (0.025)
Benchmarked Value -0.00013* -0.00051*
Weighted Returnt_ 2 (0.055) (0.069)
Firm Size -0.0017* -0.0014* -0.0017* -0.0013*
(Ln Sales) (0.059) (0.087) (0.056) (0.078)
Termination Payment -0.0047** -0.0038** -0.0042** -0.0035**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
(?V W R -0.0051** -0.0033** -0.0047** -0.0031**
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0.008) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.005)
Externally 0.0008 0 .0 0 1 1 0.0008 0.0017
Hired CEO (0 .2 1 1 ) (0.325) (0.234) (0.330)
Percentage -0.0008** -0.009**
Stock Holding (0.013) (0.006)
CEO Duality -0.040*** -0.043***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
Board Size -0 .0 0 0 2 ** -0.0007**
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.005)
Board 0.0006** 0.0009**
Independence (0.028) (0 .0 1 1 )
Board Busyness -0.0009* -0.0008*
(0.058) (0.055)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 14765 14765 14765 14765
Adj R 2 0.243 0.299 0.231 0.284
Dependent variable is an indicator for Forced Turnover, equals to ’1’ if a CEO 
is dismissed in a given year, ’O’ otherwise.
Column (1) estimates the sensitivity of turnover hazard to accounting measures 
of firm performance. Column (3) estim ates the sensitivity of hazard to relative 
performance of firm’s stocks. Specifications (3) and (4) additionally control 
for board size and composition.
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Predicted Probability I .4 7 4 *** 1.612*** 1.788*** 1.984*** 2.922*** 0.938**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.031)
Tenure 0.00066*** 0.00064*** 0.00058*** 0.00056*** 0.00067*** 0.00093**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.004)
Tenure2 -0.00037 -0.00030 -0.00034 -0.00029 -0.00013 -0 .0 0 0 2 2
(0 .1 1 1 ) (0.123) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0.133) (0 .2 1 0 ) (0.194)
ROA 0 .0 0 1 0 ** 0.00094**
(0.036) (0 .0 1 1 )
R O A f_i 0.0018** 0.00092*
(0.048) (0.045)
ROAf_ 2 0 .0 0 1 2 0.00081
(0 .1 1 1 ) (0.108)
Benchmarked Value 0 .0 0 2 1 *** 0 .0 0 2 1 *** 0.0016* 0.0038**
Weighted Return (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.071) (0 .0 1 2 )
Benchmarked Value 0.0023** 0.0017** 0.0014 0.0023**
Weighted R eturnt-i (0.015) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.119) (0.041)
Benchmarked Value 0.0018 0.0016 0.0007 0 .0 0 2 0
Weighted Returnt- 2 (0 .1 2 2 ) (0.117) (0.136) (0.144)
Firm Size 0.418*** 0.409*** 0.411*** 0.402*** 0.261*** 0.501***
(Ln Sales) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
CTVWR 0.072** 0.057** 0.069** 0.058** 0.113** 0.044**
(0.014) (0.009) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.003) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0.027)
Externally 0.236** 0.194** 0.241** 0.195** 0.287** 0.169**
Hired CEO (0 .0 2 1 ) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.035)
Percentage Stock 0.00084** 0 .0 0 0 2 1 ** -0.114*** 0.0094**
Holding (0.033) (0.035) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 2 )
CEO Duality 0.638*** 0.641*** 0.367*** 0.419**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.007)
Board Size 0 .0 0 2 2 ** 0.0037** 0 .0 0 1 2 ** 0.0033**
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.008) (0.003) (0.027)
Board -0.0018* -0 .0 0 2 1 * -0.0008* -0.0019*
Independence (0.061) (0.059) (0.079) (0.088)
Board 0.0034** 0.0030** 0 .0 0 0 1 * 0 .0 0 2 1 **
Busyness (0.028) (0.033) (0.052) (0 .0 2 2 )
Year Dummies No No No No No No
No. of Observations 14748 14765 11522 11522 11522 11522
Adj R 2 0.250 0.248 0.266 0.253 0 .2 0 1 0.339
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Table 6.5: Compensating DifferentiabBy Sub-Periods
Full Sample Post-SOX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LnPay LnCash LnNonCash LnPay LnCash LnNonCash
Predicted Probability 1.984*** 2 922*** 0.938** 4.070** 5.037*** 0.421*
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.031) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.057)
Benchmarked value 0 .0 0 2 1 *** 0.0016* 0.0038** 0.0025** 0.0023** 0.0031**
weighted return (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.071) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.030) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.017)
Benchmarked value 0.0017** 0.0014 0.0023** 0 .0 0 2 1 ** 0 .0 0 2 0 ** 0.0029**
weighted returnt_i (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.119) (0.041) (0.017) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.009)
Benchmarked value 0.0016 0.0007 0 .0 0 2 0 0.0019 0 .0 0 1 2 0.0014
weighted returnt_ 2 (0.117) (0.136) (0.144) (0.166) (0 .2 1 2 ) (0.141)
Firm Size 0.402*** 0.261*** 0.501*** 0.378*** 0.240*** 0.421***
(Ln Sales) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
&VWR 0.058** 0.113** 0.044** 0.067** 0.145** 0.026**
(0.003) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0.027) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.008) (0.039)
Externally 0.195** 0.287** 0.169** 0.199** 0.295** 0.167**
Hired CEO (0.019) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.035) (0.026) (0.014) (0.033)
CEO Duality 0.641*** 0.367*** 0.419** 0.479*** 0.350** 0.409**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.007) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.003) (0.009)
Board Size 0.0037** 0 .0 0 1 2 ** 0.0033** 0.0044** 0.0038** 0.0048**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.027) (0.005) (0.004) (0 .0 0 2 )
Board -0 .0 0 2 1 * -0.0008* -0.0019* -0.0034** -0.0040** -0.0044**
Independence (0.059) (0.079) (0.088) (0.019) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0.008)
Columns (l)-(3 ) reports estimations for the full sample and columns (4) -(6 ) 
reports estimates for the post-SOX sub period (2003-2010).
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Tenure 0.00024** 0 .0 0 0 2 1 **
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0.009)
Tenure2 -0 .0 0 1 1 -0 .0 0 1 0
(0.495) (0.434)









Weighted R eturnj_i (0.033)
Benchmarked Value -0.00071*
Weighted Return4_ 2 (0.081)
Firm Size -0 .0 0 1 1 -0.0014
(Ln Sales) (0.103) (0 .1 1 1 )
Termination Payment -0.0055** -0.0047**
(0.019) (0.026)
Percentage -0.0013** -0.0015**
Stock Holding (0.023) (0.019)
CEO Duality -0.032** -0.038**
(0.009) (0.013)




Board Busyness -0.0015* -0.0013*
(0.063) (0.067)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
No. of Observation 11522 11522
Adj R2 0.178 0.192
Dependent variable is an indicator for Forced Turnover, equals to ’1’ if a CEO 
is dismissed in a given year, 'O' otherwise.
Column (1) estimates the sensitivity of turnover hazard to accounting measures 
of firm performance. Column (3) estim ates the sensitivity' of hazard to relative 
performance of firm’s stocks. Specifications (3) and (4) additionally control 
for board size and composition.
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Predicted Probability 1.843*** 2.916*** 0.938**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.031)
Tenure 0.00054*** 0.00067*** 0.00093**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.004)
Tenure2 -0.00030 -0.00013 -0 .0 0 0 2 2
(0.123) (0.209) (0.194)
Benchmarked Value 0 .0 0 2 1 *** 0.0017* 0.0038**
Weighted Return (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.073) (0 .0 1 2 )
Benchmarked Value 0.0019** 0.0015 0.0023**
Weighted R eturnj_i (0.015) (0.116) (0.041)
Benchmarked Value 0.0016 0.0007 0 .0 0 2 0
Weighted Returnt _ 2 (0 .1 2 2 ) (0.136) (0.144)
Firm Size 0.404*** 0.261*** 0.501***
(Ln Sales) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
CTVW R 0.058** 0 .1 1 1 ** 0.044**
(0.005) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0.027)
Externally 0.193** 0.283** 0.168**
Hired CEO (0.019) (0.013) (0.035)
Percentage Stock 0 .0 0 0 2 0 ** -0.114*** 0.0094**
Holding (0.035) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 2 )
CEO Duality 0.641*** 0.367*** 0.419**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.007)
Board Size 0.0035** 0 .0 0 1 2 ** 0.0033**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.024)
Board -0 .0 0 2 1 * -0.0008* -0.0019*
Independence (0.057) (0.078) (0.088)
Board 0.0030** 0 .0 0 0 1 * 0 .0 0 2 1 **
Busyness (0.033) (0.052) (0 .0 2 2 )
Year Dummies No No No
No. of Observations 11522 11522 11522
Adj R 2 0.253 0 .2 0 1 0.339
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Predicted Probability 1.984*** 2.922*** 0.938**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.031)
Tenure 0.00056*** 0.00067*** 0.00093**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.004)
Tenure2 -0.00029 -0.00013 -0 .0 0 0 2 2
(0.133) (0 .2 1 0 ) (0.194)
Benchmarked Value 
Weighted Return
Lower quartile- 0.0019*** 0.0009* 0 .0 0 2 0 **
Median (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.077) (0.028)
Median-Upper 0 .0 0 2 2 *** 0.0016* 0.0038**
Quartile (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.079) (0 .0 1 1 )
Upper Quartile 0.0031*** 0 .0 0 2 2 * 0.0053**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0.066) (0.008)
Firm Size 0.402*** 0.261*** 0.501***
(Ln Sales) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
Board Size
Lower quartile- 0.0013 0.0006 0.0024
Median (0.108) (0 .1 2 2 ) (0.116)
Median-Upper 0.0037** 0 .0 0 1 2 ** 0.0033**
Quartile (0.008) (0.003) (0.027)




Lower quartile- -0.0014* -0 .0 0 0 2 * -0.0016*
Median (0.067) (0.081) (0.073)
Median-Upper -0 .0 0 2 1 * -0.0008* -0.0019*
Quartile (0.059) (0.079) (0.088)




Lower quartile- 0.0017 0.00005 0.0009
Median (0.132) (0.127) (0.116)
Median-Upper 0.0030** 0 .0 0 0 1 * 0 .0 0 2 1 **
Quartile (0.033) (0.052) (0 .0 2 2 )
Upper Quartile 0.0043** 0 .0 0 1 1 ** 0.0029**
(0.023) (0.044) (0.013)
Year Dummies No No No
No. of Observation 11522 11522 11522
Adj R2 0.253 0 .2 0 1 0.339
Models are estimated with controls for lagged performance,
CEO duality and CEO shareholding but are not reported for 
brevity.
Models are estim ated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Predicted Probability 1.873*** 2.808*** 0.917**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 2 2 )
Tenure 0.00068*** 0.00046** 0.00089**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0.009) (0.007)
Tenure2 -0.00027 -0.00017 -0.00024
(0.124) (0.188) (0.191)
Benchmarked Value 0 .0 0 1 1 *** 0.0025* 0.0053**
Weighted Return (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.057) (0 .0 1 0 )
Benchmarked Value 0.0009** 0.0017 0.0034**
Weighted Returnj_i (0.018) (0 .1 1 1 ) (0.037)
Benchmarked Value 0.0007 0 .0 0 1 1 0.0029
Weighted Returnt_ 2 (0.108) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0.138)
Firm Size 0.408*** 0.260*** 0.517***
(Ln Sales) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
& V W R 0.056** 0.115** 0.049**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.025)
Externally 0.144** 0.255** 0.159**
Hired CEO (0.033) (0 .0 2 1 ) (0.037)
Percentage Stock 0.00027** -0.114*** 0.0091**
Holding (0.023) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.008)
CEO Duality 0.636*** 0.363*** 0.413**
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.006)
Board Size 0.0033** 0.0009** 0.0035**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.027)
Board -0.0018** -0.0008* -0.0019*
Independence (0.047) (0.064) (0.069)
Board 0.0037** 0 .0 0 0 1 ** 0 .0 0 2 1 **
Busyness (0 .0 2 1 ) (0.045) (0.027)
Year Dummies No No No
No. of Observations 9244 9244 9244
Adj R2 0.248 0.199 0.333
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.
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Predicted Probability 1.713*** 2.998*** 0.911**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025)
Tenure 0.00061*** 0.00064*** 0.00087**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Tenure2 -0.00030 -0.00016 -0.00029
(0.125) (0.222) (0.210)
Benchmarked Value 0.0027** 0.0018* 0.0044**
Weighted Return (0.006) (0.057) (0.007)
Benchmarked Value 0.0033** 0.0019 0.0030**
Weighted Returnt_ i (0.025) (0.127) (0.033)
Benchmarked Value 0.0016 0.0011 0.0025
Weighted Returnt _ 2 (0.120) (0.153) (0.135)
Firm Size 0.411*** 0.268*** 0.512***
(Ln Sales) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
& V W R 0.062** 0.113** 0.049**
(0.010) (0.003) (0.016)
Externally 0.216** 0.286** 0.166**
Hired CEO (0.015) (0.011) (0.027)
Percentage Stock 0.00027** -0.114** 0.0098**
Holding (0.020) (0.002) (0.005)
CEO Duality 0.661*** 0.361*** 0.414**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Board Size 0.0033** 0.0012** 0.0031**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.021)
Board -0.0025** -0.0016** -0.0023*
Independence (0.044) (0.047) (0.066)
Board 0.0033** 0.0004* 0.0019**
Busyness (0.021) (0.055) (0.030)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 14748 11522 11522
Adj R2 0.271 0.220 0.346
Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticitv. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 




This thesis investigates the dynamics of CEO turnover and CEO pay in an increasingly 
regulated business environment. The recent growth in CEO pay in the USA and in 
parts of Europe, and the controversies surrounding it makes this thesis topical. We have 
made an attem pt to understand the underlying causes of CEO turnover, CEOs’ a ttitude 
towards risk and recent growth in CEO pay. The findings of this thesis are subject to 
some limitations and need further research.
At a time when the rapid rise in CEO pay is being criticised, we analyze the dynamics 
of CEO turnover in Chapter 4. We are motivated to examine if, according to the principal 
agent framework, the poorly performing CEOs are being replaced. Our results suggest 
th a t the CEO job has become more risky over the sample period and CEOs face a higher 
probability of being dismissed from their jobs. The risk of dismissal increases significantly 
since the governance regulations and stock m arket reforms of 2002.
Performance sensitivity of turnover is stronger for forced turnovers, indicating th a t 
poor performing CEOs are increasingly being replaced. We find th a t smaller and more 
independent boards are more efficient in replacing CEOs for poor performance. There is 
partial evidence of managerial entrenchment manifested in the switching of performance
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benchmarks to less-risky accounting measures for CEOs with tenure greater than  seven 
years.
Takeovers significantly increase the hazard of CEO turnover. Controlling for perfor­
mance, CEOs in target firms are twice as likely to be replaced with respect to firms 
which have not had a tender bid. Further, cross border acquisitions are associated with 
higher hazards of exit compared to domestic takeovers. The performance sensitivity of 
bo th  internal and post-takeover turnovers is comparable, indicating th a t takeovers act as 
an alternate "force of managerial discipline" (Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). Our results 
suggest partial success of governance regulations to m itigate agency problems.
The classification of causes of CEO turnover is an inexact science as CEOs are rarely 
publicly dismissed. We have checked for robustness of the classification used in this thesis. 
However, lack of information on reasons for CEO turnover may affect the precision of 
our estimates. The role of international acquirers on the risk of exit for target CEOs can 
be an interesting area of future research.
In Chapter 5, we examine the incentive-alignment hypothesis and investigate whether 
the CEOs have a misaligned incentive to undertake acquisitions. We also seek to study 
whether CEOs are rewarded differentially for wealth reducing and wealth enhancing 
acquisitions and whether the post-acquisition pay premium can be a ttribu ted  to the 
strength of corporate governance.
We find th a t CEOs undertaking acquisitions are paid more, even after controlling for 
increased firm size. Our estimations suggest th a t acquisition premium in CEO pay is 
system atic across all components of pay and is possibly achieved through a renegotiation 
of the contract.
One of the key concerns is principal-agent theory is th a t CEO compensation con­
tracts may provide the CEO with misaligned incentive to undertake acquisitions, even 
if it is detrim ental to shareholders’ wealth. Using industry-adjusted measures of firm
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performance, we find no evidence th a t post-acquisition pay premium is related to the 
wealth effect of the acquisitions. This may indicate system atic agency problems in CEO 
compensation contracts.
A strong and independent board seems to partially m itigate the misaligned incentive 
in the current executive compensation system. We attem pt to correct for selection bias 
in estim ation of post-acquisition pay premium. Controlling for post-acquisition CEO 
turnovers, the acquisition premium in CEO pay is estim ated to be lesser. This can 
be because a part of the role of board of directors to enforce corporate discipline is in 
replacing the non-performing managers.
The param eters used to  classify ’good’ and ’bad ’ acquisitions are quite varied in lit­
erature. We use the performance of the firm’s stocks with respect to  the industry in the 
year of the event to  classify good and bad acquisitions. Future research can explore the 
predictors of good and bad acquisitions in more detail.
Various theories have been put forward to explain the growth in CEO pay in the 
recent decades. In Chapter 6, we study the determ inants of CEO pay growth in the 
recent decades. Our results add to  the existing literature and suggest th a t the recent rise 
in CEO pay may be partially a ttribu ted  to the premium paid to  the CEOs to compensate 
for the rising risk of being dismissed from the job. CEOs are paid 1.5-2% premium in pay 
for each percentage point increase in turnover risk. Further our results indicate possible 
substitution effect in compensation design. The differential in pay is driven largely by the 
increase in risk-free cash component of the to tal CEO pay. In the post-SOX period we 
find a greater association of turnover risk with cash compensation, indicating a possible 
change in executive compensation design. Thus, SOX and other corporate governance 
reforms may inadvertently lead to reduced performance sensitivity of CEO pay.
The main identification challenge for establishing a causal link between increased 
compensation and employment risk is the many om itted attribu tes of firms, CEOs and
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industries th a t simultaneously affect pay premiums and forced CEO turnover. We use 
the severance pay eligibility of the CEOs in the event of involuntary turnover and year 
dummies as exclusion restrictions. W hilst we validate our instrum ents using tests for 
weak instrum ent and joint exogeneity, we acknowledge the possibility of other instru­
ments. Designing novel and robust instrum ents to  isolate the compensating differential 
in CEO pay may give us further insights into the dynamics of CEO pay.
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